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Abstract  
 
 
With this thesis, I argue that when selecting which patient should be the recipient of 
an organ for transplant, a social value judgment about the patient should be included 
alongside judgments about the patient’s level of urgency and prognosis.  The reason 
for this suggestion is that better use can be made of scarce organ resources, in terms 
of the overall welfare created from each transplant, if the wider effects of the 
transplant for society are taken into account rather than simply how likely it is that 
the patient will benefit.  I argue that the survival of a patient that makes valuable 
contributions to society will create more overall welfare than the survival of a patient 
who makes less valuable contributions.  Other commentators have made similar 
suggestions, however, their discussion of the issue is relatively brief and as such, their 
arguments are not comprehensive enough to stand up to criticism.   
With this thesis, I go beyond their limited discussion and provide an original 
contribution to knowledge by way of providing a much more detailed analysis of the 
ethical issues surrounding the inclusion of social value considerations in organ 
allocation decisions than has been given before, thereby providing a stronger and 
more convincing case for their inclusion.  In order to support this, I also provide a 
viable framework for how these social value considerations can be acceptably 
incorporated into the organ allocation decision from both an ethical and practical 
perspective, something that is sorely missed from the existing literature.  Whilst the 
inclusion of social value judgments into resource allocation decisions has negative 
associations, I have presented a possible system whereby they can be included 
 ii 
alongside the current organ allocation system in such a way that other important 
values, such as equality and fairness, can be maintained. 
Key words: Social value, organ allocation, organs, transplant, patient selection, 
resource allocation, Seattle, social worth, criteria. 
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Introduction 
Background and rationale 
The main driving force behind this thesis question stems from the fact that there 
are far fewer organs available for transplant than are needed due to the relatively 
small number of organs that are donated (NHSBT, 2014g, p. 4).  There are already 
a large number of people writing on the topic of ways of improving organ donation 
rates (Horton and Horton, 1990; Barnett, Blair and Kaserman, 1992; Plawecki and 
Plawecki, 1992; Cantarovich, 2005; Salim et al., 2007; Lavee and Brock, 2012; 
Mercer, 2013).  There have also already been changes within Welsh and English 
law, with a presumed consent system being introduced as an attempt to increase 
organ donation rates, and Scotland also considering doing the same (Human 
Transplantation (Wales) Act, 2013; BBC News, 2018a, 2018b; Human Tissue 
(Authorisation) (Scotland) Bill, 2018; Organ Donation (Deemed Consent) Act, 
2019).  Rather than researching further into such a saturated area, the focus of 
this thesis is on improving the use of those organs that are available for transplant 
now, a topic which receives less attention in the literature due to the focus being 
on methods of increasing organ donation rates.  I will specifically be looking at the 
role social value could, and perhaps should, play in organ allocation decisions from 
a normative perspective as a way of improving the allocation of organs through 
the prioritisation of certain patients based on their instrumental value to society.  
The reason for looking at such an approach is that there is the possibility of 
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creating more welfare from each allocation, thereby making better use of the 
limited number of organs available for transplant.   
The debate will be limited to only deceased organ donation where the current 
central principle in this situation is that the organ “must go to the person who is 
most in need and has the best match with the donor – a donor can neither direct 
the organ to a specific recipient nor impose conditions as to who shall be chosen; 
all such restrictions may be ignored as invalid” (Cronin and Douglas, 2010, p. 276).  
The reason for limiting the debate to deceased organ donors and allocation only 
is that this is the area where most welfare can be gained with the addition of a 
social value criterion with few negative effects.  Living donors can direct organs to 
certain recipients, (unless making an anonymous altruistic living donation), and 
to remove this option and only allow non-directed living donation would likely 
result in a lower donation rate for living donations; people are less likely to make 
living donations altruistically to strangers than they are to people with whom they 
have existing relationships.  Furthermore, “donations by living persons ‘create and 
sustain intimate personal relationships’ and, in particular, family ties, and 
constitute exceptions to the general rules of impartial allocation” (Kluge, 1989, p. 
12). 
In Britain, the main considerations taken into account when deciding who should 
be the recipient of an available organ are how suitable a match the patient is to the 
available organ, and how urgently the patient is in need of a transplant.1  Whilst 
these measures help to put the organs to best use by minimising the chance of 
                                                      
1 See Specific organ allocation criteria (Chapter 1, Table 1). 
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organ rejection through adequate tissue matching, and minimising patient deaths 
by giving priority to those who require the organ most, I suggest that perhaps even 
better use can be made of the organs by including considerations regarding the 
patient’s instrumental value to society.  If, out of those suitably matched patients 
who most urgently require a transplant, the patient who is of most value to society 
is given priority, then not only is a patient’s life saved, but society will also benefit 
as the survival of the most instrumentally valuable patient has been ensured.  
“There is at least a prima facie case for considering some criterion like 
"social worth" along with strictly prognostic criteria. Consider, for 
instance, the choice on the eve of World War III between a top diplomat 
with a 48 percent chance of benefiting from the resource and some other 
person with a 55 percent chance.  Given the circumstances, it might well be 
reasonable to choose the diplomat because of the far greater need which 
society has of him and his correspondingly greater value. Chances of 
benefit for the patient are an important criterion but obviously not the only 
one that should be considered in allocating resources.”  (Basson, 1979, p. 
317) 
In both circumstances, a patient may well benefit, but in choosing (and hopefully 
saving) the diplomat, society benefits too.   
Even if the supply of organs increases significantly and the problem of organ 
scarcity diminishes, the discussion of the ethical acceptability and, to a certain 
extent, the practicability of the inclusion of social value considerations in resource 
allocation will still be useful.  The concept of including social value considerations 
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in organ allocation decisions could also be applied to other areas of healthcare 
resource allocation where resources are scarce, perhaps due to some treatments 
requiring rationing because of the inherent high costs involved, or because they 
may be only emerging technologies.   
“In any case, at any given time and place, the medical profession faces the 
problem of having to choose who shall live and who shall be allowed to die.  
Even if we believe that every new remedy can shortly be extended to 
everyone who needs, it, and the same for the next costly remedy after that, 
etc., medical resources remain sparse at any given time and place, and the 
problem of patient selection cannot be avoided.”  (Ramsey, 1970b, pp. 243–
244) 
The reason organ allocation specifically is the focus of this thesis however, is that 
organ allocation is one of the more pressing resource allocation decisions, and 
provides a useful case study.  Other rationing of other healthcare resources could 
be somewhat alleviated by making more money available; however, the number 
of organ transplants performed is limited by the amount of organs that are 
donated rather than simply the available finances.2  Furthermore, organ 
transplants are normally classed as a life-saving treatment, rather than merely 
life-enhancing, and so it is important that the decision as to who is to receive this 
                                                      
2 However, the number of organs available for transplant is not completely insensitive to policy 
decisions regarding financial funding.  More money could be spent on increased marketing which 
may help to increase organ donation rates, or financial rewards given for signing up to the organ 
donor register.  Nevertheless, the number of physical organs available still remains the major 
limiting factor rather than the availability of finances as is the case for many other medical 
treatments.  
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limited life-saving treatment is considered carefully so that the organ is put to best 
use. 
 
Making best use of the organ 
When using the term “making the best use of the organ”, I mean that as far as is 
reasonable and ethically acceptable, best use of an organ for transplant can be 
made by increasing the benefit created with each organ transplant.  This is in both 
the short and long term, for both the recipient and society, with the term benefit 
referring to welfare and utility created.  Whilst this does have a utilitarian element 
to it, the approach itself is not a purely utilitarian approach, as the benefit created 
does not have to be maximised, only promoted as a consideration amongst other 
important values, such as equality, justice, and dignity. 
I suggest that welfare and utility can be increased with each organ transplant by 
allocating the organ to the patient who is the most socially valuable from the group 
of most urgent patients.  In this way not only does the patient who receives the 
organ benefit, but so too does society as a whole.  Examples of things that are 
valuable to society are those that contribute towards its sustainability for the 
economy, environment, and society itself, with sustainable growth occurring 
where appropriate.   
Economic growth generally correlates with overall improvements in quality of life, 
and as such, is significantly valuable to society for promoting welfare  (Strange 
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and Bayley, 2008, p. 49).  However, this sustainable development, and so 
sustainable welfare, is not dependent on the economy alone; it also depends upon 
the two additional pillars of the environment and society.   
“No matter the context, the basic idea remains the same – people, habitats 
and economic systems are inter-related.  We may be able to ignore that 
interdependence for a few years or decades, but history has shown that 
before long we are reminded of it by some type of alarm or crisis…  [T]he 
long-term stability and success of societies rely on a healthy and 
productive population.  A society (or communities within a larger society) 
that faces unrest, poverty and disease will not develop in the long term: 
social well-being and economic well-being feed off each other and the 
whole game depends on a healthy biosphere in which to exist”  (2008, p. 
27)…  “Each country’s historical, economic, social and political context is 
unique, but the basic principles of sustainable development apply to all.”  
(2008, p. 49) 
An organ can be put to better use if these considerations are taken into account 
when deciding which patient the organ should be allocated to.  Patients whose 
values, skills, and traits can contribute to society in these ways, and meet the more 
specific needs that are covered under the general headings of the economy, 
environment, and society, are going to be more instrumentally valuable in 
promoting the increase of overall welfare.  Members of society will have increased 
levels of happiness if the changing needs of society are met, and by ensuring the 
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continued life of those patients who can help to meet these needs, not only will the 
individual organ recipient benefit, but society as a whole.   
The contributions that are most valuable will be those that go towards meeting 
the needs of society, and depending on how urgently the particular need of society 
has to be met, the contribution will be more or less valuable than other 
contributions.  For example, two of the basic needs of society are energy supply, 
and water and sanitation (Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 
2014b, p. 41).  If the need for an energy supply for a society was more urgent than 
that for a water supply, contributions that went towards meeting energy needs 
would be more socially valuable than those that went towards ensuring a water 
supply.  Any positive social contributions will have a value to society, however, the 
level of that value is determined by the level of need for that contribution within 
society. 
By having a system in place that alters depending on the needs of society, the 
government can help to increase overall welfare by giving priority for treatment 
in certain circumstances to those patients who can best meet those needs.  
“[T]hrough their data gathering and analysis, policy making and co-ordination, 
governments can provide support and leadership for moving society in a given 
direction. They can make sure that individual interests do not detract from the 
common good”  (Strange and Bayley, 2008, p. 121). 
I am aware that allocating healthcare resources to patients based on their social 
value is controversial and that the common view is that a patient’s healthcare 
should not depend on their value to society.  Using social value and taking an 
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instrumental view of human life, especially in the healthcare context, does have 
some negative associations, such as eugenics, forced sterilisation, euthanasia 
(including that of the mentally and physically disabled in Nazi Germany (Burleigh, 
2002)), and social Darwinism.  However, there are crucial differences between the 
implementation and motivation of the instrumental view of human life that I will 
be looking at in this thesis, and that present in the aforementioned concepts.  The 
motivation behind the discussion of the inclusion of social value considerations in 
organ allocation here is to determine whether such an approach would be useful 
in minimising the harm that is caused to society when patients die whilst waiting 
for an organ transplant, and how overall welfare could be increased with each 
transplant.  Considerations of the improvement of genetic features of human 
populations and the elimination of certain groups within society figure nowhere 
in the motivation behind the discussion, and indeed would figure nowhere in the 
criteria used to assess a person’s instrumental social value.  The social value 
criterion would sit alongside the current organ allocation system (albeit with a 
minor change to the waiting time criterion currently present), which for the most 
part upholds the values of equality and justice. 
The aim is not to propose a whole new allocation system based purely on patients’ 
value to society, but rather to show that an additional criterion of a patient’s social 
value would help make better use of the organs by also considering the effect the 
transplant will have on society, whilst remaining ethically acceptable. 
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How the landscape of organ transplantation has 
changed 
Alterations to the organ transplant and allocation system are constantly being 
proposed and implemented based on best practice policies, as a way to make good 
use of the organs available, with significant steps having been made since organ 
transplantation first began.  More types of organs can now be transplanted since 
its inception, and the survival rates and survival times following a transplant have 
also increased significantly. 
Organ transplantation began with the kidney, shortly followed by liver, heart and 
lung transplants.  The field continues to evolve, with the transplantation of other 
body parts such as hands, face, and possibly in the future, complete head 
transplants (Watson and Dark, 2012; Canavero, 2013).  The path to making these 
successful transplants also involved many other smaller steps and changes.  
Lessons were learnt, such as the shorter the time between removal of an organ 
and transplantation to the recipient, the better the prognosis would be, and that 
immunosuppression plays a large part in the successful graft of the organ.  
Additionally, deceased, living, and partial organ donation can now be carried out 
(NHS, 2015b). 
Other procedural changes and developments have allowed more organ 
transplants to be carried out.  There is now the option of carrying out paired 
kidney swaps, the UK’s first being in 2007, in which the recipients’ partners act as 
the donor for the other donor’s partner (2015b).  This allows two transplants to 
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be carried out for patients who would otherwise each have to wait for a suitably 
matched deceased donation if their potential living donors are not a match for 
them.  Another change that has been made, also in the UK since 2007, is the option 
to make an altruistic non-directed organ donation (2015b). 
Singapore implemented an opt-out system in 1987 (alongside a reciprocity 
prioritising criterion) (Albertsen, 2017, p. 139), and many other countries around 
the world also have an opt-out system.  In the United Kingdom in 2013, Wales 
introduced an opt-out system itself, with the hope that by not requiring the 
explicit consent of a donor to donate their organs, the number of organs that can 
be retrieved from deceased donors will increase (Human Transplantation (Wales) 
Act, 2013, secs 4–9).  England has also recently approved an opt-out system after 
the Bill received Royal Assent in 2019, and Scotland is preparing to make the 
change by 2020 ((Organ Donation (Deemed Consent) Act, 2019)(Human Tissue 
(Authorisation) (Scotland) Bill, 2018)).  (The efficacy of such systems is still 
debated however, with countries such as Luxemburg and Bulgaria having some of 
the lowest donation rates despite having an opt-out system (Willis and Quigley, 
2014, p. 56).) 
In Israel, a policy change in 2010 introduced the inclusion of a reciprocity criterion 
in the organ allocation decision in the hope that organ donation rates would 
increase (Lavee et al., 2010, p. 1133).  The policy gives differing levels of priority 
to patients who require an organ transplant, on what might be seen as a merit 
basis.  A patient’s priority differs depending on if they had previously donated an 
organ, were a registered organ donor, or had a family member who was a 
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registered donor, or were not registered as a donor themselves and had no 
relatives that were registered (in descending order, highest to lowest priority) 
(2010, p. 1131).  These prioritisation criteria are only used after the medical 
suitability criteria are taken into account, and are mainly used as a tie-breaker 
criterion.  However, the hope is that people will be more willing to register as an 
organ donor, even if only as an insurance policy, if they are given priority for an 
organ transplant should they require one.  (The policy has in fact shown to be 
effective; in the first year, donor registration rose from 49% to 55%, and the 
number of actual transplantations rose by 68% (Quigley, Wright and Ravitsky, 
2012, p. 972).) 
These procedural changes have all helped to increase the number of organ 
transplants that can be carried out, and improve the survival rates for recipients.  
But changes have also been made in the American allocation system to make 
better use of the organs that are available for transplant by improved patient 
matching. 
In the USA, changes have been introduced to the kidney allocation scheme that 
help to make better use of the organs that are available by including as a criterion 
in patient selection and organ allocation, the difference in the expected survival 
time of a patient post-transplant, to the expected remaining time that the kidney 
will function for.  This helps to avoid transplanting a kidney into an older patient 
who would only live for 10 years post-transplant when the likely usable life of the 
kidney may be 30 years.  The idea is that by matching organs to patients who have 
similar life expectancy, more life years can be saved/created with each transplant 
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by making more effective use of the remaining life years left in the organ.  The first 
iteration of this longevity matching criteria was in the form of Life Years From 
Transplant (LYFT), however, it was shortly replaced by the Estimated Post-
Transplant Survival (EPTS) policy.  Whilst the two policies are very similar, the 
LYFT policy was removed and replaced.  Even though it achieved the aim of 
increasing utility by way of significantly increasing the number of total life years 
gained from transplantation with the current donor pool, it also posed a severe 
disadvantage to certain subgroups of candidates, particularly older individuals 
and those with diabetes (Formica, Friedewald and Aeder, 2016, p. 40).  The EPTS 
policy helped to rectify this by allowing the goal of longevity matching to be 
realised, without severely disadvantaging particular subgroups (2016, p. 41). 
The reason why there has been, and continues to be, changes in the allocation 
criteria for organs, is that there have never been enough organs available for 
transplant to meet the demand.  It is hoped that by introducing changes to the 
allocation system, better use can be made of the organs available, both in terms of 
increasing the longevity of the transplanted organ, and increasing the expected 
life years of the recipient following treatment.  By better matching organs with 
patients, the cost effectiveness of the transplant is increased in terms of financial 
and quality of life gains.  However, the cost effectiveness of organ transplantation 
could be further improved if the allocation criteria also included a social value 
element, as this would increase the welfare created with each organ transplant 
compared to the current system.      
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There is an ongoing study in the UK which aims to improve equity of access, and 
to maximise the benefit and cost-effectiveness of kidney and kidney-pancreas 
transplantation (Oniscu et al., 2016, p. 1).  There is currently significant 
intercentre variability in access to renal transplantation, and the Access to 
Transplantation and Transplant Outcome Measures (ATTOM) study hopes to 
better understand the factors in this variability and resolve them. 
“The five related research aims of the study are listed below:  
1. To identify patient-specific and centre-specific factors that influence (a) 
access to the transplant waiting-list and to develop a survival probability 
model as a basis for standardising access to the transplant waiting-list and 
(b) access to transplantation (deceased donor kidney and pancreas and 
living donor kidney) for wait-listed patients.  
2. To identify patient-specific and centre-specific factors that influence 
patient survival for transplant wait-listed dialysis patients, after deceased 
donor kidney transplantation, after SPK transplantation, after living donor 
kidney transplantation and after pre-emptive transplantation 
(transplantation as a first mode of renal replacement therapy (RRT) prior 
to the initiation of dialysis treatment).  
3. To evaluate QoL [Quality of Life] and other PROMs [Patient Reported 
Outcome Measures] for patients on dialysis, after deceased donor kidney 
transplantation, after SPK transplantation, after living donor kidney 
transplantation, after pre-emptive transplantation, in waiting-list controls 
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for kidney and SPK transplantation and in those whose transplants have 
failed following recruitment to ATTOM.  
4. To perform a health economic analysis to explore costs and outcomes 
associated with alternative approaches to organ allocation.  
5. To utilise survival, health status, QoL, treatment satisfaction and costs to 
determine an optimal organ allocation policy as defined by the 
maximisation of clinical and cost–benefits derived from transplantation.” 
(2016, p. 2)  
Whilst all 5 aims of this study are directed at improving the overall outcomes of 
kidney transplantation, aim number 4 might be of most relevance to this thesis.  
Because this aim is to explore the costs and outcomes associated with alternative 
approaches to organ allocation, there is scope to explore an approach that includes 
a social value criterion.  Furthermore, one of the overarching aims of the program 
is to “investigate how we might maximise the net benefit to society from kidney 
and SPK [simultaneous pancreas-kidney] transplantation, by selecting recipients 
in a robust and transparent way so as to achieve the best balance between cost, 
prolongation of life, QoL [quality of life] and acceptability to patients and wider 
society” (2016, p. 2).  As it will be shown throughout this thesis, consideration of 
the addition of a social value criterion into organ allocation decisions would meet 
all of these factors.  The aim of the social value criterion is to increase net benefit 
from each transplant, and to select patients in a manner based on transparent and 
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justifiable criteria that balances cost and practicality, taking into account the 
approval of patients and wider society.   
One of the outcomes of the ATTOM study is to propose alternative organ allocation 
policies that consider efficiency and equity factors (2016, p. 6).  “Allocation 
schemes that focus on different aspects, such as maximum benefit from an organ 
or equal access to transplantation, can be simulated and the results used to help 
identify an allocation scheme that provides a balance between efficiency and 
equity that is acceptable to patients and society” (2016, p. 7).  Because one of the 
outcomes of the study is to propose alternative organ allocation policies, and 
simulations can be run to determine their effectiveness, an organ allocation 
system that includes a social value criterion should also be considered. 
The ATTOM study might help to allocate organs in a more effective way, that 
improves overall outcomes, for both the patients and wider society, by reducing 
intercentre variability of access to renal transplantation, and allocating organs in 
a more cost-effective manner.  But if one of the outcomes of the ATTOM study is 
to suggest alternative and novel allocation methods to improve renal allocation, 
and possibly organ allocation in general, then the addition of a social value 
criterion in the allocation decision should be considered, even if only as an 
addition to the improvements that might come about from other findings of the 
study. 
The policy changes that have been implemented, and the medical advancements 
made in organ transplantation have already led to a better use of organs in terms 
of patient outcomes, cost-effectiveness, and an increase in donated organs.  
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However, even with these improvements, there is still a severe organ shortage 
worldwide, and there remains room to increase the benefit created with each 
transplant.  The addition of a social value criterion to the organ allocation decision 
(at least until such a time as there are enough organs to meet demand), would 
continue to benefit the patient who receives the organ, but also provide increased 
benefit to wider society.  In this thesis, I will suggest a way to make better use of 
the organs that are available for transplant by allocating them to patients not just 
based on how urgently they require them, but also on how valuable the patient’s 
contributions are to society.  In this way, not only does the patient benefit from 
their organ transplant, but so too does society.   
 
Existing literature 
There have already been commentators who have written on the topic of including 
social value in resource allocation decisions, such as Basson (Basson, 1979) who 
has written a brief but useful overview of the topic, and others such as Rescher 
(Rescher, 1969), Langford (Langford, 1992), and Sanders and Dukeminier 
(Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967) who specifically argue either for or against the 
inclusion of social value judgments into resource allocation decisions, but whose 
articles are again, relatively brief.  They do not go into enough detail to thoroughly 
assess the ethical acceptability of such an approach to making resource allocation 
decisions, missing out many of the multiple facets that need to be considered to 
come to a justifiable conclusion.  It is only Rescher’s discussion that comes close 
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to providing a detailed discussion and framework for the possibility of social value 
considerations being factored in to resource allocation decisions, and as such, I 
will draw on his article throughout this thesis (Rescher, 1969).  Furthermore, the 
issue hasn’t been revisited in any real way for a long time, and with this thesis I 
hope to rectify this by providing a fresh perspective, coupled with a viable 
framework for the inclusion of social value considerations into organ allocation 
decisions. 
With this thesis, I will go beyond the limited discussion of the issue that is present 
in the existing literature, both in terms of ethical discussion and practical 
suggestions.  My original contribution to knowledge is a detailed analysis of the 
acceptability of social value considerations into organ allocation decisions, and the 
presentation of a viable framework for their inclusion.  Because the discussions of 
the issue within the existing literature are relatively brief, the cases put forward 
by the proponents of the inclusion of social value judgments are not strong enough 
to withstand criticism from detractors.  Equally however, detractors make their 
criticisms of the use of social value judgments within organ allocation decisions 
without consideration of what a potentially acceptable form of the system may 
look like.  Through the discussion in this thesis, I will give a much more detailed 
analysis of the ethical issues surrounding the inclusion of social value 
considerations in organ allocation decisions than has been given before, thereby 
providing a stronger and more convincing case for their inclusion.  In order to 
support this, I also provide a viable framework for how these social value 
considerations can be acceptably incorporated into the organ allocation decision 
from both an ethical and practical perspective.  By providing a more detailed case 
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for the inclusion of social value considerations than those which currently exist, 
and presenting a practical and ethically acceptable form of their implementation, 
the hope is that their inclusion into resource allocation decisions will not be 
dismissed so quickly.  
Commentators who argue against the inclusion of social value judgements base 
their arguments mainly around issues of fairness, or because they favour another 
allocation system.  Childress, for example, claims that a social value allocation 
system is not feasible because it involves evaluating consequences which we 
cannot accurately predict in the first place, and instead favours a lottery allocation 
system (Childress, 1970).  I accept that determining a person’s relative social value 
may be difficult, however, it is not impossible.  And favouring an alternative 
system such as a lottery, which arbitrarily allocates organs, simply as a means of 
avoiding making a difficult decision, is a poor move.  It will be shown that society 
will be better off if a social value allocation decision was attempted, rather than 
avoided in favour of a decision made at random. 
Commentators such as Ramsey (Ramsey, 1970a) and Thielecke (Thielecke, 1970) 
claim that judging a person on their social worth is unethical because doing so is 
to deny their individual worth as persons.  However, judging a person’s social 
worth does not necessarily deny their value as a person; it merely determines how 
instrumentally valuable they are to society.  Every person may be equally valuable 
as a person, having equal moral worth, but they are not necessarily equally 
instrumentally valuable to society.  And as Basson correctly points out, the value 
of a human life is not infinite, because if it were, there would be “nothing that 
 22 
should cause us to prefer the death of one man to the death of the entire 
population of the North American continent, a view which is, on the face of it, 
utterly absurd” (Basson, 1979). 
Even those who are in support of the idea miss important aspects from their 
arguments.  Lewis and Charny for example, discuss the inclusion of social value 
considerations with regards to age in their article, “Which of Two Individuals Do 
You Treat When Only Their Ages Are Different and You Can’t Treat Both?”, but the 
values which they suggest could be used in allocation decisions are those held by 
society rather than those which are useful to society (Lewis and Charny, 1989).  
Shatin also make a similar mistake by failing to clearly distinguish between 
society’s best interests and what the members of the society happen to value at 
that moment (Shatin, 1966).  Lewis and Charny claim that including the values 
which society holds in resource allocation decisions is “an attempt to bring true 
democracy into health service decision-making”  (Lewis and Charny, 1989, p. 31), 
but the inclusion of these society-held values may create a system which includes 
unwarranted prejudices based on race, age, class, etc.  Instead, considerations 
about how valuable someone is to society rather than how valued they are by 
society can avoid a system based on such unwarranted prejudices, and instead, 
remains objective.  
Rescher is also in support of social value considerations being used in healthcare 
resource allocation decisions, however, he also advocates the use of random 
allocation to make the final decision as to which patient will be the recipient 
(Rescher, 1969).  The social value considerations would narrow down the group 
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of suitably matched potential recipients to where there would be no major 
disparities between the relative values of the patients, and of this group, random 
allocation would decide who receives the organ in order to maintain some level of 
equality in the system.  However, I suggest that even if there are no major 
disparities between the patients, should there be any disparities, the higher-
ranking patient should be selected due to the fact that they can help to better meet 
the needs of society, and equality can still be maintained by ensuring that no 
medically suitable patient is excluded from the waiting list regardless of their 
value to society.  
Langford also attempts to maintain equality alongside social value in his proposed 
allocation system, however, the social value aspect is “disguised” under the 
concept of social irreplaceability (Langford, 1992).  He suggests that equality can 
be maintained whilst narrowing down the group of medically suitable potential 
recipients with acceptable forms of discrimination, such as prognosis, being used 
to filter out patients.  Of the remaining patients, the effect on other people of not 
saving a patient’s life should then be considered.  If Patient A is more irreplaceable 
than Patient B, then they are classed as being more valuable to society by virtue of 
their death being more detrimental.  Langford is right to take the idea of 
irreplaceability seriously when determining a person’s social value, but he is 
wrong to treat it as the most important criteria; it should form only a part of a 
larger set of criteria in determining a patient’s social value.  In addition, the same 
equality that Langford has in mind in his system is present in the needs-based 
allocation system currently in place which would be present in a social 
value/needs-based combination system when carried out in the right way.     
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The small body of literature already written in support of the inclusion of social 
value in healthcare resource allocation decisions places the emphasis on equality 
in the wrong places, or not at all.  In this thesis however, it will be shown that 
equality of access to healthcare resources such as organs could be afforded to 
patients even with a system including social value considerations.  It would not 
deny their value as persons as the majority of the current selection criteria would 
remain.  But with the addition of a social value criterion, I argue that the benefits 
to society could be increased with each transplant.  Furthermore, by employing 
social value in an instrumental sense, the objection that its inclusion would make 
the allocation system moralistic and judge individuals on their character can be 
avoided for the most part.  If a potential recipient were denied an organ under a 
system that included social value judgements, it would not be a punishment or 
reflection on who they are as a person, it would simply be based on how valuable 
their contributions were to society.  
 
 
Utilitarian foundation 
 
 
Introduction 
The thesis will be using a broadly utilitarian approach as it is an appropriate 
framework for making policy decisions, as policy makers should remain 
impartially beneficent.  As Eggleston says, (cited in Diepenbrock 2014), “All major 
policy decisions involve tradeoffs, and utilitarianism provides a framework for 
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making those tradeoffs and trying to do so in the way that promotes the common 
good the most" (Diepenbrock, 2014).   
The utilitarian approach is based on the reasoning that in ultimate analysis, people 
have only two fundamental objectives, ones that all of us will immediately 
understand as rational objectives.  One is their own well-being, and the other is the 
well-being of other people.  As such, for the utilitarian, compliance with our moral 
values and moral norms has a rational basis only to the extent to which this really 
benefits human beings: ourselves, other people, and society as a whole (Harsanyi, 
1995, p. 324).   
“Thus, by utilitarian standards, our moral and political values such as 
individual freedom, equality, justice, fairness, democracy, law and order, 
and so on[,] have rational justification only in terms of the benefits that we 
and other people will obtain if these values are widely respected. 
Accordingly, the best moral values and moral norms are those likely to 
produce the greatest benefits for society as a whole as judged from an 
unbiased and impartial point of view…  Thus, the basic principle of 
utilitarian theory can be expressed also by saying that the basic rational 
criterion for evaluating our moral norms, our moral values, and morality as 
a whole is their social utility.” (1995, p. 324) 
One of the reasons for taking a utilitarian approach to morality and social rules is 
because it involves using just one rational principle, that of social utility.  Most 
non-utilitarian authors base their ethical theories on their moral intuitions, which 
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are unreliable guides when it comes to ethics.  Moral intuitions differ from person 
to person depending on the social groups and societies that they come from, and 
so there is no reason to suppose that we have direct intuitive access to moral 
truths.  E.g. Rawls and Nozick, two prominent non-utilitarian philosophers, came 
to completely different ethical theories when using their intuitions: “Rawls 
arriv[ing] at a radically left-liberal and strictly egalitarian theory; whereas 
following his own intuitions, Nozick arrived at a radically right-liberal and strictly 
libertarian theory” (1995, p. 331).  Moral intuitions might still have a role in ethics 
by way of drawing our attention to some moral problems we might otherwise 
have overlooked, but they should not be the final arbiters of morality.  Moral 
intuitions cannot replace our rational judgement on how to resolve moral 
problems in the best interest of the people affected. 
A rule utilitarian approach will be used over an act utilitarian approach as it is 
preferable given its ability to recognise the importance of individual moral rights 
and obligations, something which act utilitarianism is less able to accommodate.  
A rule utilitarian approach also offers some defence against the charge that 
utilitarianism allows unlimited sacrificing of the individual for society, which most 
would agree would be an unethical policy.   
 
Rule utilitarian justification 
Preferred over act utilitarianism 
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The use of a rule utilitarian approach is preferred over an act utilitarian approach, 
particularly for use in the organ allocation social value criteria in particular, as it 
is more practical to have rules to follow, rather than an unmanageable number of 
variables to consider on a case by case basis.  The rule-utilitarian approach means 
that social value assessment rules, and general allocation rules, can be made that 
will create more welfare overall, even though there may be specific cases where 
more utility could be created if these rules were ignored.   
If an act-utilitarian approach were used when applying organ allocation criterion 
based on social value, it would mean that in each specific case, a thorough 
investigation would be needed to assess the life of the patient and their social 
contributions.  However, the costs of such a process would be sure to outweigh 
the expected benefits.  With a rule-utilitarian approach on the other hand, rules 
can be implemented that will in general create more welfare, even if there are 
certain cases in which more welfare could be created if the rule was not followed.  
For example, the immediate family of a patient are often the people who are most 
detrimentally affected by the patient’s death, so a rule could be implemented that 
those with the most immediate family members should be given priority for an 
organ.  Everything else being equal, their death will cause more detriment than 
that of a patient who had less immediate family members.  However, there may be 
cases where a patient has less immediate family members than another patient, 
but they will be more detrimentally affected because they have a closer 
relationship, whereas the immediate family of the other patient are more 
estranged.  Whilst in this case it would be better to allocate the organ to the patient 
who had few immediate family members, the investigation into the status of the 
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relationship between the family members and how each of them would be affected 
by the possible death of the patient would be too costly in terms of time, resources, 
and intrusion3, to provide much, if any, benefit.   
 
Recognises individual rights and obligations 
One reason why a rule utilitarian approach is preferred to an act utilitarian 
approach is that it recognises the moral and social importance of individual rights 
and obligations because of its commitment to an overall moral strategy.  With 
standard kinds of act utilitarianism, the action-by-action maximisation of social 
utility would destroy these rights and obligations, as no direct weight is given to 
agent-relative considerations (Hooker, 1990, p. 69).  It might not have difficulty 
dealing with the moral problem of benevolence, as social utility can be increased 
by helping other people, however, it does have difficulty with the moral problem 
of justice precisely because it cannot adequately deal with the problems of moral 
rights and obligations.  
To help illustrate this, Harsanyi gives the example of the government taking away 
a person’s home in order to build a new freeway/motorway, and asks if this is a 
morally justified action.  For the act utilitarian, this action would be morally 
justified if it creates more utility than disutility.  The building of the motorway 
would benefit the construction team through providing jobs, and users of the 
                                                      
3 It is conceivable however, that the patient and family may not mind the intrusion into their 
privacy if it means that their loved one stands a better chance at receiving an organ.  
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motorway by providing quicker travel times, as well as many other parties.  
However, its construction would also create negative utility for the person and 
their family whose home has been taken away.  For the act utilitarian, taking away 
the person’s home is still morally justified even if the utility created is only very 
slightly more than the sacrifices imposed (Harsanyi, 1985, p. 117).  For Harsanyi, 
this conclusion is clearly inconsistent with common sense morality as the 
government’s actions violate individual rights, specifically, the person’s property 
rights to their home.  He says that even if the government offered reasonable 
compensation, the taking of the home would only be justified if the resulting total 
utility were significantly more substantial than the resulting total disutility (1985, 
p. 117).  It is not enough for the resulting utility to be only slightly more than the 
disutility to justify violating the person’s moral rights.    
If individual rights are to be protected, there will be both social benefits and social 
costs; benefits for a person from their rights being protected, but inconveniences 
created when the person’s freedom of action is restricted in order to protect the 
rights of others.  However, as Harsanyi points out, the social benefits of such a 
moral code that protects individual rights and obligations will greatly outweigh 
the social costs.  “…[M]ost of us will strongly prefer to live in a society whose moral 
code gives clear protection to the individual rights, and does not permit the 
violation of these rights, except possibly in some rare and rather special cases” 
(1985, pp. 117–118).  It is the recognition of the moral and social importance of 
these individual rights and obligations that makes rule utilitarianism preferable 
to act utilitarianism. 
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By taking a rule utilitarian approach not just to morality, but also to resource 
allocation decisions, a much higher level of social utility can be created than if an 
act utilitarian approach were taken, as people would surely rather live in a society 
in which theirs, and other people’s, individual rights are respected.   
 
Preferred Over Egalitarian approach 
Defending a utilitarian approach for equality and distributive justice over a more 
egalitarian approach can be done by appealing to the concept of the “veil of 
ignorance” and looking at the different responses between Harsanyi and Rawls.  
The concept of the veil of ignorance, as described by Hooker, is used by both 
Harsanyi and Rawls when deciding what rules should be in place for society.  
“Suppose that, instead of trying to select rules from a point of view in which 
there is equal concern for everyone and full information about the likely 
benefits and harms of different possible rules, we select rules for society 
from an “original position” in which we care about only ourselves but are 
behind a “veil of ignorance” which hides from us all specific information 
about ourselves. Behind this veil, we don’t have any idea whether we are 
talented, energetic, healthy, female, religious, etc.” (Hooker, 2014, p. 285) 
The main idea here is that because behind the veil of ignorance we have no 
information that could bias our selection of the rules, we would make a rational 
choice about what these rules should be.  However, even though Rawls and 
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Harsanyi both use the idea of the veil of ignorance and have the same starting 
point, they both give very different suggestions about what these rules should be. 
For Harsanyi (cited in Hooker 2014), the rational choice behind the veil of 
ignorance would be to choose whatever rules would maximise utility. 
“If one had an equal chance of being anyone once the veil went up, then 
the way to maximize one’s own expected utility behind the veil would be to 
pick the rules with the greatest expected average utility, everyone’s utility 
being counted equally and impartially.”  (2014, p. 285)  
Rawls (cited in Hooker 2014) on the other hand, claimed that the reason why 
social and economic goods and opportunities should be distributed to the least 
advantaged people in society first is because when deciding on the principles of 
justice for a society, if no one knew what their place in that society was going to 
be, they would choose such a principle just in case they were in fact one of those 
in the less advantaged position once the veil was raised.  He argued that   
“…behind the veil of ignorance one would be rational to be risk averse and 
thus focus on the position of the worst off instead of the average position.”  
(2014, p. 285) 
The problem with Rawls’ position however, is that he supposes that the rational 
choice that people would make, would be the one that involved risk aversion, even 
though rational choice does not necessarily require risk aversion.  It is for this 
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reason that Rawls’ argument has been widely thought to be unpersuasive 
(Hooker, 2014, p. 285). 
If you apply the veil of ignorance to organ transplantation, but allow one piece of 
information from behind the veil, namely, the percentage chance that you as a 
citizen might require a transplant in your life, the rational choice would 
undoubtedly not involve risk aversion as the chance of you requiring a transplant 
is so small.  In 2016, the population of the UK was 65.6 million (Office for National 
Statistics, 2017, p. 2), and the number of people on the transplant list was 6389 
(NHS Blood and Transplant, 2017).  This means that there was just a 0.0097% 
chance for each citizen that they would need an organ transplant.4 
When deciding what the rules for organ allocation should be from an “original 
position” in which we care about only ourselves but are behind a “veil of 
ignorance” which hides from us all specific information about ourselves, apart 
from the 0.0097% chance that we will require an organ transplant, surely it would 
be more rational to choose those rules which increased average utility, rather than 
those which helped risk aversion.  The organ allocation criterion that I suggest, of 
allocating organs to those who are most socially valuable (from amongst the most 
urgent patients), would increase average social utility, whilst allocating organs to 
those who are least advantaged (from the most urgent patients) would not.  Given 
such a small chance that someone will require an organ transplant, it is unlikely 
that they would err on the side of caution and take a Rawlsian approach, 
                                                      
4 This is ignoring any hereditary or other indicators that you will require a transplant in your life.  
This statistic takes into account only the number of people in the UK and the number of people that 
require an organ transplant in the UK.  
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supporting a rule where the least advantaged are prioritised.  It is more likely that, 
given the 99.9903% chance that someone will not need an organ transplant, they 
will choose the allocation strategy that will increase average utility.  If the 
inclusion of a social value criterion into the organ allocation criteria was 
implemented, there is essentially a 99.9903% chance for each citizen that they 
would benefit from it (or at least not be detrimentally affected), with only a 
0.0097% chance that they would not.  In this situation, it would be a much more 
rational choice to opt for the rule which increased average utility.  
 
Thesis structure 
In order to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the ethical acceptability, 
and the practicability of including social value considerations into resource 
allocation decisions, I will need to look at a number of different issues, of which, 
will form the basis of the chapters. 
I begin by giving an overview of the current allocation procedures for the main 
transplantable organs in Chapter 1 in order to highlight how and why organs are 
allocated to certain patients and not others.  I outline the considerations that are 
taken into account when determining a patient’s medical suitability as a potential 
organ recipient, and how a patient’s level of urgency, and in some cases, age, 
determines their place on the waiting list.  By giving an account of the organ 
allocation procedure, the overarching principles for organ allocation can be 
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highlighted 
I then move on to discuss what is wrong with the current organ allocation system 
in Chapter 2, outlining 3 main problems, and suggest that the addition of a social 
value criterion to replace the waiting time criterion would solve these problems.  
I show that 1) the current system places too much emphasis on the welfare of the 
patients and not enough emphasis on the effects each organ allocation has on 
wider society, 2) the current system can be unfair to certain individuals due to the 
waiting time criterion, and 3) that even though part of the nature of the current 
system is to promote utility, as it stands now, it stops short of promoting 
additional utility even though it could be done in an ethically acceptable manner. 
I then discuss other possible allocation systems to see if they would provide 
suitable alternatives to the current system, either based on their defining feature, 
or alongside the current needs-based system as a combination system, concluding 
that whilst the alternatives provide acceptable options when combined with the 
current system, none offer as much benefit as a social value/needs-based 
combination system.  
This leads on to Chapter 3 where I outline how the inclusion of a social value 
criterion into organ allocation decisions could work as a replacement for the 
waiting time criterion, and why it is acceptable, and perhaps even required, based 
on the role of the government to do what is not only in the best interests of 
individual members of society, but also society as a whole. 
Once this partial justification for the inclusion of social value considerations is 
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made, a case study is examined in Chapter 4 to highlight the problematic features 
of such an approach.  The case study looks at the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center 
in the 1960’s, where social value criteria were heavily used in the patient selection 
process for medical treatment, specifically in the selection of patients for dialysis.  
Resources were scarce due to the treatment still being in its infancy, but showed 
promise due to the development of the cannula shunt, and so only a limited 
number of patients could be treated.  This approach was ultimately abandoned for 
numerous reasons, but this chapter looks at the patient selection process used and 
highlights the problematic features of the inclusion of social value considerations 
within this system: mainly, the subjective nature of the social value judgements 
made by the patient selection committee, and the criteria upon which these 
judgements were made.   
I then move on to Chapter 5 where I suggest how these problems could be avoided 
if social value judgements were included in organ allocation decisions again.  The 
main suggestion here is that rather than relying solely on a lay committee to make 
the patient selection decisions as was done in the case study discussed in Chapter 
4, experts from relevant fields such as sociology, psychology, and economics 
should be involved in the allocation process.  I outline how experts from these 
fields would form the criteria selection committee, and how they would determine 
the needs of society at a given point.  Another expert committee for patient 
selection would determine the social value of patients based on their 
contributions towards meeting the needs of society, selecting for treatment, the 
patient who is most socially valuable. 
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This leads on to Chapter 6 where I look at the ways in which a person is 
instrumentally valuable to society, and where these contributions could figure in 
an organ allocation policy, explaining that there are 3 mains categories in which a 
person can be valuable: 1) active social contributions, 2) effects on proximate 
individuals, 3) morality.  It is these categories, and the contributions within these 
categories, which would be taken into account by the expert committees when 
making their social value judgement.  I show that whilst these are the 3 main ways 
in which a person can be instrumentally valuable to society, when it comes to 
actually implementing these into the criteria on which objective social value 
judgments can be made, their scope needs to be limited both for ethical, and 
practical, reasons. 
I then move on to Chapter 7, where I outline how the final decision on who would 
be selected as the organ recipient would be made if a social value criterion were 
included in the organ allocation process.  I suggest that all of the criteria for 
determining a patient’s social value should be applied simultaneously to gain a full 
picture of the patient’s social value.  This is in contrast to applying the criteria one 
at a time in a linear manner, narrowing down the potential recipients until only 
one remained, as a patient may end up being judged on only one or two of their 
contributions. 
I also describe how points would be allocated to patients based on the 
contributions that they make, drawing parallels with the immigration points 
system as, even though the criteria differ, the structure is similar.  This parallel 
also serves to show that a points system is able to reflect social contributions, as 
 37 
the immigration points system is itself based mainly on social contributions.5 
Through the detailed discussion of the issues involved with including social value 
considerations into resource allocation decisions, it will be shown that the 
inclusion of a social value criterion can be both ethically, and practically made, 
with the welfare created with each organ transplant benefiting not only the 
individual recipient, but also wider society. 
 
                                                      
5 However, the social contributions included in the immigration points system are mainly 
economic in nature.  
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Chapter 1: What do we do now? 
Introduction 
The number of people who require an organ transplant is growing at a faster rate 
than the number of donated organs is growing and this has resulted in an 
increasing number of people dying whilst waiting for an organ transplant (NHSBT, 
2015b).  Because the number of people needing an organ is greater than the 
number of organs available for transplant, there has to be some form of rationing.  
If all people who require an organ are not able to receive one, then there needs to 
be a way to allocate the available organs fairly, and in such a way that makes the 
most of, or at least does not waste, this scarce resource.  According to the NHSBT 
(National Health Service Blood and Transplant), transplantable organs have to be 
“allocated in a fair and unbiased way based on the patient’s clinical need 
and…achieving the closest possible match between donor and recipient.”  (NHSBT, 
2014d, sec. 10) 
For the different transplantable organs, there are slight differences between the 
allocation criteria and procedure, and these procedures differ in respect to 
children also.  The more specific details of the criteria for each organ will be given 
later in this chapter, but without going into too much depth about the specifics 
relating to patient physiology.  There is, however, a general standardised system 
overall, or at least general criteria that are considered when making organ 
allocation decisions, and this will also be referred to throughout the thesis.   
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The system that is in place now in Britain generally uses patients’ medical need 
and level of urgency as the most important factor when determining who should 
receive an organ (unless the patient is a child; paediatric patients often receive 
priority over adults for paediatric organs, and sometimes even suitable adult 
organs too for various reasons, even if the child’s medical need is not as urgent as 
an adult recipient)  (NHSBT, 2014e, sec. 1.2.3, 2015c, sec. 1.3.1.2). 
Of the potential recipients, the one who is in most urgent need will generally be 
given priority for an organ transplant based on the accumulation of points using 
an algorithm based on the allocation criteria that is in place for the organ that they 
are waiting for.  The way that calculations for points are worked out differs from 
organ to organ with some criteria given a heavier weighting for some organs than 
others.  For some organs, a more exact tissue match or blood type match is needed 
than is the case for others, or waiting time may play a significant role, or the age 
of the potential recipient may be an important factor for certain organs.  
There are many parts to the organ allocation process, such as who is a suitable 
organ donor, and how patients should be assessed and registered as requiring an 
organ.  However, the more relevant aspects of the process to this thesis are those 
relating to which patients are not given a place on the waiting list and why (contra-
indications), and how the position of those who are given a place on the waiting 
list is decided (prioritisation), as it is these two aspects which relate most to the 
actual allocation of organs.  The way in which these two features apply for the 
main transplantable organs will be shown in Table 1 in the next section, and then 
the main overarching principles for organ allocation will be summarised.  Because 
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the suggested changes to the organ allocation system could apply to all scarcely 
available organs, I will discuss the problems with the organ allocation system and 
how they can be rectified in a revised system as a whole, but draw on kidney 
allocation specifically in order to provide illustrative examples.   By referring to 
kidney allocation in the form of illustrative examples alongside a broader 
discussion, it will allow for a better illustration for how a revised system could 
work.  The reason for using kidneys in the illustrative examples is that this could 
be the area in which the revised allocation system could be trialled first, given that 
the life-threatening nature of kidney failure can be better managed through 
dialysis than the failure of other organs.  Once this revised allocation process has 
been illustrated and established, it could be applied to other organs, taking into 
account the varying contra-indications for each organ.    
 
Overview 
 The “[R]ules for allocating organs are determined by the medical profession in 
consultation with other health professionals, the Department of Health and 
specialist advisory groups”  (NHSBT, 2015i).  The advisory groups (made up of 
representatives from NHSBT, commissioners and Departments of Health, others 
from statistics and clinical studies, and lay members) focus almost exclusively on 
issues to do with specific organs regarding their donation, allocation, retrieval and 
transplantation rather than the more general issues in these areas for the field as 
a whole.  They enable an exchange of views and information on practical and 
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strategic issues and recommend changes to the nationally agreed protocols for 
allocating organs when necessary (NHSBT, 2012).  More specifically they: 
• Consider operational aspects of transplantation including organ 
retrieval, organ allocation and data analysis and to monitor activity 
and outcome. 
• Recommend, as necessary, changes to the nationally agreed 
protocols, to recognise clinical governance issues and ensure, as far 
as possible, that national standards of good practice are in place 
with regard to waiting list criteria and organ allocation that provide 
equity of access to transplantation. 
• Remit to NHSBT matters of practice or policy that require 
consideration within a broader framework. 
• Liaise as necessary with the British Transplantation Society and 
other bodies in the development of national standards.  (NHSBT, 
2015a) 
Even though the specific allocation criteria for each organ are different, there are 
some broad principles that apply across most of the transplantable organs.  The 
guidelines that usually apply are that the (medically suitable) patient who is in 
most urgent need (who will die the soonest) will generally receive priority for the 
organ, with closeness of match to the available organ for transplant being used to 
decide between patients of approximate urgency.  Other criteria that are also 
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taken into account are that the patient must have a reasonable expected survival 
time after transplant; at least 2 years for kidneys, and 5 years for livers, and must 
be able to comply with the immunosuppressant therapy after a transplant (see 
Table 1 below). 
 
Patient/organ matching 
When deciding who should be the recipient for a particular organ, the blood group, 
age and size of both the donor and the recipient are all taken into account to 
ensure the best possible match for each patient.  Finding the best-matched patient 
for an organ increases the chances of a successful graft, thereby making good use 
of the organ and increasing the patient’s quality of life.  For some organs, such as 
kidneys, tissue type match is also a consideration, although this is more important 
for some patients than others.  A computer program is used to identify which 
patient is the best matched, or alternatively, the transplant unit to which the organ 
is to be offered (NHSBT, 2011).6  However, there are circumstances where the 
organ will not be offered to the best-matched patient.  If another patient is classed 
as urgent, or super urgent, the need for an organ transplant due to the risk of 
imminent death outweighs the risks associated with transplanting a poorly 
                                                      
6 The organ will sometimes be offered to a different transplant unit to the area where the donor is 
being treated in order to provide an equal distribution of organs between transplant centres; livers 
are allocated on a 4 week rolling rota to the transplant centre that has performed the least amount 
of liver transplants.  However, the organ will still be offered to the best matched patient covered 
by that transplant centre  (NHSBT, 2015d, sec. 7.3) 
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matched organ (NHSBT, 2014c, sec. 6.1, 2015d, sec. 2.6, 3). 
 
Contra-indications 
As with all organs for transplant, there are certain contra-indications that mean 
that a patient is not a suitable recipient for a transplant, with some organs having 
more stringent contra-indications than others.  There are also separate contra-
indications applicable to a potential donor that means that their organs are not 
suitable for transplant.7  However, it is the contra-indications for the potential 
recipients that are most relevant here.  It is these contra-indications that help the 
scarce resource of organs to be used effectively and minimise the risk of rejection 
or graft failure. 
The contra-indications can either be absolute or relative.  The absolute contra-
indications are mainly based on the physical in/compatibility of the recipient to 
the donor organ and are in place because transplanting an organ into a poorly 
matched patient gives a high risk of graft failure.  To offer an organ to particularly 
poorly matched recipients would be futile and a waste of an organ due to the high 
chance of rejection.  Relative contra-indications may also be based on the physical 
incompatibility of the recipient to the organ donor but do not pose such a high risk 
of graft failure, or they may be to do with the circumstances of the patient, e.g. 
their age, previous graft failures, or a likelihood they will not keep to the drug 
                                                      
7 Such as if they are HIV positive. 
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regime required for the organ to be accepted by their body.8  Whilst these relative 
contra-indications are not outright grounds for denying a patient a transplant, in 
conjunction with other factors surrounding the patient’s circumstances, the 
clinician may decide it wise to not allow the operation.  This could be because the 
patient stands only a small chance of benefiting, and transplanting the organ into 
another patient is likely to result in a higher chance of success.  The patient may 
not benefit from the transplant because they are poorly matched (absolute contra-
indication), or because they are likely to not stick to the medication regime 
required after transplantation (relative contra-indication).  In either situation, 
transplanting the organ to such a patient may not give any increase in quality or 
length of life, and the organ will have been put to poor use; it could have been 
transplanted into someone with a higher chance of a successful graft and quality 
of life. 
Each patient is different, and it is up to the clinician to decide whether they think 
the patient is suitable for a transplant.  The patient may have some relative contra-
indications that apply to them, but the clinician can decide whether they are 
enough of a barrier to prohibit the patient from being registered on the waiting 
list for an organ.  E.g. the patient may not have successfully adhered to a medical 
drug regime for a particular illness in the past, but the clinician can decide if this 
is likely to happen again from talking to the patient and determining the reasons 
behind the patient’s previous poor medication regime adherence.  
                                                      
8 See Table.1 below. 
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Specific organ allocation criteria 
Below are the specific organ allocation criteria for different organs that determine 
a person’s place on the waiting list as well as any contra-indications that might 
make them unsuitable for a transplant. 
Organs Priority Contra-indications Distribution 
Kidneys Priority for urgent 
paediatric patients 
(NHSBT, 2014e, sec. 
1.2.3) 
 
Waiting time and best 
match factors (HLA 
match, donor-recipient 
age difference, location 
of patient relative to 
donor, blood group 
match)  considered 
together in a points 
system (NHSBT, 2014e, 
sec. 1.2) 
Absolute:  
Uncontrolled cancer 
Less than 2 years expected survival 
 
Relative:  
Less than 5 years expected survival 
 
Graft loss more than 50% at 1 year. 
 
Patients unable to comply with 
immunosuppressant therapy.  
 
Immunosuppression predicted to cause life-
threatening complications (NHSBT, 2014j, 
sec. 3.3) 
 
 
Pancreases Priority is given to 
sensitised and hard-to-
match patients 
provided this does not 
prejudice 
severely ill patients 
(NHSBT, 2014h, sec. 
1.2) 
 
Absolute:  
Physical unsuitability for operation or 
receiving the organ. 
 
Patients unable to comply with 
immunosuppressant therapy.  
 
Relative:  
Certain physical unsuitability considerations 
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Waiting time (NHSBT, 
2014h, sec. 1.3.1)  
 
 
 
Continued abuse of alcohol, smoking or other 
drugs (NHSBT, 2014i, sec. 3.2)  
 
Livers Priority for super 
urgent patients, then 
hard-to-match patients 
(NHSBT, 2015d, sec. 
2.6, 3)  
 
Recipients must have an estimated life 
expectancy of 5 years with a quality of life 
acceptable to the patient (NHSBT, 2015j, sec. 
3.2)  
 
Illicit drug use (in certain circumstances) 
 
Alcohol-induced liver disease, where the 
patient is likely to revert back to alcohol 
abuse or not comply with medication 
(NHSBT, 2015j, sec. 3.7) 
 
Livers allocated on a 
4 week rolling rota 
to the transplant 
centre that has 
performed the least 
amount of liver 
transplants (NHSBT, 
2015d, sec. 7.3) 
 
Hearts  Urgent patients receive 
priority – first by blood 
group identicality, then 
blood group 
compatibility, then by 
waiting time (NHSBT, 
2014c, sec. 6.1, 2014b, 
sec. 1.2)  
 
Urgent paediatric 
patients are ordered 
according to waiting 
time (NHSBT, 2014b, 
sec. 7)  
 
 
Absolute: 
Physical unsuitability – (Included in this is 
other illnesses and physical incompatibility. 
 
Continued abuse of alcohol or other drugs 
 
Psychiatric history likely to result in non-
compliance and/or persistent non-
compliance with medical therapy. 
 
Severe peripheral or cerebrovascular disease, 
malignancy, other life threatening medical 
condition, likely to cause death within five 
years. 
 
Relative: 
Certain physical unsuitability considerations 
 
Continued smoking (Banner et al., 2011; 
NHSBT, 2014c, sec. 8)  
Hearts will be 
offered to urgent 
cases in the 
transplant centre 
where the organ was 
removed, and if no 
urgent cases, it will 
be offered to the 
nearest transplant 
centre that requires 
it to minimize 
travelling time 
(NHSBT, 2014b, sec. 
4)  
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Corneas Children and urgent 
patients are given 
priority first (NHSBT, 
2013, sec. 3.2.1.1, 
2015c, sec. 1.2.1.2) 
Absolute: If treatment is futile 
 
Relative: If treatment is likely to not achieve 
the intended outcome (NHSBT, 2013, sec. 3.3) 
 
There is currently no 
national transplant 
list for corneal 
transplantation; 
each centre holds its 
own list locally. 
Requests for corneal 
tissue are made by 
or on behalf of the 
treating 
Ophthalmologist to 
the Duty Office at 
ODT (NHSBT, 2015c, 
sec. 1.3.1) 
Table.19 
 
Overarching Principles 
It can be seen from the outlines above, that determining a patient’s place on the 
waiting list depends mainly on their level of urgency for an organ.  If a patient’s 
health is in a critical condition and they are in urgent need of a transplant, then 
that patient will usually receive priority for an available organ provided that they 
are medically suitable.  Children also often receive priority for an organ transplant, 
either due to irreparable damage being done if a transplant is postponed versus 
that compared to a non-urgent adult transplant being postponed (e.g. cornea 
transplantation), or because suitably matched paediatric organs become available 
                                                      
9 The list of contra-indications mentioned here is not a complete list; detailed patient physiology 
contra-indications have been omitted as their specific medical language and detail is of less 
relevance. 
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less frequently than adult organs (NHSBT, 2015c, sec. 1.3.1.2).  Non-urgent 
patients are again generally ordered by their level of need/urgency, with their 
time on the waiting list being counted if everything else is equal.  For kidneys, one 
of the main considerations for allocation is waiting time, but this is because the 
risk to the patient’s health whilst waiting for an organ can be managed through 
alternative medical treatments such as dialysis, and a patient can be on dialysis 
for up to 20 years or longer (NHSBT, 2015e).  However, even though a patient’s 
life can be sustained on dialysis, it is a burdensome treatment and is no 
replacement for a real kidney.  The inclusion of waiting time as a criterion plays a 
role in minimising the accumulative detriment that is caused by being on dialysis 
for a prolonged period of time, both from an emotional, and physical standpoint, 
by helping to minimise the chances of the patient’s health deteriorating to such a 
point where a transplant is no longer a viable treatment option. 
The contra-indications for potential organ recipients are mainly based around 
criteria that help to ensure a successful graft.   Contra-indications related to 
patient/organ blood type and tissue match, as well as contra-indications related 
to adherence to the immunosuppressant medication regime, help to ensure that 
the organ is not rejected.  By taking care to pair patients with organs that are as 
close a match as possible to their own physiology, or at least compatible, patients 
stand the best chance of their transplant being successful, resulting in increased 
welfare for themselves, and effective use of the available organs. 
However, there are a couple of contra-indications for certain organs that have 
more to do with life expectancy post-transplant than they do with matching the 
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patient’s physiology.  For kidneys, there is a relative contra-indication that the 
patient must have a life expectancy of more than 2 years, and for a liver, the patient 
must have a life expectancy of at least 5 years with a quality of life acceptable to 
the patient.  The reasoning here is more along the lines of making good use of the 
limited organs that are available rather than ensuring the welfare of the recipient, 
as even if the recipient would only live for one year post transplant, their welfare 
might have been increased. 
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Chapter 2: Why change the current 
system? 
Introduction 
It was made clear in the last chapter that there are restrictions in place on who 
can receive an organ transplant and who cannot, and there are also rules on how 
the people who can receive a transplant are ordered on the waiting list.  These 
rules are in place in order that the organs can be put to good use by not being 
transplanted into people who are classed as having too high a risk of organ 
rejection or complications, and not providing an organ to those patients whose life 
expectancy is too low (NHSBT, 2014j).  Transplanting an organ into high-risk 
patients jeopardises the benefit that this scarce resource can create; if 
transplanted into a patient with less risk of complications and with a longer life 
expectancy, the expected useable life of the organ can be increased.  To transplant 
an organ into someone where it will be used for only a year due to the patient’s 
poor life expectancy, when the organ’s expected useable life is closer to 10 years, 
could be seen as poor use of a scarce and valuable resource (everything else being 
equal) due to the remaining life years left in the organ.  It is for this reason why 
there is an absolute contra-indication for kidney transplants that the patient must 
have a life expectancy of at least 2 years, and a relative contra-indication that the 
patient must have a life expectancy of at least 5 years.  By having these regulations 
in place, the number of lives that can be saved, and the amount of welfare 
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produced from the available organs is hoped to increase.  However, as will be 
discussed in the first part of this chapter, whilst the current contra-indications for 
kidneys, as well as all other organs, limit potential recipients to only those that are 
medically suitable and so does go some way to getting the most use out of an organ 
and increasing welfare (mainly for the patient), I suggest that allocating organs 
under a system that also takes into account an additional criterion of a person's 
social value will make even better use of the organs available by increasing the 
amount of overall welfare created, not just for the patient, but also for wider 
society. 
In this chapter I will describe what is wrong with the current allocation system for 
organs, including kidneys, and why it is not preferable when compared to an organ 
allocation system based on patient need (in terms of medical suitability and ability 
to benefit) and their value to society.  There are three main reasons as to why the 
current allocation system is not preferable: 1) too much emphasis on patients as 
individuals, 2) unfair to certain individuals due to the waiting time criterion, and 
3) the argument for further utility, whereby extra utility could be acceptably 
created whilst maintaining the main ethos behind the current system.  I then move 
on to briefly look at alternative systems of organ allocation, such as random 
selection, and systems which allocate organs based on a patient’s merit, age, or 
value to society in order to ascertain whether a social value allocation system 
would indeed be the preferred alternative option over the current system.  It will 
be shown that these alternatives, when based solely on their main feature, result 
in unnecessary deaths.  However, when combined with the current needs-based 
system, they become more appealing, but it is only the combination of needs-
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based and social value criteria in a combined system that provides a real 
improvement over the system currently in place. 
 
Problems with the current system 
There are shortcomings with the current waiting list system that is in place; 
however, there is an attempt to balance these against the benefits that are gained.  
For example, because prioritisation for an organ on the UK waiting list is mainly 
based on the patients urgency, it means that at any point, the numbers on the 
waiting list could expand to such an extent that “having one’s name on the waiting 
list has little effect on the chances of treatment in the foreseeable future” (Leenen, 
1982, pp. 33–34) (unless one’s need is particularly urgent).  
However, the postponement of treatment for those who are in less urgent need is 
balanced against the benefits of treating those who are in most urgent need.  By 
treating the most urgent first, a life is saved that would perhaps have been lost had 
treatment been given to a patient whose medical needs were less urgent; the less 
urgent patient has a better chance of surviving long enough to be treated when 
the resource next becomes available. 
The allocation of kidneys is slightly different in that whilst the level of urgency is 
taken into account when it comes to children, prioritisation for adults is mainly 
based on being a suitable match for the organ in combination with the patient’s 
waiting time.  Including urgency as a more central criterion in kidney allocation 
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may not be necessary given that the health of a patient with renal failure can often 
be managed through dialysis, and allocating organs to those patients who are the 
most suitably matched helps to make good use of the organs available as it helps 
to reduce the risk of organ rejection.  However, there is still a problem with the 
allocation criteria for kidneys, as will be highlighted in the next sections, given the 
inclusion of a waiting time criterion.   
 
Too much emphasis on patients as individuals 
Whilst the current system does go some way to making sure that the organs 
available for transplant are not wasted, it does not go so far as to make sure that 
the most is made of those organs, or at least, even better use could be made of the 
organs.  Whilst any organ that saves someone’s life is not strictly wasted, when 
viewed not in isolation, but compared to who else’s life could have been saved 
using that organ, it may emerge that the organ could have been used more wisely.  
When someone's life is saved, or when any treatment is given, there are wider 
effects than just those which simply affect the individual, and the consequences of 
these wider effects should be taken into consideration when making resource 
allocation decisions.  These effects could be positive or negative, and steps should 
perhaps be taken to promote or minimise some of these effects. 
Under the current allocation system, the NHSBT explicitly directs, under the 
heading of ‘benefit’, that: 
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“Donated organs should be distributed in a way that provides greatest good 
to the cohort of patients on the National Transplant Waiting list for that 
organ.”  (NHSBT, 2014a) 
Whilst it might be right to provide the maximum benefit to the patient cohort, if it 
is also possible to increase wider welfare at the same time as satisfying the former 
aim, with no extra detriment caused, analogous to Pareto improvements, it would 
be foolish not to.  
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association10 
lists 5 factors which they feel may appropriately be taken into account when 
allocating organs or other scarce medical resources, and all but one are directly 
patient centred: 
(1) the likelihood of benefit to the patient 
(2) the impact of treatment in improving the quality of the patient's life 
(3) the duration of benefit 
(4) the urgency of the patient's condition (i.e., how close the patient is to 
death), and in some cases 
(5) the amount of resources required for successful treatment.   
                                                      
10 Even though these factors come from the AMA, they match the factors of the UK organ allocation 
system, but are given more explicitly and succinctly.  
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(Clarke et al., 1995, p. 29) 
These considerations, apart from the last, relate to how much benefit the organ or 
scarce resource can give to the patient.  However, if other considerations such as 
how much benefit the organ could give to society were also considered, even 
better use of the organ could be made. 
Take a situation where there is a research scientist who has made, and is 
continuing to make, discoveries on how to cure deadly diseases, and a recluse, 
unemployed, friendless individual with no family.  Both individuals require an 
organ transplant, but there is only one organ available and it must go to either the 
scientist or the recluse.  Both patients are in urgent need, and both patients will 
make a full recovery with another 20 years good health ahead of them.  It could be 
argued that giving the organ to the scientist would be a better option as not only 
would the scientist benefit from the organ, but so too would the rest of society.  
However, if the organ were given to the recluse, only the recluse would benefit.  In 
either case, the organ would not have been wasted as it has saved someone’s life, 
however, in the case of allocating the organ to the scientist, the organ has been put 
to better use by way of it not only saving a patient, but also creating extra welfare 
for society.  By considering the wider effects the transplant has outside those for 
the patient, more welfare has been created than would have been created if these 
effects were not considered.   
The scientist’s survival has the potential to change society for the better and to 
save lives all around the world with their research, and their death means that 
society will miss out on this.  The death of the recluse on the other hand, will have 
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no such impact.  Whilst it may seem insensitive to point it out, the death or survival 
of the recluse has little impact on society, or indeed anyone (apart from the patient 
himself and the city funeral directors brought in to deal with the deceased).  To 
give the organ to them would be a comparatively poor use of the resource if it were 
to mean the scientist would die instead.  The scientist has more instrumental value 
to society than the recluse does, and by including the instrumental social value of 
the patients in the organ allocation decision, more overall welfare can be created 
whilst still achieving the maximum benefit for the patient cohort.  Of course, it can 
be expected that making such assessments as to which patient has the most 
instrumental value in real cases will not be as straightforward as in this 
deliberately extreme case, but nevertheless, it serves to highlight the role 
instrumental value could play in organ allocation.   
This is the crux of the argument for altering the current organ allocation system.  
Even though the organs are not being wasted as they are saving people’s lives, and 
they are being used wisely to an extent, the benefit that the organ has to offer could 
be increased further.  The current system falls short in that not enough emphasis 
is placed on the fact that the organ available for transplant has more benefit to 
offer than simply saving just one person’s life.  If organs were allocated based on 
how valuable patients’ lives are to society (alongside the needs-based system), 
with the most socially valuable (and urgent) patients receiving priority, then the 
welfare that is created from each organ transplant is greatly increased, and the 
detriment caused to society by the death of one of its valuable members is 
reduced.   By allocating organs in this way, not only will the patient who receives 
the organ benefit, but also the society to which they belong. 
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Under the current system, in general, those who need an organ the most receive 
priority for the organ (provided they are medically suitable) even if it means that 
the situation in the example mentioned above occurs.  A patient may be given 
priority for treatment over another similarly urgent patient, despite the 
consequences of the death of this other patient being more detrimental.  With 
kidneys, even though urgency does not play as large a role for adults as it does for 
other organs, the same situation could occur if the recluse were a more suitable 
match to the available organ than the scientist, or more importantly, if the recluse 
had been on the waiting list for a longer period.  The organ could be transplanted 
to an individual whose survival or death has no real consequences (beyond 
themselves), or at least only a minor impact on the welfare of society, even if it 
means that someone whose contribution to society is extremely important may 
die instead whilst waiting for the next available organ.  Allocating organs in a way 
that takes into account the patient’s instrumental value to society can rectify this 
situation.  There are of course, considerations other than maximising efficiency of 
resource use that also need to be taken into account, such as equality of access, 
fairness and justice, and deontological considerations relating to the moral 
equality of individuals (which will be discussed later in the thesis), that may place 
a constraint on the extent of the increase of benefits. 
It must be noted that if a social value criterion is used, it does not necessarily have 
to be the case (and indeed in the system that I propose, is not the case) that those 
most in need of an organ transplant under the current use of the term urgency will 
miss out on the chance of a transplant to someone who is in less need but more 
valuable to society.  People’s lives are still important, and so those people who are 
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in most need of an organ should be treated first, as is currently the case.  To not 
treat these people first may result in their unnecessary and untimely deaths.  (If 
these urgent patients whose deaths were relatively imminent were treated first, 
significantly less urgent patients would still be able to be treated later on as they 
have longer left to live.)  However, in a situation where there is more than one 
person who is in need of an organ, and they are at a similar level of urgency or 
need, in order to realise the extra benefit that the organ can provide, the organ 
should be given to the person whose contribution to society is most important.  
For example, patients waiting for a heart transplant on the urgent waiting list are 
all classed as being of the same urgency, and once on the waiting list, if there is 
more than one patient who is a suitable match, the organ goes to the person who 
has been waiting the longest (NHSBT, 2015h).  In the case of kidneys, if there is 
more than one patient who is a medically suitable match for the available organ, 
and has an equal amount of points from the other criteria of distance from the 
organ and age difference from the donor, the organ would be given to the patient 
who had been on the waiting list the longest.  What I suggest instead, is that rather 
than relying on a first-come first-served system (the problems of which will be 
discussed in the second half of this chapter) for patients who are at the same level 
of urgency and suitably matched, the organ should be given to the person who is 
most instrumentally valuable to society.  In this way, those who are in most need 
of an organ receive treatment first, but the benefit created for society is increased 
by the most instrumentally socially valuable of those patients being given priority. 
Despite this, there may be situations in which it would be reasonable to allocate 
an organ to someone whose need for a transplant is less urgent under the current 
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use of the term ‘urgency’.  For example: suppose there are two patients waiting for 
the same suitable organ, with one patient being in urgent need but who is less 
socially valuable, and the other patient in slightly less urgent need but who is more 
socially valuable.  If there were only one suitable organ likely to become available 
before the less urgent more but socially valuable patient would die without a 
transplant, then they should receive the organ.  The reason for this is that if the 
more urgent patient were to receive the organ first, the less urgent patient would 
likely die before another suitable organ becomes available, and the extra welfare 
that could have been saved/created from saving the more socially valuable, but 
less urgent patient would be lost.  The problem with the use of the term urgency 
under the current system is that it doesn’t factor in that both of these patients are 
really at the same level of urgency.  Regardless of whoever receives the organ in 
this example, the patient who is not the recipient will die before another organ is 
likely to become available.  As such, the term urgency should encompass all those 
patients who are likely to die before another suitable organ is likely to become 
available.  This revised criterion for the grouping of patients into the urgency 
categories better reflects the actual urgency of the patients in a practical setting. 
So out of those patients who will die before another suitable organ becomes 
available, the most socially valuable patient should be allocated as the recipient.  
If there are 4 patients in this group and only one organ to allocate, 3 patients are 
going to die no matter who receives the organ, regardless of imminent need.  And 
so, in such a circumstance, it seems reasonable to allocate the organ to the patient 
whose continued life will provide the most benefit to society; this way, the overall 
detriment that is caused by the deaths of the patients is reduced.  (The redefinition 
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of urgency is discussed in more detail in the next chapter under the heading “How 
Will the New System Work: Option 1”.) 
Of course, treating patients as individuals, and trying to give them each the care 
and treatment that is best for them is a commendable aim, and common practice 
in doctor-patient relationships.  Indeed, in other areas of healthcare where 
resources are not as scarce, such an approach is ideal.  Advocating for the inclusion 
of social value considerations to be taken into account when resources are not 
limited would provide less benefit the more plentiful the resources are.  However, 
when resources are scarce, taking into account the wider effects of allocation 
decisions will provide extra benefit, just as is the case regarding the £30,000 QALY 
(quality adjusted life years) limit in Britain (NICE, 2015c).  Because monetary 
resources are limited, there is a loose cap on how much money can be spent per 
QALY (depending on their circumstances) in order that the available financial 
resources can provide as much benefit as possible.  The utilitarian nature of the 
financial-QALY will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
I acknowledge that the idea of including social value criteria into an organ 
allocation system does raise a number of ethical issues.  But before I discuss these 
in detail, I will first look at some of the other problems with the current allocation 
system, and how the inclusion of social value considerations in patient selection 
could rectify them.       
 
Unfair to certain individuals due to waiting time criterion 
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Whilst the current system may adequately decide which patients are suitable for 
an organ transplant in the first place and which patients are a suitable match for 
an available organ, the way in which the final decision is made as to who receives 
the available organ is flawed.  As previously mentioned, patients are generally 
ordered on the waiting list according to how urgently they require a transplant.  
However, of the most urgent patients who are a suitable match for the available 
organ, (both physiologically and in proximity to the organ), and at relatively the 
same level of urgency and prognosis, it is the patient who has been on the waiting 
list the longest who would receive the organ (NHSBT, 2015h).  It is this inclusion 
of waiting time as a deciding factor where the problem lies. 
Allocating resources on a first-come, first-served basis is fair when those 
interested parties all have the option to claim the resource from the same date, 
and are aware of the option.  However, in the case of organ transplants, people 
who are in urgent need of a transplant may have been registered on the waiting 
list for a shorter or longer time than someone else on the waiting list through no 
fault of their own.  Take the case of two patients who are both in equally urgent 
need of a transplant, and for kidneys, are an equally suitable match; one patient's 
illness may have presented itself early on, whereas the other patient's illness may 
have developed later, but progressed more aggressively and plateaued to the same 
progression rate as the first patient.  Both patients have the same level of need for 
the transplant, and both patients are an equally suitable match, but (everything 
else being equal) it will be the patient who has been on the waiting list the longest 
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who will receive treatment first.11  I argue that it is unfair to use waiting time as a 
criterion in this situation given that the two patients did not have the opportunity 
to register on the waiting list at the same time, as one patient did not even have 
their illness at the same time as the other.  The patient who has suffered the 
shorter but more aggressive illness is being penalised for not having their illness 
for as long, despite the fact that they are in just as much need, and just as suitable 
a recipient, as the patient who has had the longer, less aggressive form of illness, 
and who too had no control over when their illness presented itself, and its 
progression rate.12  I suggest that replacing this waiting time criterion with a social 
value criterion would create more benefit overall, for both the recipient and 
society, and remove what might be seen as an unfair criterion that disadvantages 
some individuals without providing any real benefit.  It might be pointed out that 
if social value considerations were included in organ allocation decisions as a 
replacement for a waiting time criterion, patients may still be disadvantaged 
based on circumstances that are outside of their control, and so why should this 
be a preferable option given that a waiting time criterion is not preferable for this 
exact reason?  The difference between the two criteria however, is that the waiting 
time criterion is not morally relevant, and creates less benefit than a social value 
criterion.  The patient who has been waiting the longest may not have suffered any 
more overall than the patient with the shorter, more aggressive illness; they may 
                                                      
11 There is a provision however, which helps to rectify injustices when a patient was not registered 
on a waiting list when they should have been: “6.12.2 If a patient was not (re)activated on the list 
when it is documented that they should have been and where the relevant allocation system 
includes waiting time as a factor, the waiting times should be amended. This should be approved 
by the relevant Chair of the Advisory Group (or Deputy when appropriate).”  (NHSBT, 2014d) 
12 However, if the patient were in significantly more need, this would be taken into account and 
they could be registered as super-urgent (MacGowan et al., 2013). 
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have suffered for longer, but perhaps not to the same intensity.  With a social value 
criterion however, even though patients may still be disadvantaged due to 
circumstances that are outside of their control, the reasons for its use are morally 
relevant and based on objective judgements that should ultimately increase 
overall welfare.13  (The moral reason for the inclusion of a social value criterion 
will be discussed later in this chapter.) 
A further problem with the first-come, first-served element of the allocation 
criteria is that it may unjustifiably favour the well off to the detriment of the less 
well off.  Whilst many people endorse a first-come first-served system for the 
distribution of resources in particular circumstances, such as intensive care beds 
(American Thoracic Society Bioethics Task Force, 1997) and organs for transplant 
(Childress, 2001), with The American Thoracic Society defending the principle as 
“a natural lottery” within an egalitarian approach for fair resource allocation 
(American Thoracic Society Bioethics Task Force, 1997), others claim it does just 
the opposite (Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, pp. 423–424).  
Even though a first-come, first-served system, just like with lottery allocation, 
ignores differences between people, it doesn't necessarily treat people equally, or 
at least, it does not make the opportunity equally accessible for all.  “It favours 
people who are well-off, who become informed, and travel more quickly, and can 
queue for interventions without competing for employment or child-care 
concerns” (Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, p. 424).   If a first-come, first-
served approach is to be truly equitable, then all potential recipients of the scarce 
                                                      
13 The way in which these social value judgments can be made objectively will be discussed in detail 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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resource must be able to present themselves in a timely fashion.  If patients with 
insurance, or who are more well off, or who can join the queue faster due to fewer 
commitments are likely to be diagnosed as having end stage organ failure earlier 
than patients without insurance, or who are less well off, or with more 
commitments, then a first-come, first-served approach inappropriately favours 
some patients over others.  “Injustice can arise not only from treating the equal 
unequally, but also from treating the unequal equally”, and it is this injustice that 
can arise in a first-come first-served system (Leenen, 1982, p. 33). 
Furthermore, the queues of a first-come, first-served waiting list system are also 
vulnerable to bias or corruption.  The relationship between a referring doctor and 
a consultant may affect a patient’s place on the waiting list (1982, p. 33), or, as the 
pandemic influenza planners for New York state pointed out: “Those who could 
figuratively (and sometimes literally) push to the front of the line would be 
vaccinated and stand the best chance for survival” (Bilittier, 2005, pp. 267–268). 
In short, “first-come, first-served [systems] allow morally irrelevant qualities - 
such as wealth, power, and connections - to decide who receives scarce 
interventions, and is therefore practically flawed” (Persad, Wertheimer and 
Emanuel, 2009, pp. 423–424).  Of course, not all of the problems with a first-come, 
first-served system are unique to this system alone; other systems may also be 
vulnerable to corruption and misuse to a larger or smaller extent.  But it remains 
the case that a first-come, first-served system could be easily manipulated, e.g. by 
GPs exploiting their relationships with consultants to place patients in the queue 
for treatment earlier.   
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The objection that a first-come, first-served allocation system allows morally 
irrelevant qualities to influence who receives scarce resources, might also be 
levied against a system that incorporates social value considerations.  After all, in 
both systems, non-medical factors will play a part in determining who can/will 
receive resources.  However, simply because there are non-medical factors in play 
in both systems, it does not mean that in both systems the non-medical factors are 
morally irrelevant.  Within the social value allocation system, the non-medical 
factors that would influence who receives treatment will make better use of the 
organ by way of creating more welfare and minimising the overall harm and 
detriment caused by the death of patients, whilst still maintaining a level of 
fairness and justice; these ‘morally irrelevant’ factors are necessary in order to 
achieve the aims of the system.  Within a first-come, first-served allocation system 
on the other hand, the non-medical factors that affect whether a person receives 
treatment offer no such benefit.14  The non-medical criteria simply favour those 
individuals who are in more privileged positions. 
The reason why the non-medical criteria of a social value allocation system should 
be considered morally relevant is because one of the aims of a health care system 
is to ensure that the limited resources available are put to best use, as 
demonstrated by the contra-indications that exclude certain patients as being 
suitable recipients and the current criteria that a patient must meet to be 
considered as a possible recipient.  For example, the current healthcare system in 
the UK will not allocate a liver or kidney to a patient who is unlikely to live for 
more than 5 or 2 years (respectively) after the transplant, as more welfare could 
                                                      
14 (Or if they do, it is not intentional.) 
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be created by allocating that organ to someone who will live a lot longer  (NHSBT, 
2014j, 2015j).  The welfare created here in regard to the caveat is mainly for the 
patient as measured by QALYs, however it also makes good use of the organs for 
society by not allocating them to patients who will get significantly less life years 
from the transplant than other patients, thereby likely increasing overall welfare.  
It is these kinds of moral considerations in the current system relating to welfare 
promotion that makes the non-medical social value criteria morally relevant too, 
but for more than just the cohort of patients, as will be shown in the following 
section. 
 
The further utility argument 
The issue of promoting utility brings me on to the next problem with the current 
allocation system in that, despite the partly utilitarian elements within the current 
system, it does not go far enough to increase the utility created from each organ 
allocation.  The way the final decision is made with regards to which patient 
receives the organ is not consistent with the rest of the reasoning that has 
preceded it.  The whole organ transplant process, from organ retrieval right the 
way through to patient selection, is centred around avoiding “wasting” the organ, 
and “promoting” the benefit the organ can give, but with the main focus being the 
benefit for the patient.  For example, when the organ is removed from a donor, it 
is kept in conditions to avoid its deterioration, it is transported to the place of the 
recipient as quickly as possible to avoid further deterioration again (Organ 
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Donation Taskforce, 2008), and the patient selected to be the recipient of the 
organ is chosen for a number of reasons, all of which give the organ the best chance 
possible of being used for the rest of its usable life, e.g. the patient has a better 
prognosis or is a more suitable match than another possible recipient.  And 
patients who are excluded from the waiting list are done so on the grounds of 
avoiding the futile employment of a resource on medical grounds.  From beginning 
to end, the driving force behind the transplant process is to make good use of the 
organ.  The process could be seen as having utilitarian elements to it in that it aims 
to increase the amount of utility created from each organ (not maximise the utility) 
but it only does so in the limited scope of the relationship between the organ and 
patient, and with only minor consideration given to the wider effects.  There is still 
room for more utility to be created, without a significant increase in harm, if this 
utilitarian element of the allocation process were taken a little further.  Given the 
limited utility promotion that is present in the current system, further promotion 
of the utility that can be created through an organ transplant by considering the 
wider effects other than those for the patient alone, may appeal.  Even though the 
current system does attempt to promote organ utility through medical criteria, 
failing to consider certain other criteria that may further increase utility is 
inconsistent with the nature of the rest of the allocation process. 
The consequentialist nature of the process falls at the last hurdle, or stops short of 
the last hurdle, perhaps on grounds of fairness and equality of access, or perhaps 
just because of social taboo.  If the consequentialist nature of the process was to 
be extended, the patient selected to be the recipient of the organ should not simply 
be the patient who is in most urgent need, but rather the patient who will allow 
 68 
even further utility to be created through the organ transplant.  Choosing a patient 
who is in urgent need obviously helps to promote utility by saving a patient who 
would otherwise die, but factoring in other non-medical considerations, namely 
value to society, would also help.  In this way, not only has better use of the organ 
been made by allocating it to the most medically suitable urgent recipient who 
stands the best chance at using the organ for the rest of its usable life, but it has 
also helped to realise the utility potential of the organ by allocating it to the 
recipient who is likely to contribute the most to society. 
If the current organ allocation system is already based on a limited 
consequentialist approach, then there are at least some grounds for considering 
whether this approach can be extended to include considerations outside of those 
for the patient alone.  The impact and benefit that an organ can create does not 
stop at the patient who receives it; the continued life that the recipient has impacts 
society, and to promote the best use of the organ, these impacts and effects should 
be taken into account, with those patients who will have the best impact on society 
being the preferred recipients. 
Note here that when talking about the limited utilitarian nature of the current 
system, and the possibility of extending this element, the aim is not to actually 
maximise utility and welfare at all costs; the aim is simply the promotion of welfare.  
If the aim were to maximise welfare, then the allocation process and patient 
selection criteria for organs may involve violations of other values, such as 
equality, and respect for life, that are almost universally important.  It may mean 
excluding certain groups from treatment, or giving certain patients priority for 
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treatment even though they are not in urgent need.  Simply promoting the increase 
in welfare however, rather than attempting to maximise it, means that other 
important values can still be taken into account and balanced against the increase 
in welfare.  “[U]tilitarian considerations can properly be used, provided that we 
continually look over our shoulders, as it were, to see how far we are departing 
from an ideal of equality.  Such careful use of utilitarian criteria allows for rational 
decisions to be made in many cases where we would otherwise be reduced to 
random selection” (Langford, 1992, p. 14). 
 
Alternative allocation systems 
Introduction 
I have already mentioned that allocating organs to patients based on criteria that 
includes their value to society will make better use of such a scarce resource, but 
in the interests of fairness, it would be beneficial to briefly look at some other 
alternative systems to see if they too may provide any increased benefit, and 
whether or not they provide a better option over the inclusion of social value 
considerations in terms of equality of access, distributive justice, and welfare 
creation. 
There are a number of possible alternative principles for allocating resources, 
other than focusing on a patient's need (e.g. random selection, youngest first, 
merit), however, if a system is based on just one of these principles, it is unlikely 
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to encompass all of the relevant values and considerations to ensure fair and 
effective distribution of the resources (Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009); 
this will become clear in the discussion below.   When combined with the needs-
based system already in place however, these alternative systems become more 
ethically acceptable, but only one of these alternatives, namely social value 
combined with the needs-based system, would provide significant overall benefits 
over the current system.15   
I will begin by first looking at saving the most lives, then move on to examine 
welfare/QALY maximisation, youngest first and fair innings, random allocation, 
and merit allocation. 
 
Save the most lives (easiest to treat first) 
Allocating organs in such a way as to save the most lives is similar to the medical 
need system that is currently in place, but instead of the main focus being to save 
those who are most in need of treatment regardless of how complicated the 
operation is (alongside taking into account other factors such as QALYs, waiting 
time, and long-term prognosis), the focus here is often on providing treatment to 
those who can most easily and readily be saved.  Not all patients who are most in 
need of treatment will have a good prognosis even if they receive the required 
treatment as some treatments and procedures carry a higher risk than others, 
                                                      
15 Douglas B. White et al. have proposed a similar multi-principle strategy to allocate ventilators in 
a public health emergency, but with medical need being combined with saving the most life years 
and preferring patients in the younger stages of life (White et al., 2009). 
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both inherently, and for individual patients.  As such, the thought here is that the 
focus should be on saving those who we know can be saved, thereby saving the 
most lives and minimising the risk of wasting the resources that are available on 
patients who may not benefit. This type of approach is frequently used in military 
and disaster triage situations where there are usually many people who are in 
need of medical attention, with only limited numbers of people able to provide the 
required treatment (Lee, 2010).  By focusing resources on those patients who can 
most easily and readily be saved, it ensures that more lives are saved (even if only 
in the short term).  Significant amounts of time and resources are not spent on the 
more difficult to treat patients whose treatment needs are more complex, whilst 
the condition of the easier to treat patients deteriorates. 
However, when allocating organs for transplant, a policy that aims to save the 
most lives may result in the organs not being put to best use, or at least, not being 
used as well as they are under the current system.  If patients are selected for a 
transplant simply because their life can most easily and readily be saved, it might 
offer the benefit of using the organ in an operation where there is a high chance 
that the patient will survive, however, the length of survival time is not taken into 
account.  If using a “save the most lives” policy, an organ may be given to someone 
who may only survive for five more years, over someone who could survive for 
twenty more years, simply because their life is easier to save at the time.  If 
everything were equal, then aiming to save the most lives may be a suitable 
approach to organ allocation, but because things are rarely equal (some lives 
having been shorter than others; 20-year-olds having lived less than 70-year-olds, 
and so some lives can be extended longer than others), other considerations need 
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to included.   
Another important aspect alongside the length of the life that is saved is the quality 
of the life that will be saved.  A “save the most lives” system on its own would not 
take this into account and may favour those who can most readily be saved but 
whose quality of life would be minimal over a patient whose quality of life would 
be much higher but may be more difficult to treat.  Furthermore, if saving the most 
lives is the aim of the policy, and people who can most readily and assuredly be 
saved are treated first, it may result in patients being treated who could survive 
for longer without a transplant before other patients who may soon die, but whose 
transplant operation would have taken more time and skill, but perhaps had a 
better prognosis.  This could lead to the unnecessary and untimely deaths of those 
patients who are most in need, but the survival of those less urgent, but easy to 
save patients, who would likely have survived until another organ became 
available anyway.  It is not enough to simply save the most lives; other 
considerations need to be included as well.  A save the most lives system alone 
may maximise the numbers of lives saved, but it is not an ideal system as it does 
not take into account the quality of those lives saved, or the number of additional 
life years.   
When combined with the current allocation system however, some of these other 
factors are considered, so that not only those patients who are the easiest to save 
are treated, but also those who are most in need of treatment.  Of the patients who 
are in most need of treatment, those whose lives can most readily be saved would 
be treated first.  And if the other considerations of the current system are taken 
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into account too, such as one of the contra-indications for a transplant being 
having an expected survival rate of less than 5 years even with a transplant, the 
“save the most lives” system becomes more acceptable. But despite the increased 
acceptability of this save the most lives/needs-based combination system, it offers 
only minor advantages over the current system, and as will be shown later in this 
chapter, significantly less than a social value/needs-based combination system. 
 
Youngest first or fair innings 
Another possible organ allocation method would be to allocate the organs to the 
youngest patients first, with the reasoning being that “there is some span of life 
years considered a reasonable life and that societal obligations owed to those who 
have had this life span are less than to those who have not…” (Rothstein, 2011, p. 
7).  “[A]nyone failing to achieve this [span of life years] has in some sense been 
cheated, whilst anyone getting more than this is ‘living on borrowed time’” 
(Williams, 1997, p. 119).  Resources would be directed to those who have had less 
life years, or to those who had not yet reached the amount of life years considered 
for a ‘reasonable life’ (fair innings).16  Even if the organ is transplanted into an 
older patient whose expected survival time is longer than 5 years with an organ 
transplant, (everything else being equal) it is still likely that a younger patient will 
live longer than a more mature patient by virtue of simply being younger.  
                                                      
16 In the current British organ allocation system, children do already receive priority for suitable 
organs, however the reason for this is more to do with suitably sized organs for them becoming 
available less often, and that they may be prone to irreparable damage in certain circumstances if 
treatment is postponed (NHSBT, 2014f, 2015g). 
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Similarly, when allocating vaccines in an influenza pandemic, the young are 
prioritised (U.S Department of Health and Human Services, 2008), but again, it 
could be argued that this is due to their vulnerability rather than simply as means 
to fulfilling any societal obligations to ensure that the young achieve whatever 
span of years is considered a reasonable life. 
But despite the current prioritisation of children for particular resources being 
mainly due to their vulnerability, there is still something to be said for prioritising 
them, and other young patients due to the life that they have not yet lived, and for 
de-prioritising those patients who have had a ‘fair innings’. 
Allocating resources, especially life-saving resources, to the youngest patients 
first, who are arguably the worst-off as they would otherwise die having had the 
fewest life-years (Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, p. 425), means that 
they have the opportunity to have something supremely valuable that older 
patients have already had access to: more life years (Kamm, 1993). This means 
that those patients who have already reached old age or who are closely 
approaching it “would not have their lives further prolonged when this could only 
be achieved at the cost of the lives of those who were not nearing old age” (Harris, 
1985, p. 93).  Treating the older person in a situation where it means that the 
younger person would die would be inherently inequitable.  “The younger person 
would get no more years than the relatively few he has already had, whereas the 
older person, who has already had more than the younger person, will get several 
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years more" (Lockwood, 1988, p. 50).17 
However, if the principle of allocating resources to the youngest patients first was 
strictly adhered to, it may give rise to intuitively unfavourable situations where 
infants are the main recipients of available resources (Emanuel and Wertheimer, 
2006).  Two-month-old babies would be prioritized for life saving treatment over 
twenty-year-old young adults because they have had less life, despite the fact that 
the death of a twenty-year-old is intuitively worse than the death of a two-month-
old (McKie and Richardson, 2005; Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, p. 
425).  “The 20-year-old has a much more developed personality than the infant, 
and has drawn upon the investment of others to begin as-yet-unfulfilled projects” 
(Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, p. 425). 
Furthermore, as objected in the other alternative systems, if the allocation policy 
were based solely on the one main feature, in this case, allocating to the youngest 
first, then it would result in the unnecessary deaths of patients due to prognosis 
not being taken into account.  If organs were allocated to the youngest patients 
first as the sole criterion, it could result in younger patients who may not require 
an organ immediately, and whose death is not imminent, receiving a transplant 
                                                      
17 It should be noted that the span of life-years considered to amount to a reasonable life or to 
having had a fair innings will differ from region to region with there not necessarily being a set age 
constituting having reached this point (Williams, 1997, p. 123).  Even on a more local scale within 
the same region there may be differences between what constitutes a fair innings, with upper 
classes generally having higher life expectancies and the lower classes having lower life 
expectancies (Dunnell et al., 2018).  This raises the question of whether the life-years required to 
reach the point of a fair innings will be higher for those who would generally have a longer life 
expectancy than those who would generally have a shorter life expectancy.  
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before other patients whose need is greater, and whose death without a 
transplant, will occur sooner.   
However, if a youngest first or fair innings approach was combined with the 
needs-based system already in place, this method of resource allocation becomes 
more acceptable.  Of those patients who are most in need, and have a suitable 
prognosis with treatment, the youngest patients could be prioritised.  The benefits 
of this are that it does not necessarily mean that it would be mainly infants who 
would receive resources, and older patients are not categorically excluded from 
consideration for treatment, as suggested by Daniel Callahan who recommends 
strict age cut-offs for scarce life-saving interventions (Callahan, 1995).  In a 
youngest first/needs-based combination system, even if there were only two 
older patients who are a suitable match for an organ, and both in urgent need, 
neither has to be passed over for treatment in favour of a young patient who is in 
less urgent need; it would simply be the youngest of the two older patients who 
would be selected.  Those older patients who are most in need will not be pushed 
further down the waiting list by younger patients whose health needs are less 
urgent.   
But again, despite the increased acceptability of the system when combined with 
the needs-based approach, it still does not offer as much benefit as a social value 
combination system would.  It might be true that there are more life years saved 
overall, and the young have been given an opportunity to extend their life to what 
will hopefully be a normal lifespan, but these benefits mainly affect the individual 
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patients, whereas a social value combination system will not only benefit the 
individual patients, but also the wider society. 
 
Prognosis or life-years 
A similar alternative allocation system to prioritising the youngest first is to 
allocate resources in such a way that the most life years are saved.  The difference 
here however, is that resources are allocated in such a way to maximise the most 
amount of life years saved with the motivating idea being that living more years is 
valuable, and so saving more years is also valuable (Kamm, 1993; Persad, 
Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, p. 425).  Allocating resources to the youngest first 
attempts to rectify, or at least limit, the perceived injustice and inequality of young 
patients not having had enough life years as individuals, whereas a system 
allocating resources in order to maximise the amount of life years saved does not 
look to try to rectify any kind of inequality.  It simply seeks to maximise the 
aggregate benefit of saving something valuable: life years.  However, this does 
cause a tension between the quantity of life-years saved, and their distribution 
(Russell et al., 1996). 
Because the system simply focuses on the aggregate number of life years saved, it 
causes concerns over distributive justice in that it does not take into account just 
who receives these saved life-years, and in what quantities.  The exclusion of a 
distributive consideration means that intuitively un-just and unfavourable 
situations could occur, in which someone who is well-off in terms of life-years 
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lived could be made slightly better off with an extra year of life being given/saved, 
instead of slightly improving the life of someone who is worse-off due to having 
not lived for as long by giving them an extra year of life.  Similarly, there is a 
difference between giving a few life years to many people, and giving many life 
years to a few people, despite the number of life years given being the same 
(Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, p. 425).  Ten extra life-years given to 
one patient will have more of a personal effect on them than 1 extra year of life 
would have on 10 patients.  I am not making a judgement about which distribution 
of life years here is more favourable, but simply highlighting that under this 
approach, the different effects caused by the distribution would not be considered.  
The system also fails to consider the quality of the life years that it is wishing to 
maximise; it does not consider that a shorter life of  higher quality may be more 
preferable to some, than a longer life with a lower quality.  Five extra active life 
years for a patient may be more preferable to them than 10 extra life years being 
bed-bound. 
Even if saving the most life years was combined with the needs-based system, 
making it a more viable allocation system than if it were based on saving the most 
life-years alone, it would offer less benefit than the social value combination 
system.  An increased amount of life years saved is not the most important thing 
to be considered, and it does not necessarily offer any increased benefit on a wider 
scale.  Any benefit created mainly relates to the individual patient, with little 
benefit being passed on to wider society.   
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QALY maximization 
The number of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) that can be expected after 
treatment is already a consideration that is part of mainstream resource allocation 
in the UK.  The reason why QALYs play such a prominent role in UK resource 
allocation is because for the most part, healthcare in the UK is restricted by 
financial constraints.  In order to ensure there are enough financial resources 
available to provide at least basic care for the whole population, QALYs can be 
used to determine the appropriate amount of money that should be spent on a 
patient for a particular treatment dependent on their prognosis.  The benefit of 
using QALYs within resource allocation decisions is that it helps to ensure that 
best value for money is made, with treatments not being offered if they will not 
offer a significant improvement in quality of life and life years gained, whilst 
safeguarding the limited financial resources available overall so that more people 
can receive the treatment they require.  In this way, vast sums of money are 
protected from being swallowed up by paying for particularly expensive 
treatments that may only provide marginal, if any, increases in wellbeing.  
Individual patients will not draw away huge sums of money at the detriment to 
other patients, as may be the case if a financial limit per QALY were not in place.  
QALYs are a way of attempting to make the best use of the financial resources 
available by ensuring that there is enough money available to provide at least 
basic care to everyone.   
When it comes to the application of QALYs to organ allocation however, the 
justification for its use would have to differ slightly from its financial justification, 
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as organs are not limited in availability in the same way that financial resources 
are.  Financial resource limitations can be solved by simply making more funds 
available from somewhere else, whereas organ resource limitations cannot.  
Organ resources are limited in a physical way through donation numbers, and 
simply making more available from elsewhere is not possible.  Whilst the 
justification for QALYs on financial grounds is that it ensures there are enough 
funds for basic treatment for everyone, the same approach could not be used with 
organ allocation because of these physical resource limitations.  An organ cannot 
be split between all the patients who require it in order to provide all with some 
improvement in quality of life; the organ has to be given in its entirety and to only 
one patient.18  In effect, the recipient has used up the available resource to the 
detriment of the other possible recipients in a way that would be unlikely to 
happen if the resource limitations were financial, and QALYs were used to allocate 
the finances.  This is not to say that QALYs do not have a place in organ allocations 
decisions, but simply that their role is slightly different.  Instead of playing a role 
in the distribution of resources among many recipients, within organ allocation 
decisions, QALYs would look at which individual would receive the resource in its 
entirety.  Each patient can expect a different number of quality adjusted life years 
after treatment, and so the patient who would have the greatest amount would be 
favoured for treatment. 
However, the problems with using QALYs in this way, and indeed with using 
QALYs in general, is that it is much more likely that the young will be favoured for 
                                                      
18 There are some organs which can be divided into parts, such as livers and lungs, but they cannot 
be divided into the number of parts to match the number of patients who require them and remain 
viable for transplant. 
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treatment over the old, given the fact that young people can generally be expected 
to have more life years left by virtue of them simply being younger.  This kind of 
discrimination on the grounds of age could be said to violate elements of 
distributive justice in that older people will not receive treatment even if they will 
make a full recovery. 
Furthermore, a QALY approach to allocating resources does not consider the start 
and end point of a patient’s quality of life.  “It disregards the fact that a small but 
significant improvement for a person in a bad state may be preferred by society to 
a more substantial improvement for a person in a less severe state (in Norway this 
preference is part of the official guidelines for prioritising in the national health 
service)” (Nord, 1992, p. 875).  Whilst adhering to public preferences is not always 
a wise decision when it comes to making healthcare resource decisions given that 
the public do not have the relevant level of expertise to make these decisions 
objectively, and public views are notoriously fickle (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; 
Ubel, 1999; Litva et al., 2002), there is still something to be said for the difference 
between making someone who is well off, marginally better off, and making a less 
well-off person marginally better off. 
As a distribution system for resources, it may increase the overall number of life 
years with a higher quality of life created from treatment, but it does not maximise 
the utility that is created from the allocation of the resources.  Simply because a 
person may live for longer with a higher quality of life does not mean that the 
resource has been put to best use, especially when QALYs are used in organ 
allocation decisions.  It is only the individual patient who is taken into account 
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when QALYs are used in this setting.  There are other alternative allocation 
systems that would offer more benefit, such as a social value system, as will be 
shown later in this section.  
 
Random organ allocation 
Another possible alternative for allocating scarce medical resources, such as 
organs, is to allocate them randomly to suitable recipients.  The benefit of random 
allocation is that it means no one is favoured over anyone else; as long as the 
selection is being made from a group of people who are all a suitable tissue match, 
everyone stands the same chance of being allocated the organ.  This system avoids 
prejudice entering into the decision, which is a problem other allocation systems 
face, and giving each person an equal claim to a scarce resource also helps to 
reflect the equal moral status of each person (Ramsey, 2002).  Furthermore, as 
mentioned previously, resources such as organs are indivisible in a way that other 
resources are not, and so a kidney or a heart cannot be equally divided between 
the patients who require it.  In order to treat patients equally in this circumstance, 
it means giving them equal opportunity of access rather than equal amounts of the 
resource (Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, pp. 423–424).  
However, random organ allocation may result in unnecessary deaths if the patient 
cohort as a whole is included for possible selection, as the organ may be randomly 
allocated to someone who is not in immediate need of an organ, resulting in the 
death of another patient who was in immediate need.  By not taking into account 
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a patient’s urgency and prognosis, an organ allocation system based on random 
selection would result in many unnecessary and untimely deaths. 
If a random allocation system did take into account urgency and prognosis, with 
only those patients who are in most urgent need and have a good prognosis being 
put forward for random selection, it would make a random allocation system more 
acceptable by limiting the amount of unnecessary and untimely deaths whilst still 
maintaining equality of access.  However, it would not offer as much overall 
benefit as a social value allocation system that took into account urgency and 
prognosis.  It may have placed more emphasis on providing an equal chance at 
receiving an organ, but the benefit that is created from this allocation mainly 
benefits only the individual recipient, and their friends and dependents.  A social 
value combination system on the other hand, offers wider benefits whilst still 
maintaining an appropriate level of equal access by not excluding any medically 
suitable patient from the waiting list.  To adhere to random allocation on the 
grounds of equal access, even between those patients who are most urgent and 
with a good prognosis fails to take into account other relevant differences between 
patients.  Some patients may be very old or very young, or have a longer or shorter 
life expectancy after treatment, and with different expected qualities of life at that.  
Whilst the exact implications of these considerations might be unclear, they are 
undoubtedly of relevance (Elhauge, 1994).  The addition of a social value criterion 
would take these kinds of considerations into account by looking at the 
contributions that a patient might make to society and the welfare that they would 
create, and how long they can be expected to carry on their contributions.  
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Of course, a random allocation combination system may have an advantage over 
a social value combination system in that it does not require any real 
measurement or prediction of uncertain consequences.19  It also has the advantage 
of being less vulnerable to bias, corruption, and manipulation.  However, these 
advantages only remain advantages as long as the challenges that a social value 
combination system face, are shied away from.  The issue of measurement and 
prediction of future events, actions and consequences admittedly results in 
uncertain predictions, but these need not be wildly inaccurate if based on 
evidenced trends and causal relationships.  At least by attempting to make these 
predictions and basing allocation decisions on them, there is a better chance at 
improving overall welfare than if left to chance alone. 
With regard to the possibility that a social value combination system is more 
vulnerable to bias, corruption, and manipulation than a random allocation system, 
this does not necessarily have to be the case.  If left unchecked, such corruption 
would indeed be likely to enter into the system, but with the proper policing, 
regulation, and reviewing of decisions, there is no reason to suspect that any more 
corruption would enter into the system than is the case for the current allocation 
system.  A random allocation combination system may be less vulnerable to 
corruption than either the current or a social value system, but nevertheless, there 
would likely still be the opportunity for corruption to enter the system if there 
were not the proper policing, regulation and reviewing of decisions present here 
too.  
                                                      
19 Apart from the medical suitability aspect 
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Merit/Reciprocity allocation 
Organ allocation based on merit could also be thought of as something similar to 
deservedness where a patient would be a possible recipient or not dependent on 
how much they deserved to receive an organ.  As such, this approach is backward-
looking in that it rewards past usefulness or sacrifice (Persad, Wertheimer and 
Emanuel, 2009, p. 426). 
Things that might make a patient less deserving of, say, a liver transplant, may be 
where the patient’s illness is self-inflicted, e.g. if the patient had caused their liver 
failure through excessive drinking despite warnings about the health risks.20  
Someone who may deserve to receive a liver transplant however might be 
someone who had dedicated their life to attempting to increase organ donation 
rates or raise awareness of the health risks associated with excessive alcohol 
consumption, are a registered organ donor themselves (Kamm, 1993), or took 
care of their own health, reducing the health resources they require (Morreim, 
1995).  The idea of “fault” and whether or not an illness or injury is self-inflicted 
being present in medical resource allocation considerations is a contentious topic 
in its own right (Sharkey and Gillam, 2010), but its inclusion in organ allocation 
decisions would stop injustices of the kind mentioned in the following example. 
The positive aspect of allocating organs based on a patient’s merit or deservedness 
                                                      
20 It might be replied that cases such as this, amongst others are not entirely self-inflicted as 
someone’s drink problem may be related to past circumstances and events outside of their control.   
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is that it means those individuals who do deserve an organ transplant do not miss 
out to someone who arguably doesn’t.  For example, it would seem completely 
unfair if someone who spent their life warning people of the health risks 
associated with excessive drinking (and did not drink themselves) and promoted 
organ donation, should die waiting for a liver transplant whilst someone with 
alcohol related end stage liver disease (ARESLD) received a transplant first. 
Reciprocity might also be a favourable allocation consideration for priority 
treatment for those patients who are ill through doing activities in which they 
were conscripted into (military), or for which they volunteered to do in order to 
benefit society (nurses looking after contagious patients)21, with the idea being 
that people are provided with assistance for the significant and positive 
contributions that they have made (Macklin, 2004). 
However, even if the idea of deservedness and merit allocation were implemented, 
it may not be of much help in most cases.  In the example above, the patients are 
at the opposite ends of the spectrum to each other in terms of merit, and so it is 
easy to make a distinction between the two patients on who deserves to receive 
the organ most.  But cases towards the middle of the spectrum, it may become 
more difficult to decide.  Suppose, for example, that there are two people who both 
have end stage liver disease through no fault of their own; how does the idea of 
merit help to determine who deserves an organ transplant more?  Tied with the 
                                                      
21 Healthcare practitioners may not always be able refuse to treat someone with a communicable 
disease, and so their treating of these patients might be said to be obligatory rather than voluntary.  
However, the healthcare practitioner presumably pursued their career knowing that this was the 
case, and so their action can still be seen as voluntary to a certain extent.  But even if not, this only 
makes their treating of the contagious patient akin to conscription. 
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idea of merit and deservedness is the notion of “being a good person” and so 
perhaps this idea can help to make a distinction; do people who do good things 
deserve good things to happen to them, whilst people who do bad things deserve 
fewer good things to happen to them?  If one of the patients is having an affair and 
lying to his family about it, should this count against them?  Or if one of the patients 
is not a vegetarian, would that mean they were less of a good person?  Some would 
argue that it would.  The whole concept of being a good person is too subjective to 
be of much use in certain types of situations.  However, if broad strokes are used 
to rule out those who might be less deserving than someone else, such as ruling 
out those patients with ARESLD over those whose liver disease is not self-inflicted, 
then merit allocation could still be a workable system. 
But even if patients’ relative deservedness could be determined, there are still 
other inherent problems with merit/reciprocity allocation.  For instance, in order 
to determine the extent to which someone had lived a healthy lifestyle, or the 
extent to which someone was responsible for their own illness, it would require 
“time-consuming, intrusive, and demeaning enquiries” (Anderson, 1999; Macklin, 
2004; Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009).  And merit/reciprocity allocation 
also faces the same objections as with the other systems; if based solely on merit, 
then it would result in unnecessary deaths.  People who were more deserving of 
an organ would receive an organ before those who are less deserving, even if the 
more deserving patient did not require the transplant immediately.  The less 
deserving patient would die when they did not have to.  Both patients might have 
been saved if the patient in more need was treated first. 
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It remains the case however, that even if extra considerations such as a patient’s 
level of urgency and prognosis were also included for a merit combination system 
so as to minimise the number of untimely and unnecessary deaths, it would not 
create as much welfare from each allocated organ as would be created had the 
organs been allocated using a social value combination system.  Reciprocity is 
inherently backward looking and not future-orientated like social value 
considerations, and so is likely to create less welfare, with its aim being to reward 
positive past actions rather than encouraging positive future actions.22  The organ 
allocation system in Israel uses such a merit system to prioritise patients who are 
registered donors, or who have already donated an organ, rewarding past actions, 
and encouraging others to register as organ donors (Lavee et al., 2010; Quigley, 
Wright and Ravitsky, 2012).  Whilst attempting to increase organ donation rates 
through such incentives is commendable as it helps to reduce the organ shortage, 
it does nothing to increase the welfare created with each transplant.  
The bigger issue however, is that by rewarding past actions, healthcare is turned 
into a ‘prize’ for good behaviour, rather than as a life-saving service for those in 
need.  The inclusion of a social value consideration on the other hand, being 
forward-looking, does not reward people for their past behaviour, but simply uses 
their past behaviour as an indicator of what their future behaviour will be and 
allocates resources accordingly to increase the welfare created by each resource.  
A social value combination system is not rewarding behaviour because the patient 
is more deserving of the resource, as is the case with reciprocity; it is allocating 
                                                      
22 However, it might be argued that rewarding positive past actions will in turn encourage positive 
future actions. 
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the resource to them because their contributions are valuable to society.  
 
Social value organ allocation  
I turn now to the social value allocation system that has been mentioned 
throughout this section, and why it might be a suitable system for the allocation of 
scarce medical resources, especially transplantable organs.  An organ allocation 
system based on a person’s social value would look at how valuable each patient 
is to society and then allocate the organ to the most socially valuable patient out 
of those who are a suitable match.  The idea behind basing resource allocation on 
patients’ social value is that there are some patients who are more instrumentally 
valuable than others, and in order to make the most of the available resources, it 
should be these more instrumentally valuable patients (in terms of meeting the 
needs of society) who are prioritised for treatment.  In this way, the resources do 
not merely provide benefit to the recipient, but also to the wider society.  For 
example, guidelines that suggest priority treatment for workers who produce 
influenza vaccinations embodies social value considerations as this will help to 
save the most lives in an influenza pandemic (Emanuel and Wertheimer, 2006); 
the nature of their job adds to their overall social/instrumental value by helping 
to achieve the aims of the vaccination program, namely, to save lives.  
However, as with all the other alternative allocation systems discussed, if the 
system is based solely on its main feature, the system is not a viable option for 
organ allocation given the number of untimely and unnecessary deaths that would 
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result.  In the case of the social value allocation system, if based solely on a 
patient’s value to society, those patients who are most instrumentally valuable to 
society would be prioritised for treatment over those patients who are less 
socially valuable, even if the less socially valuable patient’s level of urgency were 
greater.  But if the system also took into account the main considerations of the 
current system, namely the patient’s level of urgency and prognosis, then the 
system becomes a more viable option.  The untimely and unnecessary deaths 
could be avoided by the resource being allocated to the most socially valuable 
patient from those who are in most urgent need.   
Furthermore, a social value allocation system differs from the other alternative 
systems in that rather than prioritising patients for one main reason (age, merit, 
etc.) it prioritises patients based on their ability to promote other important 
values (Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009, p. 425).  This means that other 
values and considerations are necessarily important to a social value allocation 
system, although only important insofar as they help to improve society.  A 
person’s life-years lived, whether their illness is self-inflicted, or what their quality 
of life will be after treatment, are all important considerations to take into account 
in order to help determine the likely level of welfare they can contribute to society 
if selected for an organ transplant.  Some of these considerations will play more of 
a role than others, with some being broadly backward looking, such as past 
contributions and self-inflicted illnesses, whereby they are indicators of future 
behaviour.  However, other considerations such as current contributions, job, 
family, and expected lifespan, are more forward looking and predictions of future 
circumstances might be made.  But it is herein these extra, non-medical 
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considerations, that social value allocation becomes problematic.   
The non-medical considerations that are necessarily part of a social value 
allocation criterion are problematic because 1) it introduces non-medical criteria 
into a medial decision, and 2) it might be a difficult task to determine the extent to 
which each non-medical consideration plays in each person’s welfare 
contributions.  The answers to these two problems will be discussed in more detail 
in the following chapter, but I will briefly answer them here in order to move 
forward.  
In answer to the latter problem, it might be difficult to determine the exact extent 
of the role each non-medical consideration plays in a person’s overall welfare 
contribution, and so in turn, it will be difficult to determine a person’s overall 
social value, but it is not an impossible task.  It is possible to make broad strokes 
at first (even if not fine, accurate, strokes), refining and revising the details over 
time with better behaviour prediction methods, and by drawing upon statistics 
regarding how the factors in a person’s life are likely to affect their future 
behaviour in order to determine a person’s social value.   
In answer to the former problem of introducing non-medical criteria into a 
medical decision, the important thing to note is that the included non-medical 
criteria are being used alongside medical criteria to further increase utility. A 
patient’s social value is only one factor that will be considered alongside other 
important medical criteria that are currently used.  Furthermore, it might be 
argued that organs are a social resource, and so on these grounds, the inclusion of 
non-medical criteria in order to increase welfare for society might be acceptable 
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(Truog, 2005).  If organs were a personal resource, then they could be used in 
whatever way the owner wished, however, because donated organs are a societal 
resource (in most cases), they should be used in such a way that most benefits 
society, and this may mean including non-medical considerations in the allocation 
decision. 
It is important to note that the patient would not necessarily be judged on the 
values that society actually holds, but rather, those which are valuable for society; 
the values that will benefit society.  A patient’s instrumental value would be 
assessed objectively by a committee of experts from relevant fields rather than by 
simply accepting society's perceptions and prejudices.  The reasons why the 
contributions that will benefit society will be used instead of the contributions 
that society values, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, however, a brief 
explanation is warranted here. 
If the opinions that society holds, are used as a basis for allocating organs to 
individuals, the goal of making better use of the organs available for transplant 
may not be achieved, given the often prejudiced, misinformed, or uninformed 
opinions society may hold.  For example, three well respected economic institutes 
(the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics, 
CBI/PwC, and Oxford Economics) wrote reports on the economic impacts on 
Britain of leaving the EU, all concluding that leaving the bloc will have a significant 
cost for British households (Centre for Economic Performance, 2016; Oxford 
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Economics, 2016; PwC, 2016).23  Nevertheless, the British public voted to leave 
the European Union.  This may ultimately lead to the majority of the population 
suffering to some extent, and so less overall welfare will be created due to the 
knock-on effects.  As mentioned earlier, economic growth generally correlates 
with overall improvements in quality of life, and as such, is significantly valuable 
to society for promoting welfare (Strange and Bayley, 2008, p. 49).  If the values 
that society holds were used to allocate organs, it may actually end up 
undermining the aim of the social value policy, by in fact reducing overall welfare.  
If experts from the relevant disciplines were to make the decisions about what, 
and who, is socially valuable, there is more chance of the social value system 
achieving the aim of increasing welfare. 
There are also 2 other main problems associated with assessing social benefit, 
namely uncertainty over the prediction of future behaviour from past behaviour 
and circumstances, and assessing what behaviours and skills are likely to produce 
most benefit.  However, these too will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Social value is not as subjective as judgements of merit 
Social value is not “too subjective” in the same way that the concept of merit is 
subjective.  The things that are classed as being socially valuable are based on 
                                                      
23 “For the Centre for Economic Performance, drops in trade with the EU “is likely to cost the UK 
economy far more than is gained from lower contributions to the EU budget”. The CBI/PwC report 
concludes that leaving the EU “would cause a serious shock to the UK economy”, while Oxford 
Economics reports that “our scenario modelling does not give much cause for optimism about the 
impact of Brexit”” (Giles, 2016).   
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what the needs of society are, and when restricted to the basic needs of society, 
these needs can be objectively assessed, and are based on what society actually 
needs to function (Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 
2014b).24  (A more detailed account of the objective nature of societal needs is 
given in Chapter 5 under the heading of Basic societal functions, p.197).  Whether 
or not someone merits receiving an organ transplant is rooted in the perspective 
and values of the individual making the judgement, rather than based on an agreed 
set of conditions.  However, regardless of whether or not we can make an objective 
decision about the deservedness of a patient for an organ, it makes practical sense 
to use a more forward-looking criterion for organ allocation, such as social value.  
Reciprocity is inherently backward looking and not future-orientated like social 
value considerations, and so is likely to create less welfare, with its aim being to 
reward positive past actions rather than encouraging positive future actions.25  
Allocating organs based on merit/deservedness does not help to make the most of 
the organs available by increasing the welfare created with each organ transplant, 
as allocating organs to people who might deserve them does not help to meet the 
current needs of society. 
It is also this difference in motivation that separates judgements of merit 
(assessing past contributions) from judgements of social value (assessing future 
contributions), and so the criticisms of one cannot necessarily be applied to the 
other.  Whilst both approaches might assess a person’s contributions to society, 
                                                      
24 Of course, when it comes to the non-basic needs of society, there is room for subjectivity to figure 
in the assessment as there will be differing opinions on what “luxuries” are most valuable 
depending on the interests of the person opining.    
25 However, it might be argued that rewarding positive past actions will in turn encourage positive 
future actions. 
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under the social value criterion, whether or not a person deserves the organ does 
not figure into the final organ allocation.  The aim of the social value criterion is to 
prioritise patients for treatment based on how valuable their contributions are to 
society, and not whether they deserve the organ or not.  The two approaches are 
distinct and different from each other, and will prioritise different patients in the 
same scenario.  E.g. Patient A and Patient B are both equally suited for an available 
liver, but Patient B is significantly more socially valuable.  Patient A deserves the 
organ as they have always been conscious about the health of their liver, but does 
not make socially valuable contributions.  Patient B makes socially valuable 
contributions but does not deserve the liver due to their organ failure being 
caused by alcohol related end stage liver disease (ARESLD).  Patient B also vows 
to never consume alcohol again, and we have good reasons to suppose that they 
will be able to refrain from alcohol.  Under the merit criterion, Patient A would be 
given priority for the organ, whereas under the social value criterion, Patient B 
would be given priority.  Under the social value criterion, the merit of the patient 
is not considered in terms of deservedness due to past actions, but only in terms 
of the instrumental contributions they can make to the needs of society.  The social 
value criterion is more removed from allocating organs as a form of reward for 
past actions, and instead focuses on allocating organs in a more objective and 
instrumental manner.   
Determining who deserves to receive an organ under the merit criterion would 
involve substantially more subjective judgements than determining which people 
are likely to make the most socially valuable contributions to the basic needs of 
society.  
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Moral Reason for Social Value 
A social value criterion is not arbitrary in the same way that the waiting time 
criterion is arbitrary.  Under the waiting time criterion, if there were two patients 
who had been on the waiting list for different amounts of time, everything else 
being equal, the patient who had been waiting the longest would be given priority 
for treatment.  Essentially, this means that even though the illnesses of the two 
patients might have presented itself at the same time, the patient who could get to 
the doctor first, or who realised their illness might be something serious first, will 
be the patient who receives treatment.  Using waiting time as a determining factor 
in patient priority is arbitrary as the patient who has been waiting for a shorter 
time is not necessarily in any less discomfort or in any less urgent need.  
Furthermore, treating the patient who has been waiting the longest does not 
necessarily create any more welfare than treating the patient who had been on the 
waiting list for less time.  Using the waiting time criterion is fair when people have 
access to the resource at the same time, but in the organ allocation system, it just 
means that people who are in a better position to see their doctor first will have 
priority for an organ.  The use of a first-come, first-served system here means that 
morally irrelevant qualities help to decide who is the organ recipient.   
However, a similar objection might be levied at the use of a social value criterion.  
Under the social value criterion, everything else being equal, those patients who 
are most valuable to society will be given priority for an organ.  Those people who 
are in a better position to make socially valuable contributions will be given 
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priority over those patients who are not as able to make them, in the same way 
that those patients who are in a better position to see a doctor first will be given 
priority for an organ under the waiting time criterion.  If the waiting time criterion 
is unfair because it is affected by the personal circumstances of a patient to 
determine their priority, then is a social value criterion not also just as unsuitable 
given that it solely relies on a patient’s personal circumstances to determine their 
priority? 
Whilst the two criteria are both affected by personal circumstances for which the 
patient is not (wholly) responsible, there is a moral reason for the social value 
criterion which the waiting time criterion does not have.  The social value criterion 
will help to increase the amount of welfare that is created with each organ 
transplant, with not only the patient benefiting, but also the wider society, and 
because the approach to organ allocation in this thesis is from a utilitarian 
perspective, a criterion that will increase the amount of welfare with each organ 
transplant is morally relevant.  However, the waiting time criterion offers no such 
increase in welfare as only the recipient benefits, and so this criterion is less 
morally relevant.  Whist both systems might allow the same non-medical factors, 
that are (partly) outside of a patient’s control, to enter into the prioritisation 
decision, it is only under the social value criterion that these factors are morally 
relevant as their consideration will help to increase the overall welfare created 
with each transplant.  The first-come, first-served system on the other hand, 
achieves no such aim, and so there is no moral justification for its use. 
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It might still be the case that a person is advantaged or disadvantaged based on 
circumstances that are outside of their control under both the social value and the 
first come first served system, however, it would be better to choose the system 
that offers more overall welfare than another system that suffers from the same 
issue.  And even though it might be the case that people have an advantage or 
disadvantage based on circumstances that are outside of their control, it is still 
morally relevant to take these circumstances into account in order to achieve the 
partly utilitarian aims of the system.  Under the first-come, first-served system, 
the same qualities and circumstances are morally irrelevant qualities to take into 
account as they do not help to increase welfare.  
 
Social value offers most benefit  
Now that the possible alternative resource allocation systems have been 
discussed, it is time to underline why a social value allocation system would be a 
better alternative, or rather, why social value considerations should not be 
excluded from organ allocation decisions. 
As has been highlighted throughout this chapter, by including social value 
considerations in the organ allocation process, benefit is provided not only to the 
patient who receives the organ, but also to wider society.  Unlike the rest of the 
alternative allocation systems, the welfare that is created with the inclusion of 
social value criteria affects many people rather than just one.  There is of course, 
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the possibility that the other systems may provide some increased welfare to 
wider society as well as the organ recipient, but it at a far lower level, and the 
outcomes much less certain.  For example, saving the most lives could be seen as 
benefiting society as it will minimise the distress caused to friends and family 
through the death of a loved one.  However, under a social value combination 
system, the benefits and welfare that would be created from each organ allocation 
would be at least that created by a save the most lives combination system.  If one 
of the social benefits of saving the most lives was that it minimised the number of 
friends and family who would be affected by a patient's death, the social value 
system would do a better job of this by saving those patients (who are in most 
urgent need) whose peers would suffer the most.  It would minimise the number 
of friends and family having to come to terms with the fact their loved one is going 
to die.  And indeed, in the system that I propose, such a factor is incorporated into 
the social value assessment.   
A further advantage of a social value combination system over the other 
alternative combination systems is that it does not focus simply on one value to 
the exclusion of others.  It necessarily looks at other values, some of which are 
present in the other alternative allocation systems, as it tries to create the most 
welfare. 
From the discussion of the alternative allocation systems above, it is apparent that 
there are at least some positive aspects to each of them, and as such, certain 
aspects of their criteria may be able to find a place in a multi-principle system, and 
indeed do to a certain extent in the current needs-based system.  There are some 
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principles that are important to consider alongside other principles in order to 
avoid the poor use of organs.  E.g. in the current allocation system, a patient’s level 
of urgency is one of the main factors affecting when they receive a resource, 
however, life expectancy is also an important factor as even if a patient is in urgent 
need, if their life expectancy is poor even after treatment, then they are unlikely 
to be treated.  As has been shown, an organ allocation system based solely on one 
principle is insufficient as it does not take into account other important, morally 
relevant considerations, and as such, a multi-principle allocation system is needed 
that combines these morally relevant individual principles, including a social 
value criterion (Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel, 2009). 
 
Multi-principle allocation system 
The current needs-based allocation system is already multi-principle to a certain 
extent in that it does not just take into account the urgency of the patient, but also 
their prognosis, QALYs, and how at risk the patient is, but with urgency arguably 
being the most heavily weighted.  The principles make for an allocation system for 
organs and other healthcare resources that is generally acceptable and makes 
good use of the organs.  However, this ‘good use of resources’ could be made in to 
‘best’, or at least ‘better use of resources’ if the further principle of social value 
were also included in the current multi-principle allocation system.  The current 
system’s principles for patient selection are medical based, but with the additional 
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inclusion of the non-medical social value principle, the extra welfare will help 
make better use of available resources. 
The question might be raised however, of why not use one of the previously 
mentioned alternatives as the main basis of an allocation system, and then have 
additional principles to make up a multi-principle system?  The answer to this is 
that, for the most part, if the alternative allocation systems were used as the main 
basis, it would result in many untimely and unnecessary deaths (as discussed in 
the previous section).  However, if a patient’s level of urgency and prognosis was 
taken into account first, these unnecessary deaths could be avoided, whilst still 
achieving the aim of whichever principle the additional system is based around 
(even if to a slightly lesser extent) by taking the principle into account as an 
addition.  But since it is the social value principle that will offer the most welfare 
out of the alternatives discussed, and if implemented in the right way, can still be 
at least as ethically acceptable as any other principle, this is the principle that 
should be included as an addition to the current organ allocation system. 
Furthermore, even if a patient’s urgency and prognosis were considered first, 
creating a multi-principle allocation system combining elements of the other 
alternative systems would not provide any more of a suitable system than the 
addition of a social value criterion into the current system would, with it replacing 
the waiting time criterion. 
This combination of the other alternatives is not preferable given that it wouldn’t 
create any more welfare than just the single addition of a social value criterion, 
and depending on the combination of the alternatives, it might actually create 
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more harm, or infringe on other important values.  For example, if random 
allocation was combined with age so that perhaps, of those who are the youngest 
and require treatment, the recipient is selected at random, the policy would be 
broadly ageist when it does not need to be (depending on the expected life years 
remaining in the available organ for transplant), and the random selection of a 
patient means that the welfare that could be created through the considered 
selection of a patient is not created. 
Moreover, the social value criterion itself may take into account elements of these 
other systems where appropriate in order to determine the expected social value 
contributions that a person can make to society in receipt of a particular organ.  It 
takes these other elements into account only so far as to assess the expected 
benefit to society in each case, not as principles to be considered in their own right.  
E.g. a person’s age might be taken into account to determine how long it is likely 
that they will be able to carry on making their social contributions if they receive 
a particular organ.  Elements of the alternative systems may be considered under 
the addition of a social value criterion in so far as they go towards helping make 
an assessment of the likely welfare that would be created from the organ 
allocation to different patients, and so it makes more sense to limit the multi-
principle allocation system to the current system combined with the social value 
criterion. 
Given that it is the social value principle that will offer the most benefit, it is this 
principle that is the focus of this thesis.  The formulation and inclusion of other 
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principles into other allocation systems as an alternative could be looked at in 
another paper.   
The existing system works well to maximise the aggregate benefit to the patient 
cohort by ensuring that organs are biologically matched as well as possible to 
ensure a successful transplant, and are given to the most urgent cases (and are 
matched for expected lifespan with patients where possible).  However, where the 
decision is between two or more recipients who are equally suitable for an organ, 
and are in equally urgent need26, we should choose the patient whose receipt of 
the organ will also increase wider social utility.  The addition of a social value 
criterion does this directly whereas other alternative allocation system 
suggestions either do not do so at all, or do so only approximately. 
In the next chapter, the way that the social value combination system could work 
will be discussed in more detail. 
                                                      
26 On the redefined definition of urgency. 
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Chapter 3: Social Value as an 
Additional criterion 
Introduction 
As seen in the previous chapter, if the alternative allocation methods to the 
current system are combined with the current needs-based criteria, they are viable 
systems for allocation, however, these systems do not offer any real improvement 
over the current allocation system.  They will offer little, if any, improvement in 
the number of lives saved, and whilst perhaps satisfying a separate goal, that being 
whatever the extra criteria the combination system is based on, those separate 
goals do not provide any real improvement over the current system in terms of 
the welfare created. A social value and needs-based combination system on the 
other hand, would actually provide an improvement over these alternatives and 
the current system.  Not only would people’s lives be saved, as is the case with all 
the other systems, but there would be an increased benefit to society; something 
the other combination systems do not provide. 
In the second part of this chapter, I will outline the broad structure of how the 
social value combination system would function (with the more specific details of 
the criteria that will be taken into account explained in Chapter 6).  However, 
before I do so, there are a couple of issues that need to be examined.   
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Tied up with the idea of allocating organs based on social value are the issues of 
ownership of organs and in what type of way are organs a social resource.  In 
whatever way organs are being allocated, it would be beneficial to look at who 
“owns” or has responsibility for those organs, and following on from this idea, in 
what way those organs should be allocated?  Depending on the body/organisation 
that “owns” or has responsibility for the organs, those organs would/should be 
allocated differently depending on the duty of that organisation.  It will be shown 
that it is permissible for both the local authority and the government in general to 
do what is in the best interests of society to a certain degree, and so the allocation 
of the organs should be carried out in the way that benefits society in keeping with 
this degree.  This then leads on to the question of to what extent donated organs 
are a social resource; are they a resource that should be available to help improve 
the lives of all those in society, or are they a resource that should be available for 
those individual members of society who require them?  It is to these questions to 
which I will turn in the first part of this chapter. 
 
Ownership of organs and their use for transplant 
If organs are to be allocated based on social value considerations, the reasons 
behind the inclusion of the social value considerations need to have just grounds.  
The justification for the inclusion of social value considerations can be found not 
only in the fact that many more people would benefit from this redesigned 
allocation system, but also by looking at the duties that the body/organisation 
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who owns or has responsibility for the organs has, and how best they might fulfil 
those duties through the distribution of the organs they are responsible for. 
In this section, I will first look at who has responsibility for bodies and organs, and 
then move on to look at the overarching duties of the authorities and individuals 
who have responsibility for them, and how this relates to the allocation of organs 
for transplant. 
 
Who owns the body and its parts? 
The debate on bodily ownership is extensive, with commentators arguing in 
favour of property rights in corpses and human tissue, and some arguing against 
this.  The current position of the law is that there is no property in a corpse or 
human tissue unless they have been subject to the application of skill (or intended 
for use in transplantation) (Liberty, 2008b).  However, whether the law is right or 
wrong in this matter, and whether you believe that there should indeed be 
property rights in corpses and bodily tissues or not (regardless of the application 
of skill), is not of too much concern to the argument in this section as both 
positions are compatible with the overall argument.  Regardless of whether or not 
there are property rights in corpses and bodily tissues, it still remains the case in 
both situations that someone, or some body/organisation will have legal 
possession and responsibility for them, and the tissue/organs are quasi-property 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1995, p. 78; Liberty, 2008b).  Identifying the party 
responsible for organs for transplant and what their duties should be is what is of 
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concern here.   
 
Responsibility for bodies and organs 
When someone dies, it is firstly the responsibility of the family or executors to deal 
with the body in an appropriate way and in accordance with what the deceased 
would have wanted, as far as is possible: 
In the early English case of Williams v. Williams, Kay J. stated that 
"[a]ccordingly the law in this country is clear, that after the death of a man, 
his executors have a right to the custody and possession of his body 
(although they have no property in it) until it is properly buried."  (Marusyk 
and Swain, 1989, p. 360) 
But it is not just that there is a right to possession of the body; there are also duties 
that must be fulfilled: 
“There is a duty upon certain people to dispose of a body after a death. This 
duty falls on the executor or administrator of the deceased’s estate, the 
parents of a deceased child (if the parent has sufficient means), a 
householder upon whose premises the body lies (this includes for example, 
a hospital authority if the body of a dead patient is on its premises) and the 
local authority where no arrangements are otherwise made for the 
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disposal...27 It is an offence for any such person, having sufficient means, to 
fail to discharge this duty” (Public Health (Control of Disease) Act, 1984; 
Liberty, 2008a).28 
However, the family or executors can waive their right to the body and hand over 
responsibility for it to another person who, “when lawfully in possession of it, 
would be entitled to dispose, retain, or otherwise deal with the body or body parts, 
subject to public health provisions” (Skene, 2002, p. 176).  The person who is now 
in lawful possession of the body may authorise the removal of any part of the body 
for therapeutic purposes, medical education, or research.  Although, this must be 
in accordance with the expressed requests of the deceased, or the person in lawful 
possession of the corpse has no reason to believe that the deceased would have 
had an objection to their body being used in such ways (Human Tissue Act, 1961).  
It is then the responsibility of the relevant agencies to use the organs in the ways 
agreed upon by the deceased individual or the person in lawful possession as far 
as is possible.   
                                                      
27 Where a man died in hospital and none of his relatives could be found so as to make 
arrangements for a private funeral, the Court of Session, Inner House, held in Secretary of State for 
Scotland v. Fife County Council, [1953] S.C. 257, that it was mandatory, and not merely 
discretionary, for the local authority to have the body buried or cremated, there being no duty in 
this connection upon the hospital authority as such. 
28 The fact that the local authority has a duty to dispose of a dead body where no arrangements are 
otherwise made for the disposal, stems probably not so much out of a respect for the dead, but for 
the health and well-being of society as is supported by the fact that this law is found in the Public 
Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984.  
Even though the executors have certain duties to fulfil, (and this includes those circumstances 
where the local authorities have to deal with the deceased), they do not have to cover the expenses 
of such duties out of their own pocket.  They are entitled to recover the costs of the funeral from 
the estate of the deceased, so long as the funeral expense is appropriately proportionate to the 
standing and status of the deceased (Smale, 1994, pp. 65–66; Conway, 2003, p. 186). 
“Although the executor has a right to dispose of the body, he or she must not spend more than a 
reasonable amount on funeral expenses without specific authority or consent from the 
beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate” (Liberty, 2008a). 
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So even though relatives, or the local authorities, may not have any claim of 
ownership over dead bodies that are in their possession, they do have at least 
quasi-property rights in them by way of their responsibility/duty to deal with the 
bodies in whichever way is appropriate under law (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
1995, p. 78).  However, quasi-property rights, or indeed full property rights are 
not just confined to bodies or parts of the deceased.  Full or partial property rights 
can also be afforded to parts taken from the living if they have received treatment 
which significantly alters their original attributes, or the body part/sample is 
needed for a reason designated under law.29   
Even though the approach taken so far in relation to bodily ownership has been 
broadly based on what the law says, if taken from an ethical perspective, the same 
conclusion is reached.  If there is ownership in organs, then the donation of an 
organ to the state, or agency of the state that manages transplantation, could be 
seen as a gift, or transference of property from one party to another. 
If the organs of the deceased, or the living, were to be donated for transplant, they 
would at least be the quasi-property of the local authorities/government as it is 
they who have the responsibility/duty to distribute organs for transplant, and the 
                                                      
29 There have been cases where people have been prosecuted for the theft of their own urine that 
was designated for use in alcohol tests from a police department (R v Welsh, 1974).  Even though 
the police department may not actually own the urine, and they have not done anything to it that 
could be said to have given it different attributes than it originally had, because the urine was 
designated for use by a proper authority, the authority could be said to have a quasi-property right 
in the urine.   
(Even though urine is not a bodily tissue in the same sense as an organ or cells, it could still be 
argued that it is a form of tissue from the body, and the same could also be said for hair.  (Although, 
it might be unclear as to whether the a customer at a hairdressers who left their hair on the floor 
after it was cut, might be entitled to a claim against the hairdresser if the hairdresser were to then 
sell that hair on.  It might not be illegal as the selling of hair for wig making is routinely done, but 
would the sale of a customer's hair without their knowledge be classed as an invasion of privacy?  
Or perhaps profiting on the physical by-products of others without their consent.)) 
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lawful possession of the body parts has been passed on from the individual, next 
of kin, or executors (if there were any), to the government. 
When a person donates their organs for transplant, the organs become a social 
resource because they are donated on the understanding that they will be used to 
help members of society who require them.  They are willingly donated by society, 
for society.  As such, it is up to the state and the relevant agencies, being 
responsible for the donated organs, to decide how best to distribute this social 
resource.  
Now that the issue of who owns/has responsibility for bodies and organs has been 
clarified, I will move on to discuss what the main roles and duties of the 
government are, and how they relate to organ allocation, specifically looking at 
why the fulfilment of these duties points towards including a social value criterion 
in organ allocation. 
 
The role of the government/state (and how it relates to organ allocation) 
In this section I will be looking at what the role of the government is, or at least 
should be.  As was discussed in the previous section, there are circumstances in 
which the government will come into legal possession of bodies, and the parts that 
are most important for this thesis, organs for transplant.  The reason why the role 
and duties of the government are of interest when debating the inclusion of a 
social value criterion into organ allocation is that certain duties of the government 
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actually point towards using social value in organ allocation decisions. 
Whatever its duty is to the people, and to society as a whole, it will have a bearing 
on how the organs for transplant should be allocated.  If the duty of the 
government is to do what is best for the individual members of society from, say, 
a prioritarian approach, then that will mean allocating organs in one way, perhaps 
on the needs-based system with the most urgent patients receiving the available 
organs.  However, if the duty of the government is to do what is best for society 
overall from a utilitarian approach, then that will mean allocating the organs in a 
different way, perhaps based on who is most valuable to society, with a view to 
increasing overall welfare and meeting the needs of society as a whole rather than 
those of individual citizens. 
However, the role of the government in this respect is twofold.  It not only has a 
duty to do what is best for the individual, but also what is best for society.  For 
example, in those cases where the deceased has no relatives, or at least, no 
relatives who wish to take responsibility for the body, the government will take 
responsibility (Public Health (Control of Disease) Act, 1984, sec. 46.1).  It has a 
duty to the wider society to deal with the body in order to prevent the risk of 
disease from the rotting corpse, but it also has a duty to do what is/was in the best 
interests of the (in this case) deceased individual as far as is reasonable.  It is the 
duty of the government and the health care practitioners to ensure that as best as 
is possible, reasonable, and ethically acceptable, the wishes of the deceased are 
respected in order to do what was in their best interests.  So, if it is known that 
they did not want to donate their organs then their wish should, and will, be 
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respected. And if they had a preference for burial or cremation, then the 
government will also respect that wish (Public Health (Control of Disease) Act, 
1984, sec. 46.3).  
To further illustrate that the government has a duty to do both of these things, it 
may be beneficial to look at what the situation would be like if the government had 
just one of these roles. 
If the duty of the government were to do what is best for individuals, then that 
would perhaps mean that certain individuals would receive disproportionate 
amounts of help at the expense of the rest of society.  It would mean that certain 
individuals could receive help or assistance with vast resources being spent on 
them if their need was great, whilst the rest of society may suffer from the loss of 
resources, reducing the aggregate welfare of society.  This does not happen in 
government, and nor should it.  There is a level of utilitarianism that is present in 
the governmental duties, with an aim to do what is in the best interests of society 
as a whole (to a point).  Vast resources are not spent on individuals at the expense 
of the wellbeing of the wider society. It might be pointed out that those who 
require hospital treatment receive more help and money than those who do not 
need hospital treatment, but the fact is, their treatment does not come at the 
significant expense of other people’s well-being.  That is why there is a limit on the 
amount of money the government will pay to improve a person’s health; there is 
approximately a £20,000 - £30,000 limit per patient on the quality adjusted life 
years (QALYs) (Devlin and Parkin, 2004), (however, this is not a strict limit and 
exceptions are made, especially in relation to the cancer drugs fund) (BBC News, 
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2014a; Cancer Research UK, 2014; NHS England, 2015).  This ensures that 
individuals do not have excessive amounts of money paid to help them at the 
expense of the money available to the rest of society.  So even though the 
government does have a duty to look after individuals within society, it does not 
do so at the expense of the wellbeing of the whole. 
On the other hand, if the duty of the government was solely to do what is best for 
society as a whole, it may mean that those individuals in society who are 
vulnerable will not be given the assistance they need to ensure an adequate 
quality of life, or even to avoid death.  Society as a whole may flourish with the 
investment of time and money in areas that ensure the sustainability and 
sustainable growth of society in most aspects, but there may be many individuals 
who require help that will be ignored.  If the focus was on doing what was in the 
interests of aggregate welfare for society, it may mean that individuals’ rights are 
not protected, such as the right to minimum levels of basic welfare and healthcare 
etc., and to just treatment in relation to such things as discrimination, equality of 
opportunity, and distribution of resources or welfare.  This is surely a situation 
that we do not want, and a situation that the government should not allow to 
happen if avoidable.  So even though the duty of the government is to do what is 
best for society as a whole, it also has a duty to look after those members of society 
who are most vulnerable, in whatever way that may be, as far as is reasonable 
whilst balancing the needs of the whole.  The government has a duty to protect its 
citizens, both as a group and as individuals. 
When these two duties of the government (doing what is best for society, and what 
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is best for the individual) are applied to the allocation of organs, an allocation 
system much like the one that is in place now, but with the inclusion of the 
additional criterion of social value, would help to fulfil these duties.  To fulfil the 
duty of doing what is best for society, a utilitarian approach where organs are 
allocated purely on a social value basis would be needed.  And to fulfil the duty of 
doing what is best for the individual (or at least the individuals most in need), a 
prioritarian approach where organs are allocated purely on a patient urgency 
basis would be needed.  But because both of these duties need to be fulfilled as far 
as is possible, a combination system that includes both prioritarian and utilitarian 
considerations is needed.   
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, as the current allocation system stands, 
more emphasis is placed on fulfilling the duty of doing what is best for the 
individual [patient] than it is for doing what is best for society.  (That is not to say 
that the current system ignores the wider effects on society completely; it does 
look for the best tissue match to avoid rejection30, and will not offer an organ to a 
patient whose transplant would be futile, and there are numerous contra-
indication considerations.  But the emphasis remains mainly focused on the 
patient as an individual).  However, with the additional inclusion of the social 
value criterion, the balance is restored somewhat.  The needs-based element of 
the allocation system fulfils the duty to do what is best for the individual.  Whereas 
the addition of a social value criterion to the allocation system (alongside the other 
criteria that relate to making the best societal use of scarce resources) fulfils the 
duty to do what is best for society.  In this way, both duties of the government are 
                                                      
30 Although this is partly a patient centred criterion.  
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represented in the allocation system, with individuals’ needs being taken into 
account so that those patients who are most in need are treated first, and the needs 
of society being taken into account by the most socially valuable of the urgent 
patients receiving treatment first. 
The balancing of the duties here in organ allocation follows a partly Rossian 
approach, with the maximisation of aggregate welfare being constrained by 
respecting the rights of the citizen.  (This results in the overall welfare simply 
being increased rather than maximised.)  There are prima facie duties to do what 
creates welfare for the individual, as well as what creates aggregate welfare for 
society.  However, the duty to create aggregate welfare for society is defeasible in 
the light of competing concerns, such as infringing on equality and rights, which 
may be thought of as more important in this situation (Ross, 2007).  As such, the 
increase in aggregate welfare through the use of a social value criterion is only 
used as a tie-break decision once the other duties of respecting citizens’ rights 
have been fulfilled through the application of the medical criteria.  This is not to 
say that the utilitarian approach here is abandoned, but rather that, to achieve an 
increase in welfare from the allocation of the organs, the other values that we hold 
as important, such as equality and rights, need to be maintained and fulfilled 
before the social value criterion is used.  
This revised system provides the opportunity for those who are most in need to 
receive an organ, and it also helps to do what is best for society by allocating the 
organ to the patient in this group who is most valuable to their society.  Allocating 
organs to those vulnerable members of society who are important to its 
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flourishing, whether that be economically, artistically, or scientifically, etc., but 
more specifically, important to whatever needs require fulfilling within society at 
that particular time, will help to improve the aggregate welfare of society as a 
whole.  Doing so will ensure and safeguard its flourishing better than allocating 
organs to those vulnerable people who do not contribute as much to society, or 
are not valuable in fulfilling the current needs of society. 
 
Using people as a means to an end 
It might be questioned as to why we should sacrifice the good of an individual for 
the good of society as, in fulfilling the duty of the government to do what is good 
for society, in the case of organ allocation through the social value combination 
system, it will mean disadvantaging an individual for the good of society.  The 
patient who is most in need31 may miss out on treatment in favour of someone 
who is less in need.   Nozick outlines this objection: 
“But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good?  
Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice 
for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm…  But there is no social 
entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good.  There 
are only individual people, different individual people, with their own 
individual lives.  Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses 
                                                      
31 On the current use of the term need. 
 117 
him and benefits the others; nothing more…  To use a person in this way 
does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a 
separate person, that his is the only life he has” (Nozick, 1974, pp. 30–33). 
There are two parts to the reply to this objection.  The first is that because the 
nature of organ allocation is that there are not enough resources for all, there have 
to be some people who make a sacrifice, even if it is an unwilling sacrifice.  Even 
under the current system without the addition of a social value criterion, patients 
have to forgo their own health for the health of another.32  Under an allocation 
system that includes a social value criterion, the same unavoidable sacrifice that 
some individuals will have to make due to scarce resources will remain, but 
instead of that being the end of the story, the sacrifice will actually provide a wider 
benefit, with that benefit being increased social welfare.  The decision of who to 
give the organ to is a forced choice between people: whomever it is given to, 
someone will die or suffer because of the lack of an organ.  Therefore, we are not 
choosing to sacrifice a person, but merely choosing whom to sacrifice.  Because at 
least one person’s health is going to be sacrificed for another under any allocation 
system, and the final potential recipients that will be considered for an organ 
transplant under a social value combination system are all at the same level of 
urgency33, it makes sense to at least limit the detriment that is caused by the 
sacrifice, and promote welfare.   
The second part of the reply is that, if the social value criterion is included, the 
                                                      
32 Of course, they do not willingly make this sacrifice; it is imposed upon them based on how 
urgently they require an organ transplant (regardless of the fact that even though patients may 
have differing levels of immediate need for a transplant, they may actually be of the same urgency). 
33 On my suggested use of the term 
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patient may be being selected as a means to an end, with that end being increased 
benefit to society, but that does not ignore the fact that the patient is a separate 
person and his is the only life he has.  The patient still has the ability to choose 
how to live his life, and no one will force him to do anything he does not want to.  
He has simply been selected as a recipient because the traits and skills that he has, 
make it more likely that he will benefit society.  But he is free to do as he pleases.  
He has been given an extended life, and still retains his freedom to pursue his own 
ends, which, due to careful patient selection, will happen to be beneficial to the 
rest of society too.    
Furthermore, the recipient will not have been treated as only a means to an end, 
but also as an end in himself given that the recipient will have given his consent to 
receive the organ, expressing his nature as an autonomous creator of his own 
ends. 
Allocating organs in such a way as to include social value criteria may be seen as 
a controversial idea, however, there is only a slight deviation involved from the 
current system.  Instead of categorising the most vulnerable potential recipients, 
and then of those, if at the same level of urgency, allocating the organ to whoever 
has been on the waiting list longest, a system including a social value criterion 
would categorise the most vulnerable patients, and then of those, allocate the 
organ to whomever is most valuable to society.  This revised system simply limits 
the harm caused to society overall by avoiding the death of someone who is more 
valuable to it than someone else.  The government is fulfilling its duty to the people 
as a whole, whilst still fulfilling its duty to the most vulnerable individuals.    
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How will the new system work? 
The inclusion of social value considerations within the organ allocation process 
now has at least a pro tanto justification on the grounds that it can create more 
welfare than the needs-based criteria alone, but how would the social value 
combination system actually work in practice?  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the waiting list for an organ transplant should not be organised based 
solely on an individual’s value to society, but it should be included on some level.  
There are a number of options for the way in which the social value and needs-
based combination system could work that will fulfil the duty of doing what is best 
for the individual by treating the most urgent patients first, whilst also fulfilling 
the duty to do what is best for society by including the additional social value 
criterion.  The preferred formulation of the combination system has been alluded 
to in the previous discussion, however, it will be covered in more detail in the 
discussion below (option 1), as well as a possible alternative formulation of the 
system (option 2). 
 
Social value as a replacement for waiting time 
The best place to include social value considerations in all possible formulations 
of an allocation system that includes a social value criterion would be after the 
medical needs and patient medical suitability criteria had been taken into account.  
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In this way, the unnecessary deaths of patients can be minimised; those who are 
most in need of, and medically suitable for an organ transplant, will be given 
priority.  It is then here that the social value considerations can be factored in.   
As it stands now, if there are two or more patients who are at the same level of 
urgency (or with kidneys, suitable match) and have the same prognosis with a 
transplant, whoever has been on the transplant waiting list the longest will be 
given priority (NHSBT, 2014h, 2014b, 2015d).  Under the social value combination 
system, if there were two or more patients who were at the same level of urgency 
and prognosis, and were a suitable match for the organ, then whoever is more 
valuable to society would be given the organ.  The social value criterion would 
replace the waiting time criterion in this final stage (option 1). 
Note that the suggestion I am making here is not that a patient cannot have access 
to the waiting list for an organ if they are not socially valuable.  If a patient is 
medically suitable for an organ transplant, they can be registered on the waiting 
list, regardless of their social value, and if they are in urgent need, they will be 
considered for priority treatment.  However, where their social value will play a 
role, is in determining whether they receive an available organ over another 
urgent and suitably matched patient.  Regardless of their value to society, a patient 
will always have access to be registered on the waiting list for an organ transplant 
so long as it is a medically viable treatment option.  Whether they have access to 
the actual available organ however, will depend on their relative social value to 
that of the other urgent (and suitably matched) patients. 
Below are 2 options for how the social value considerations could figure in a 
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combination system.  
 
Option 1 
Redefining urgency 
The first option would be to identify the patients in most urgent need, and then 
allocate the available and suitability matched organ to the patient who is most 
socially valuable.  However, the conditions to meet the urgency criterion would 
need to be changed to better reflect the situation for the patient cohort, with the 
most urgent group being all those who will die before another organ is likely to 
become available.  The social value of all of the patients who are likely to die before 
another organ is likely to become available would be compared, and the most 
socially valuable would be chosen as the recipient.  The reason for grouping these 
patients together, despite some of them being able to survive without a transplant 
for longer than some other patients in this group, is that if those who can survive 
for longer are going to die before another organ is likely to become available, then 
are they not really at the same level of urgency as someone whose life expectancy 
without a transplant is less, but who will also die before an organ is likely to 
become available?  All but one (the recipient) of this group of patients face the 
same fate if there is only one organ available, it is just that the fate of some patients 
will come about sooner than others.  
For example: if hearts become available once a month on average, and there are 5 
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possible recipients who are all a suitable match and will die before another heart 
is likely to become available (the next month), then these 5 patients can be said to 
be at the same level of urgency as all will die before their next opportunity for a 
heart is likely to become available.  So it makes no sense to select for treatment 
the patient whose fate will come about the soonest when all 5 of the patients face 
the same imminent fate, albeit more imminent for some of the 5 than others.  
Instead, of the patients who will die before another organ is likely to become 
available, the most socially valuable patient of the group should be selected. 
A possible objection to this is that the nature of organ donation is that availability 
is sporadic.  It is not generally possible to know with certainty when the next organ 
will become available as organs may come from accident victims and other sudden 
deaths.  (Of course, there are people whose deaths can be foreseen within a given 
time, e.g. those with a terminal illness, however, traffic accidents and other sudden 
deaths cannot.)  This means that under this redefined classification of urgency, an 
organ from these unpredictable sources may suddenly become available that 
would have been suitable for a valuable patient in the group of 5 who was 
previously allocated an organ despite having a longer life expectancy than a less 
valuable patient in the group who had a shorter life expectancy.  In this scenario 
only one person’s life has been saved (even if it was the most socially valuable 
patient) when two lives would have been saved, resulting in an even greater 
benefit to society.  
In reply to this objection however, even though it might not be possible to say with 
absolute accuracy when another organ will become available, it is possible to 
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make informed predictions based on previous availability rates and work within 
these statistics.  E.g. if no more than one heart a day becomes available, the most 
urgent group would only consist of those patients who would die today without 
an organ.  Or if it were unusual for 2 hearts a week to become available, the most 
urgent group would consist of those patients who would die this week without an 
organ.  In this way, even though predictions with certainty cannot be made, 
allocation decisions can be made within the limits of informed predictions. 
As it happens, transplant rates have not widely fluctuated (NHSBT, 2015k), and 
the rate at which organs are transplanted throughout the year also remains 
steady, with no sudden seasonal influx of organs, and so reasonable predictions 
can be made regarding the likely availability of different organs (NHSBT, 2015f).  
Take kidneys for example:  in the financial year 2015/2016, 2227 kidney 
transplants were carried out, with relatively little variation in the number of 
transplants carried out each month (and the variation is even smaller for other 
organs, such as hearts (NHSBT, 2015f, fig. 14)) (NHSBT, 2016, fig. 8). 
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Fig.1 (NHSBT, 2016, fig. 8) 
By dividing the total amount of transplants carried out per year for an organ by 
the amount of days in the year, an average number of transplants per day carried 
out can be determined.  For kidney transplants based on the 2015/2016 figures, 
that number is on average, 6 transplants a day.  For hearts, the figure is 0.49 a day, 
or more usefully, one transplant every 2 days (NHSBT, 2015f, fig. 14).  In the case 
of hearts, the patients who would be classed as the most urgent would be those 
patients who will die without a transplant in the next 2 days following the last 
transplant.  When it comes to pancreas transplants, 29 were carried out in 
2014/15, and so the average transplant rate is approximately 1 per fortnight, and 
so any patient who is likely to die within 2 weeks since the last pancreas transplant 
would be classed as urgent (NHSBT, 2015f).  With kidneys, because the availability 
of the organs is much higher than that of other organs with around 6 transplants 
a day being carried out, there may not be 6 or more patients who will die before 
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another organ is likely to become available.  As such, the patients who would be 
prioritised for an organ may be a mixture of those who will die before the next 
suitable organ is likely to become available, but also those patients who are next 
in need and a suitable match.  
 
Option 2 
After waiting time 
There is a second option for the position of the social value criterion, however it 
is less preferred to that of option 1.  If replacing waiting time with social value 
considerations in the final stage does not appeal, then there is also the possibility 
of allowing the waiting time consideration to be taken into account first, and then 
use social value as a tie-breaker.  Essentially, the current allocation system would 
remain in place, but with the final addition of a social value criterion to make a tie-
break decision if necessary.  If there were only one organ available, of those 
patients who have been on the waiting list for the same amount of time, and are at 
the same level of urgency, the person who is most socially valuable would receive 
the organ first.  The social value criterion would be used to make the tie-break 
decision in cases where there are two or more patients who are tied in terms of 
urgency and their accrued time on the waiting list.   
However, the problem with this is that it is not likely that this situation would 
occur frequently enough to warrant having such a social value combination 
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system in place to begin with. It is unlikely that of the patients who are suitable 
for the organ transplant, at least two will have been on the waiting list for exactly 
the same amount of time, and both have the same prognosis.  They may have been 
registered on the list on the same day, but it would be an impressive coincidence 
if they had been registered within the same minute or second.  It is reasonable to 
assume that for all but the smallest amount of cases, there will always be a 
difference in the waiting time between suitably matched patients.  The reason why 
this is important is because, if waiting time is taken into account before social value 
considerations, then the allocation system is in no better place than it is now; the 
use of the social value consideration would only be used very rarely, if at all.  
However, if the waiting time consideration is replaced by social value 
considerations at this final stage for equally urgent patients, then the allocation 
system is in a better position, and no worse off for the removal of the waiting time 
criterion.  The organs are both saving someone’s life and improving society.  
Because of this, option 1 should be the preferred formulation of where the social 
value criterion would fit into organ allocation decisions. 
 
Conclusion 
A positive case for the inclusion of a social value criterion into organ allocation 
decisions has been given in this chapter, by first showing that it is the state who 
has quasi-property rights in donated organs for transplant, or at least is in legal 
possession and has responsibility for them, and given this, should allocate the 
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organs to society in keeping with its duties to society.  Because the state has a duty 
to both the individuals within society and to society as a whole, the way in which 
the organs are allocated should help to satisfy these duties, and this is exactly what 
the addition of a social value criterion, implemented in the way I have suggested, 
could help to do. 
By removing the waiting time criterion and instead, grouping all those patients 
together who will die before their required organ next becomes available into the 
same category of urgency, the state is doing what is in the best interests of the 
individual, as far as is reasonable, by ensuring that those who are in most urgent 
need are considered for treatment first.  The addition of a social value criterion 
when deciding which patient out of this most urgent group should be the organ 
recipient helps to satisfy the other duty of the government; to do what is in the 
best interests of society as a whole, by allocating the organ to the patient who is 
the most socially valuable within the urgent group.  
Now that a positive case for the inclusion of a social value criterion into organ 
allocation decisions has been shown, and where it would figure in the allocation 
decision, just who should make the social value assessment can be discussed 
(Chapter 5), followed by a detailed account of types of contributions that would 
be assessed when determining a person’s overall social value (Chapter 6).  
However, before doing so, it would beneficial to look at an earlier situation where 
social value had been included in resource allocation decisions, and why it was so 
problematic in that particular case.  By doing so, the objections that the case study 
faced can hopefully be avoided when considering the values that should be taken 
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into account under a revised social value criterion, and how they should be used.  
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Chapter 4: Lessons from Seattle 
Introduction  
Before I go any further and discuss just what makes someone, or something (such 
as a trait or skill) socially valuable, it should be noted that the rationing of medical 
resources to patients based on their social value has occurred before, but was then 
abandoned in favour of the needs-based system that is now commonplace in 
medicine.  In 1962, Dr. Belding Scribner, who was researching dialysis treatment, 
reached a stage in his research where dialysis might prove to be a viable long-term 
treatment with the use of a cannula shunt for those with renal failure, and began 
treating patients at the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center.  However, the resources to 
treat possible patients were severely limited and so only a handful of patients 
could receive this treatment.  Scribner decided that the fairest way to allocate 
these resources would be to hand over the patient selection decision to a lay 
committee made up of members of society who would represent the community 
and assure that choices were made objectively, without outside pressure, and 
would decide which medically suitable patients would receive treatment (Robbins 
and Robbins, 1967).  
The decision making process was first detailed in an article titled "They decide 
who lives, who dies", by Shana Alexander in Life magazine (Alexander, 1962), and 
although the breakthrough of an indefinite treatment for renal failure should have 
been arguably the most important aspect of the article, what it is now famous for 
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is the exposure of the allocation process; up until then it was largely in the hands 
of the medical professionals and done behind closed doors without the patients or 
the public knowing what was going on.  The reaction to the revelation was mainly 
critical, and whilst this is understandable, and many of the criticisms were valid 
due to the way in which the social value criteria were decided and implemented 
in the patient selection process at the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center, many of the 
problems faced in this circumstance could have been avoided. 
The social value allocation criteria and the lay committee responsible for making 
the decisions were ultimately abandoned and disbanded for what might be seen 
as ethical, political, or financial reasons, or a combination of them all.  However, 
looking at this allocation system, the members that made up the committee, and 
how they made their decisions, will prove a useful case study in anticipating 
problems that might occur in a revised social value allocation system, and how 
those problems can be avoided.  It will help to highlight some of the arguments 
against using a social value criterion in organ allocation decisions, and more 
specifically, how the poor implementation of the criterion can needlessly create 
problems and injustices. Whilst it was estimated that 42% of the dialysis centres 
at the time, assayed patients in terms of their social utility, it is only the dialysis 
centre set up by Scribner for which there is detailed information available, and as 
such, is the focus of the discussion (Ramsey, 1970b, p. 248).  I will first give a more 
detailed overview of the case, and then move on to highlight the pitfalls and 
problems of Scribner’s approach, and how they could be avoided in a revised 
system. 
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Overview of the case 
Dr. Belding Hibbard Scribner was a U.S physician and a pioneer in kidney dialysis 
who developed a cannula shunt to be used in kidney dialysis patients that could 
be used again and again rather than inserting new dialysis tubes into new arterial 
locations (Quinton W, Dillard D, 1960; Scribner et al., 1960).  This invention was 
so important in the treatment of kidney failure as, previous to the shunt, dialysis 
treatment meant inserting tubes into a new arterial location each time the 
treatment was carried out (or each site only had a couple of uses).  This meant that 
dialysis was not a viable long-term treatment as there was only a limited number 
of times and locations that the tubes could be inserted.  However, because the 
Scribner shunt was a “permanent” fixture in a patient's artery and could be used 
indefinitely, kidney dialysis could now treat a patient with kidney failure 
indefinitely too. 
A year after the first cannula was placed in the arm of a patient, and subsequently 
2 others, the treatment looked as though it would be a success and Dr Scribner felt 
enough technical progress had been made to try a feasibility study.  The aim was 
to see whether a community-supported programme could provide a service-
orientated artificial kidney centre as a public service (Blagg, 1998), as previous 
funding from the University Hospital in Seattle had been discontinued for a 
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number of arguably valid reasons.34  Funding was obtained from the John A. 
Hartford Foundation for implementing a community haemodialysis centre for 
treatment of chronic uraemia and terminal renal failure, later supplemented by a 
grant from the United States Public Health Service, and had support from the King 
County Medical Society and the Seattle Area Hospital Council.  The centre was built 
outside the hospital in the basement of Elkind Hall, the Swedish Hospital’s nurses’ 
residence, in order to reduce costs, and was able to accommodate three beds and 
the associated equipment since ‘one nurse can conveniently monitor three 
patients on dialysis’ (Blagg, 1998, p. 235). 
Because the estimated annual number of ideal candidates for long-term dialysis, 
(5-20 per million population (1998, p. 235)), was significantly higher than the 
capacity of the newly formed Seattle Artificial Kidney Center, there needed to be 
some form of selection process to narrow down the possible recipients for 
treatment; two committees were formed to carry out this task.  The first was the 
Medical Advisory Committee that made the initial selection and was made up of 
renal disease physicians and a psychiatrist; the second was the Admissions 
Advisory Committee, (which, after the article by Alexander (Alexander, 1962), 
would become known as the “God Committee”), and was made up of an 
anonymous cross-section of the community: two physicians not involved in the 
                                                      
34 “The hospital administration soon informed Dr Scribner that no new patients were to start 
maintenance artificial kidney treatment. It was recognized this treatment would cost at least 
$10,000 to $20,000 per patient per year, it looked as if it was going to be successful, and research 
monies for support of this activity could not be relied on indefinitely.  Consequently, the University 
could be placed in the difficult position of having a number of patients on an expensive treatment 
programme with no funds to support them, yet unable to withhold treatment because the patients 
would die and the adverse publicity would be very damaging. The problems of developing a 
dialysis centre at the University Hospital were also recognized, particularly as some form of patient 
selection would be necessary, and the University, a public institution supported by tax dollars, 
would be in a very poor position to decide which citizens should be treated and which denied 
treatment” (Blagg, 1998, p. 235) 
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care of dialysis patients, a lawyer, a housewife, a businessman, a labour leader and 
a minister (Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967, p. 367; Blagg, 1998, p. 236). 
The criteria used to make the patient selections were: 
“A stable, emotionally mature, responsible citizen disabled by the 
symptoms of uraemia; Absence of long-standing hypertension and its 
permanent complications, particularly coronary artery disease and 
cerebrovascular disease; Demonstrated willingness to co-operate in 
carrying out the prescribed treatment, especially the dietary restrictions; 
Age 25-45 years; Slow deterioration of renal function (serum creatinine 8-
12 mg%), since any residual function simplified the therapeutic problem; 
Six months residence in the area (Washington, Alaska, Idaho, Montana and 
Oregon); Financial support; Value to the community; Potential for 
rehabilitation; Psychological and psychiatric compatibility; and Children 
and young adults who were not potentially self-supporting were excluded.”  
(Blagg, 1998, p. 236) 
Whilst the mix of criteria used were both medical and non-medical, it was the 
medical criteria that were applied first, and once the patients that were medically 
suitable for kidney dialysis had been narrowed down, it was then up to the 
Admissions Advisory Committee to make the final decisions on which of the 
medically suitable patients would receive treatment.  They decided to base their 
decisions on social and economic criteria, and would represent the community 
and assure that choices were made objectively, without outside pressure (Robbins 
and Robbins, 1967).  “Their role was to assess the relative worth of a candidate to 
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their family and the community in terms of the degree of dependence of others upon 
the candidate’s continuing existence, and the rehabilitative potential and moral 
value or worth of the candidate” (Robbins and Robbins, 1967).  At first, the 
committee limited candidates to residents of the state of Washington who were 
under the age of 45 and could afford the treatment (usually through their insurer).  
However, because the number of patients who applied was so great, other 
selection criteria needed to be introduced and it was decided that social 
contribution considerations would be taken into account.  Eventually, the 
committee not only looked at what they thought the social contributions of the 
possible recipient were, but also “the personality and personal merit of the 
candidate, the strength and weaknesses of the candidates family, and the family's 
emotional support for a patient on chronic dialysis” (Pence, 1995, pp. 297–298).  
Other methods of patient selection were considered but not used because of the 
issues associated with those methods35 (although selection by social worth is not 
without its own problems, as will be discussed in next section). 
Ultimately, the Admissions Advisory Committee, or the ‘God Committee’, was 
disbanded, and the social worth selection criteria for the allocation of limited 
medical resources abandoned.  Ten years after the Seattle Swedish Hospital 
opened the kidney centre, dialysis treatment became federally funded after 
pressure from lobbyists, kidney patients, and concerns that “too much money was 
                                                      
35 “A strictly medical selection committee would have lacked a diversity of viewpoints, could have 
built- in prejudices if a candidate was followed by a physician committee member, and outside 
pressures could be exerted on members. Use of first-come, first-served, could have made the 
decision difficult and arbitrary if there were too many candidates, and if no medical criteria were 
used, very poor candidates might be treated. This could have jeopardized the whole project 
because of the limited facilities and limited financial backing with nowhere else to go for support. 
Treatment of all candidates would have avoided the selection problem, but would have so 
overloaded the centre that the project would have failed immediately” (Blagg 1998, p.236). 
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being spent on space [exploration] and the war in Vietnam and too little on dying 
people who might be saved” (Pence, 1995, pp. 311–312).  This meant that the 
social worth patient selection criteria did not have to be used anymore, and there 
was no longer a need for the “God Committee”.  “Faced with the ethical problem of 
which patients should be funded and how to select such patients, Congress, took what 
was then the easy way out - it simply funded all patients” (1995, p. 311 added 
italics). 
When first set up, the Seattle kidney centre did not have this option of treating all 
patients in order to avoid the difficult decisions of deciding which patients should 
be afforded the chance of life, which is why there was a need for a patient selection 
committee in the first place.  And the same went for other kidney centres; it was 
estimated that 42% of the dialysis centres at the time, assayed patients in terms 
of their social utility (Ramsey, 1970b, p. 248).  But again, these social value 
judgements were made out of a necessity to allocate the available limited 
resources, not as judgements that only those patients who were valuable to society 
should receive treatment.  If there had been more resources available, then of 
course, those patients who were less valuable to society would have been treated 
too, as indeed became the case in the end when federal funding was made 
available. 
The exposure of the selection committee in Alexander’s article (Alexander, 1962) 
and the process that they used to select patients for treatment has been described 
as the birth of contemporary bioethics discussion and research (although this is 
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debatable).36  Before then, there were no guidelines or academic discussion on 
how patients should be selected for treatment, and so the Seattle “God Committee” 
chose the method that they felt was best, namely the use of social worth 
considerations.  And because there was no guidance on how such a selection 
system should work, the Seattle committee was simply “the prototype of one way 
to solve this question of who lives and who dies” (Ramsey, 1970b, p. 244).  Given 
that the Seattle committee was attempting to allocate resources in a way that had 
not been tried before, there were worries and concerns about the whole process, 
with reactions by scholars, and the publicity surrounding the developments in 
Seattle being primarily criticisms centred around the committee favouring 
patients who embodied the personal values that they held (Blagg, 1998, p. 237).  
However, these criticisms were surprising to Dr Scribner and the team themselves 
as they felt it was the new dialysis treatment that was of more interest than the 
selection committee: 
“All of us who were involved felt we had found a fairly reasonable and 
simple solution to an impossibly difficult problem by letting a committee 
of responsible members of the community choose what patients (should 
receive treatment) among those who were medically ideal...  In retrospect, 
of course, we were terribly naive.  We did not realize the full impact that 
the existence of the committee would have on the world.  We simply could 
                                                      
36 “Albert Jonsen dates 'the birth of bioethics' from the year 1962, when Shana Alexander's article 
describing the Seattle dialysis selection committee appeared in Life magazine.  Elsewhere Jonsen 
describes 1965-75 as the 'formative decade' for bioethics in this country. David Rothman, in what 
is the first history of the bioethics movement, dates its beginning with the 1966 publication of 
Henry Beecher's articles exposing abuses in human experimentation." (Meilaender, 1995) 
However, it might be argued that the birth of bioethics was even earlier in 1946 with the 
development of the Nuremberg code. 
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not understand why everyone was most interested in the existence and 
operation of the lay selection committee than in the fact that in two years 
we had taken a disease and converted it from a 100% fatal prognosis, to a 
two-year survival.  Nor were any of us prepared for the very severe storm 
of criticism that was to be forthcoming at the annual medical meetings and 
in the scholarly literature.”  (Blagg, 1998, p. 238). 
It should be noted however, that it might not have been simply the fact that the 
Seattle committee was using a controversial selection process that meant it 
became the focus of Alexander's article in LIFE magazine when, arguably, the focus 
should have been on the innovative dialysis treatment.  The patient selection 
process as a whole and the moral dilemmas that go along with it had never been 
put so openly in the public field before; previously, it had been discussed only 
privately among physicians (Pence, 1995, p. 299).  The reason the Seattle “God 
Committee” and selection process might have caused so much of a stir could have 
also been due to the public being informed for the first time, of the ethical 
dilemmas associated with patient selection, as well as the social worth criteria 
being used.  That is not to say that the criticism of the system generated by 
Alexander’s article was not valid, but that the amount of interest it caused could 
be seen as being partly due to the issues of medical ethics being brought into the 
public sphere for the first time.  
Because the Seattle social value selection process was novel, new, and untested 
until it was actually used, it can be seen as a prototype, and as such, there is room 
for improvement.   The problems with the Seattle system can be largely attributed 
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to the fact the Seattle allocation system was the first of its kind, and so those who 
designed it did not know fully what problems to pre-empt and what safeguards to 
put in place.  In a revised system, lessons can be learnt, and I will argue that a 
revised social value allocation system could be introduced with fewer issues, and 
may be incorporated into the already widely accepted needs-based system, 
creating an even more beneficial resource allocation system. 
 
Problematic features of the Seattle system 
In this section, I will discuss what the main problems with the Seattle system were, 
both in terms of criteria, and the procedure used to make patient selection 
decisions.  The main problems of the system were that, firstly, it appeared to place 
both moral value judgements on an individual as well as instrumental social value 
judgements, when it is only the instrumental social value of a person that is 
important when making objective social value decisions.  Secondly, there were 
problems with the actual social value criteria used in that they were especially 
subjective, and not useful criteria for a lay committee to use when making a 
prediction on a person’s future contributions.  The criteria were also open to 
abuse from patients who may put themselves and others in potentially risky 
situations in order to increase their chances of selection, and the criteria unjustly 
jeopardised the equality and fairness of the selection process.  Thirdly, there were 
problems with the patient selection committee itself in that the members of the 
committee were made up of lay people who had no relevant knowledge and 
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expertise of what made someone socially valuable and what is socially valuable to 
begin with; their judgements were based on their own values and prejudices, and 
the diversity of the committee members was very narrow.  These main problems 
will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
 
The value of patients 
One of the main problems perceived with the criteria the Admissions Advisory 
Committee used (the social worth standard), was that patients were being seen as 
more or less valuable than each other, and then being given or denied treatment 
on the basis of this decision (Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967).  There are two 
separate issues here: 1) the denial of treatment, and 2), the social worth 
judgement; it is when these two issues are combined that the problems arise.  It is 
true that some people are more instrumentally valuable to society than others, 
and it is true that there is always going to have to be some denial of treatment 
when scarce resources are involved.  But denying people lifesaving treatment 
based on their value to society is where the problem lies for most critics.  For them, 
the denial of life saving treatment based on the patients’ social worth is effectively 
saying that not only are the patients’ contributions to society not as valuable as 
someone else’s, but also that their life is not as valuable to society.   
However, it might be argued that this is not the case.  Even though one person's 
contributions to society are not as valuable as someone else’s, this does not 
necessarily mean that their life is not valuable.  The fact that the patients were 
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narrowed down by their medical suitability/feasibility first, rather than by their 
social worth, shows that even those people who might make few social 
contributions are still valued, and are still valuable to society as a person, albeit 
less than someone else.  If they were not valued, then they would have been 
discounted even before their medical suitability was taken into account on the 
basis that their contributions to society were less valuable than other patients.  It 
was not necessary that a person was both medically suitable and socially valuable 
in order for them to receive treatment; only medical suitability was necessary, 
whilst social value was used only as a prioritisation tool.  There was no threshold 
for social value that a patient had to meet in order to be considered for treatment; 
it was used only to make comparative judgements between patients.    
Despite this, Sanders and Dukeminier still had concerns that there might be 
“undisclosed preferences and prejudices, as well as objective criteria” contained 
within the term medical  suitability or feasibility (Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967, 
p. 373).  At some other centres, such as the Northern California Chronic 
Hemodialysis Center, there were specific rules on patient selection that said, “social 
values must not influence the decision” (Northern California Chronic Hemodialysis 
Center, 1967, p. 372).  However, because the specifics of just what constitutes the 
term feasibility are not detailed, Sanders and Dukeminier worried that social 
value judgements might still be included, but disguised under the term feasibility. 
Under a revised social worth allocation system, where possible candidates for 
treatment are first narrowed down by medical suitability using the current 
medical need and matching criteria that are in place, worries about social value 
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judgements being incorporated at this early stage in the patient selection should 
be alleviated.  The algorithms for ranking patient’s according to their medical need 
and as a suitable tissue match are now well formulated and established, and 
broadly free from social value judgements.37  The revised system should also not 
face the objection that if a patient does not receive treatment because the social 
value of another patient was higher, the unfortunate patient’s life is not valuable.  
It is not that their life is not valuable, or even that it is less valuable; it is simply 
that someone else’s life is more instrumentally socially valuable.  As was the 
response to critics of the Seattle system, the fact that the social value judgement 
on patients comes after the medical suitability selection, shows that all patients 
are valuable and have equal moral worth, and it is only their social value that 
differs. 
 
Social worth criteria 
Subjective criteria     
One of the inherent problems with using social worth criteria to assess a patient’s 
value to society, is actually determining how socially valuable a patient is; what 
criteria do you use?; How deep do you look?; How do you weigh the different 
factors?  In his book, Classical Cases in Medical Ethics, Gregory Pence correctly 
                                                      
37 However, it might be argued that there are remain some form of social value judgements in the 
current patient selection process by way of the QALY and the accusations that there is 
discrimination inherent in the criteria that mean some patients, namely the elderly, are less likely 
to receive treatment.  
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points out why these issues posed a problem for the Seattle committee:  
“...this committee was struggling with issues of distribution in the era 
before bioethics.  At the time, no philosophers were writing about ethical 
issues of allocating artificial or natural organs, no philosophers were 
writing about bioethics at all.”  (Pence, 1995, p. 298)  
As was mentioned in the last section, the Seattle committee and the selection 
process they used could be seen as a prototype for a social value allocation system  
(Ramsey, 1970b, p. 244), and as with most prototypes, problems are discovered 
and refinements need to be made.  The committee was deciding what criteria to 
include in the decision making process from their own individual consciences 
without any moral or ethical guidelines from research sources; they were on their 
own (Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967, p. 371).  Making such decisions without any 
guidance and outlines was sure to raise eyebrows, especially when those decisions 
were being made by lay people who did not have the relevant knowledge and 
experience to fully know and understand what makes someone socially valuable, 
and when their decisions might be biased due to arbitrary prejudices.  At best, the 
lay committee was simply a cross-section of the local society and represented 
their views on who should receive treatment.  The Seattle committee drew up a 
list of all the factors that they would weigh up when making their selections: age 
and sex of the patient; marital status and number of dependents; income; net 
worth; emotional stability, with particular regard to the patient’s capacity to 
accept the treatment; educational background; nature of occupation, past 
performance and future potential; and names of people who could serve as 
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references (Alexander, 1962, p. 106).  However, the committee members all had 
differing opinions on the importance of each criterion.   
In her article on the Seattle Committee, Alexander claims that the criteria the 
committee used to make its selection decisions was sometimes arbitrary, with 
patients over the age of 45 being rejected for treatment, the rejection of children, 
and only patients who lived in the Washington area being considered for 
treatment (Alexander, 1962, p. 106).  However, these criteria are not 
fundamentally arbitrary and do have a reasonable amount of justification.  The 
doctors justified the exclusion of patients over the age of 45 on the grounds that 
“older patients with chronic kidney disease are too apt to develop other serious 
complications” (1962, p. 106).  And the exclusion of children was on the grounds 
that “the nature of the treatment itself might cruelly torment and terrorize the 
child” and concerns over whether “a child forced to live under the dietary 
restrictions would be capable of growth” (1962, p. 106).  The basis for these 
decisions was on the patient’s ability to benefit rather than simply on some 
arbitrary reason.  The exclusion of patients from outside the Washington area was 
on the grounds of fairness in that “the basic research to develop the u-shaped tube 
[cannula shunt] had been done at the University of Washington medical School 
and at its new University Hospital – both state-supported institutions –  [and so] 
the people whose taxes had paid for the research should be its first beneficiaries” 
(1962, pp. 106–107).  For residents of other states to benefit from treatment that 
the residents of the Washington area had effectively paid for, and whose citizens 
also required treatment, would be unfair on the citizens of Washington.  
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Sanders and Dukeminier also had concerns over the subjective nature of the 
selection criteria.  They question the “public service” criteria that the Seattle 
committee took into account by asking whether “persons who got themselves 
jailed in the South while working for civil rights were doing a "public service"? 
What about working for the Antivivisection League?  Why should a Sunday-school 
teacher be saved rather than Madalyn Murray” (Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967, p. 
378).  They point out that nonconformists who participated in such activities 
might have been ruled out when historically they have contributed so much to the 
making of America; “The Pacific North-West is no place for a Henry David Thoreau 
with bad kidneys” (1967, p. 378).  So the Seattle committee might have been using 
social value criteria that were not objective, and influenced by their own personal 
biases and prejudices.  However, the presence of prejudice and bias in the 
selection decision could also have been avoided if the selection committees were 
made up of different members, specifically, members who had experience in the 
relevant fields relating to assessing the needs of society and patient behaviour and 
circumstances.  
The issue of the subjective values of the committee being incorporated into what 
should have been an objective reflection of a patient’s value to society will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter under the section The Selection 
Committees.   
 
Prediction problems 
 145 
It might have been the case that the selection criteria the Seattle committee used 
was a reflection of their own values rather than an objective reflection of the needs 
of society, however, even if the selection committee had decided on social value 
criteria that were objective and warranted, there could still be concerns over how 
useful the criteria would be in the end.  Childress points out that “the difficulties 
with predicting using social worth raised doubts about the feasibility and 
justifiability of using a utilitarian approach, and there was also difficulty in judging 
the consequence of present actions and which persons will fulfil their potential 
function in society” (Childress, 1970; Blagg, 1998, pp. 237–238).  Even if the social 
value criteria used were justified, if the outcomes of a person’s actions, or the 
likelihood of them making certain contributions to society in the future cannot be 
accurately predicted, then how can accurate social value judgements about a 
person be made?  Whilst this is not a problem confined to only the Seattle 
committee (any system that attempts to place a social worth judgement on a 
patient will face the same objections), accurately predicting the outcomes of a 
person’s actions, the likelihood of them making future contributions, and knowing 
the value of these contributions is even more elusive when it is a lay committee 
attempting to make these judgements, or even if left to the physicians.38  They do 
not have the relevant knowledge and expertise to make these judgements 
accurately.  (This will be covered in more detail in the next section.)  Rescher 
acknowledged how difficult the task of the Admissions Advisory Committee was, 
especially compared to the task of the Medical Advisory Committee (Rescher, 
1969, p. 179): “Biomedical factors are easy, but familial and social factors are 
                                                      
38 Furthermore, if social value decisions were made by the physicians, this may create distrust 
between the patients and the medical profession. 
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difficult and [involve] intangibles.  Even so, these must be taken into account from 
the ethical viewpoint, and largely based on the principles of utility and of justice” 
(Blagg, 1998, p. 237). 
Under a revised system, once the selection of patients for medical suitability has 
been made, instead of a lay committee determining how socially valuable a patient 
is, a committee of experts from relevant fields would make these decisions.  
Experts from fields such as sociology, economics, and psychology are in a better 
position than a lay committee to know not only what the needs of society are, but 
also the likely effects that different people will have in society, (provided that they 
have enough information).  That is not to say that predicting the outcomes of a 
person's actions, or determining the likely future contributions of a person, would 
be a simple task for these professionals, but rather that, even though difficult, and 
perhaps impossible to predict with absolute accuracy, experts from relevant fields 
stand a better chance at making these predictions, and looking at the right criteria 
to begin with, than a committee of lay people.39 
 
Criteria abuse 
Another problem with using social worth criteria to allocate resources to patients, 
is that patients may abuse, or play on the criteria in order to either make 
themselves more valuable to society, or to make their death more of a burden on 
                                                      
39 A more detailed discussion of who would be best placed to make up the selection committee will 
be given in Chapter 5. 
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society.  Society would surely not discourage a person from trying to contribute 
more to society, even if it was for his own security; however, if a person were to 
intentionally put themselves in a position where their death would be more 
burdensome without making any real social contributions whilst in this position, 
they would in effect be holding the allocation committee to ransom.  For example, 
the Seattle committee placed as much, if not more, value on family as it did on 
societal contributions,40 so that “A candidate who plan[ned] to come before this 
committee would [have been] well-advised to father a great many children, then 
to throw away all his money, and finally to fall ill in a season when there will be a 
minimum of competition from other men dying of the same disease” (Alexander, 
1962, p. 125).  Because the Seattle committee placed so much value on family 
without any safeguards against those who might exploit these criteria, the system 
was open for abuse.  There might not have actually been any cases where a 
candidate had purposefully put themselves in a position where their death would 
be more burdensome to society in order to increase their chances for treatment, 
but if a social worth allocation criterion were to be introduced again, such 
possibilities would at least need to be considered. 
However, the need for safeguards to avoid abuse of the system depends mainly on 
how significant the risk of abuse of the system is.  For example, how likely is it that 
someone would make life changing decisions about having a family if a social value 
criterion were in place, on the basis of the small chance that they may end up 
requiring an organ transplant at some point in the future?  The chances of 
                                                      
40 “Other factors equal, the group chooses those with dependents...”  (Sanders and Dukeminier, 
1967) 
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someone making life altering decisions on the basis of a small risk, are going to be 
so small themselves that significant safeguards to abuse of the system aren’t all 
that necessary.  There are much bigger risks to people’s lives and health that 
people do not avoid, and sometimes even actively pursue, e.g. the risk of a 
multitude of health issues due to smoking.  Or issues that people do not plan for in 
the future because the event or risk is too far away, or because they think the 
actual occurrence of the risk will not happen to them, e.g. pensions, house/life 
insurance.  If people regularly do not avoid or put in safeguards to protect 
themselves from these types of risks, there is no reason to suppose that they will 
be more inclined to alter their whole life around the even smaller chance of 
needing an organ transplant. 
But this does not address the possibility of someone abusing the system once they 
find out that they require an organ transplant.  If someone were to find out that 
they require an organ, they could still put themselves in a position where their 
death would cause more detriment than it would cause if they died in their current 
circumstances, even if they have not taken advantage of the system beforehand by 
purposely having a lot of children, or choosing a career path that is likely to be of 
value.  E.g. a parent and spouse could purposely lose all their money and cancel 
their life insurance policies if they found out that they require an organ so that 
their death would mean that there was no financial security for their family.  Or 
the eminent medical researcher could encrypt his unpublished results so that they 
would be lost if he died.  In these circumstances, the patient would in effect be 
holding the NHS to welfare ransom.  Even though the children and spouse exist 
and their welfare depends on the patient, and the encrypted, unpublished results 
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of the medical researcher might prove useful, responding to these engineered 
situations would undoubtedly encourage other patients to put themselves in 
similar situations in future cases.  Such a situation would mean that the addition 
of a social value criterion in the organ allocation decision would become solely 
based on the minimisation of detriment rather than a balance of this and the 
promotion of welfare. 
In order to avoid such a situation, patients who purposely engineer the type of 
situations mentioned above could be moved to the bottom of the waiting list so 
that they are not rewarded for their abuse of the system, and to discourage future 
abuse of the system by other individuals.  Although avoidable detriment would be 
caused in the short term, overall welfare would be increased as other patients 
would know that the system would not bend to accommodate such engineered 
circumstances.  A parallel could be drawn with not negotiating with terrorists in 
order to limit further acts of terror.    
 
Equality and fairness 
One of the problems that Sanders and Dukeminier have with including social 
worth evaluations in organ and resource allocation decisions is that they feel 
making such decisions may not be in keeping with the equality and equal 
protection clause of the (American) constitution, and which is present in the NHS 
constitution too (NHS, 2013): 
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“It suffices to point out that selection procedures that permit men to 
evaluate and compare the social worth of human beings and, on that basis, 
to spare the life of some and doom others may well not meet that command.  
Judicial notions of morality and fair play, which finally determine the limits 
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, may require a more 
impersonal method of selecting who is to be saved from among the dying.”  
(Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967, p. 374) 
Sanders and Dukeminier are right to a certain extent, that deciding who lives and 
who dies on the basis of social worth may not be allowed under the laws of 
equality and protection as it amounts to discrimination.  However, the 
government also has a duty to make the best use of the available organs for 
transplant, and as was discussed in the previous chapter, a more impersonal 
method of patient selection, such as random allocation, does not make best use of 
organs.  By not making a considered selection of a patient, and instead selecting a 
patient through an impersonal method (drawing names out of a hat), the benefit 
that is created is less than could acceptably be created.41  Equality may have been 
increased a little, but so too has the risk for detriment to society by not actively 
opting for the survival of the most socially valuable patient.  A balance needs to be 
struck between these two approaches to ensure that both the requirements to 
maintain equality, and to make the best use of the resources available, can be met.  
In both the Seattle patient selection system, and in a revised system, a level of 
equality was (and would be) present in that patients were not (and would not be) 
discounted for treatment based on their value to society from the outset.  A 
                                                      
41 Unless by chance, the most socially valuable patient happens to be selected. 
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patient’s medical suitability is most important (from both an ethical and practical 
point of view) and so that is what is determined first, and then their social value 
is considered thereafter. 
Furthermore, there is a distinction to be made between direct and indirect 
discrimination.  An analogy could be made with the idea of “genuine occupational 
requirements” in employment selection where there is an element of 
discrimination in order to achieve a legitimate aim (Equality Act, 2010).  These 
kinds of discriminations can be thought of as indirectly discriminatory as opposed 
to directly discriminatory as the criteria for selection for a job are relevant, and in 
place in order that the job can be carried out, which leads to the side effect of 
indirectly discriminating against a group.  However, the criteria are not unjustly 
prejudiced.  The kind of discriminatory considerations that might be taken into 
account in a revised organ allocation system that included a person’s social value 
could also be thought of as the more acceptable indirect discriminations as they 
are only in place to achieve the aim of society benefiting from each organ 
transplant. 
Langford also suggests that there can be appropriate forms of discrimination in a 
resource allocation system whilst still maintaining the principle of equality: 
“This is possible because adoption of a principle of equality does not entail 
that we make no discriminations, only that these discriminations are “i) of 
an appropriate kind and ii) that they are applied according to established 
rules, and not arbitrarily… 
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It might be urged that what counts as an appropriate kind of discrimination 
depends entirely on the kind of culture in which we live.  However, there 
are rational grounds for ruling out some kinds of discrimination in any 
society, once a principle of equality is accepted.  In other words, the 
principle is not infinitely flexible.  For example, attempts to justify 
discrimination in terms of race or gender, can, I think, only be made on the 
basis of demonstrably false empirical accounts of the nature of race and 
gender, as in Nazi accounts of race and Aristotle’s of gender.”  (Langford, 
1992, pp. 13–14) 
Just because there may be some form of discrimination in a resource allocation 
system does not mean that the principle of equality is ignored.   
A further perceived problem with the Seattle system is that the selection 
committee were ‘playing God’ with their “unbridled consciences, built-in biases, 
and fantasies of omnipotence” (Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967, p. 378).  To select 
patients in this way (with broad discretion) might be acceptable for experimental 
trials as it could help to demonstrate the validity of the project.  But “once the 
procedure proves its merit and passes from the experimental to the standard, 
justice requires that selection be made by a fairer method” (1967, p. 378).  
However, in the case of the Seattle Kidney Centre, the new technology of using a 
cannula shunt for dialysis was by no means a standard practice (even though it 
did prove to be a successful procedure), and so the committee’s method of 
selecting patients could be defended on the grounds that the procedure was still 
experimental.  The selection committee themselves thought of their selection of 
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patients as “picking guinea pigs for experimental purposes” and not that they were 
denying life to others based on their social value (Murphy, 2003, p. 98). 
However, even if the committee defended their selection process on the grounds 
that the procedure was still in experimental stages, it remains the case that certain 
patients were favoured for treatment, and chosen as guinea pigs for experimental 
purposes, based on their perceived higher social value, which wasn’t a criterion 
that needed to be included to demonstrate the validity of the project and 
effectiveness of the treatment.  But this preferential selection on social value is not 
necessarily where the problem lies; I suggest that the problem lies in the way that 
the Seattle committee judged the social value of patients.  Their criteria were 
highly subjective and prejudiced (see following section) and it is discrimination 
based on these subjective opinions, dissimilar to the types of discrimination in the 
genuine occupational requirements, which poses the problem for fairness.  Even 
though there would still have to be a level of discrimination in a revised system in 
order for the system to provide any extra benefit, this discrimination should be 
based on objective grounds, and balanced against the requirement for equality 
and fairness, and the potential detriment that would be caused by setting the level 
of discrimination too high.  E.g. favouring treatment of only those patients who are 
most stereotypically good-looking (symmetrical faces, golden ratio etc.); it may 
make for a more aesthetically pleasing society of people, but whatever amount of 
utility is gained, it would undoubtedly be outweighed by the detriment caused by 
such a high level of discrimination based on such a superficial value, and so is not 
an acceptable discriminatory factor.  
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The selection committee 
As briefly mentioned in the last section, one of the main problems with the Seattle 
allocation system was the Admissions Advisory Committee (patient selection 
committee) itself.  Unlike the Medical Advisory Committee members, the members 
of the Admissions Advisory Committee were arguably under-qualified to make the 
kind of social value judgements that they had decided to make.  Furthermore, they 
were all from a middle-class background, and so there was the real possibility that 
there would be sections of society who would be unrepresented, or who would be 
the subject of the committee bias and prejudice.   
 
No relevant knowledge 
If we look at the Medical Advisory Committee first, those members are well suited 
and qualified for their role in the preliminary patient selection based on the 
patient’s medical suitability, as those members were physicians and had a 
background in dialysis; they had the relevant knowledge and experience to know 
which patients were medically suitable for the treatment.  The Admissions 
Advisory Committee on the other hand, was somewhat less qualified for their role.   
The Admissions Advisory Committee decided that those patients who were of 
most value to society would be selected for treatment, and so their role was to 
 155 
work out just which patients were indeed most socially valuable; it is for this task 
that members of the Admissions Advisory Committee were under-qualified.  The 
committee was made up of lay members consisting of two physicians not involved 
in the care of dialysis patients, a lawyer, a housewife, a businessman, a labour 
leader and a minister (Blagg, 1998, p. 236).  None of these are professions 
particularly suited to determining the combined social value rankings of the 
professions, family, and morality, of members of society, or even knowing what 
the needs of society are in the first place in order to form relevant social value 
criteria.  At best, they could make ‘educated’ guesses as to which patients were 
more valuable; at worst, they could base their decisions on their personal biases 
and prejudices.  They did not have enough knowledge or experience of what the 
needs of society were, or which criteria were more important than others.  A 
committee made up of members from fields relevant to determining the needs of 
society would have been better placed to make decisions on the social value of 
patients.   
 
Judgements became subjective 
As a result of the committee being made up of members who were not trained as 
to what the needs of society were, their own personal values crept in to the 
selection criteria, meaning that their aim of selecting those patients who were most 
valuable to society for treatment, had morphed into selecting those patients who 
were most valued by society. The reason for this stems from the fact that they did 
not have the relevant skills and experience to know which skills, traits, and 
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contributions were most necessary to society and its functioning, and so they had 
to make their best guess, and make their decisions on a “virtually intuitive basis”  
(Alexander, 1962, p. 118).  Unfortunately, this meant that their own subjective 
values became part of the selection criteria, inadvertently changing their selection 
criteria from determining who is most valuable to society, to who is most valued 
by society/themselves.  
The subjective elements of their selection criteria are clear when it is questioned 
as to whether particular considerations are really useful to society, e.g. teaching 
in Sunday school (Sanders and Dukeminier, 1967, p. 378).  Teaching in Sunday 
school might be morally laudable in the eyes of other church goers, but can it really 
be seen as useful to society?  (It might even be argued that it harms the children 
by corrupting their minds with religion.)  The labour leader on the committee 
suggests that a “strong will” should be considered in the selection criteria as it 
means the patient is less likely to give up, and that a person should “have some 
religion, because that indicates character” (Alexander, 1962, p. 123).  Having a 
strong will might be socially valuable in the sense that resources will not have 
been wasted by allocating them to someone who will not give up when the 
treatment becomes too tough, but having will power pertains more to medical 
prognosis and suitability which had already been considered, than it does to social 
value.  And besides the fact that someone that does not have “some religion” can 
have as much character as someone that does, is character all that valuable to 
society, especially given its rather vague meaning?  If social value is based on a 
person's contributions and usefulness to society, having character is not 
necessarily a reflection of this.  Just because someone has character does not mean 
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that they make valuable contributions to society.   
The focus of the selection criteria should have been on the patients’ value to 
society, but what ended up happening, due partly to mistaken judgements about 
what is socially valuable, is that the selection criteria became based on societal 
values, or at least the personal value of the committee members. 
It should be noted however, that the members of the Admissions Advisory 
Committee should not be completely blamed for not achieving their aim of 
objectively selecting those patients who were most valuable to society for 
treatment.  They were right to attempt to allocate the resources using social value 
considerations because, as previously argued, it would create the most amount of 
welfare from the available resources.  However, it was unlikely that they could 
have objectively and accurately ranked patients on that basis given that they were 
only lay members and were not well versed in the values necessary for society to 
function and grow sustainably, nor of the interplay between them, let alone how 
the changing needs of society over time will influence which patients are most 
valuable.  Had they chosen a different method of determining which patients 
should receive treatment, such as a lottery or first-come, first-served, they would 
have undoubtedly been more successful at achieving their aim of objectively 
selecting patients without personal subjectivity entering into the decision, but it 
would have meant opting for an inferior selection method.   
To solve the two issues stemming from the lay committee's lack of relevant 
knowledge and experience, a selection committee made up of a team of experts 
from relevant fields, such as sociology, economics, and psychology, should have 
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been used, and indeed could be used in a revised system.  Experts from these fields 
are undoubtedly in a better position than a lay committee to know what the actual 
needs of society are and their relative importance (as will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter).  A patient selection committee made up of experts will 
also be able to make better judgements about which patients can best help meet 
the needs of society, more so than a lay committee could, and so can make 
relevant, objective, and justifiable social value judgements rather than being based 
on subjective personal prejudices.  
 
Not diverse enough 
The next problem of the Admissions Advisory Committee is that its members were 
all from the same middle class background, which gives rise to the possibility that 
patients of different classes and social groups might not have been considered for 
treatment because of the prejudices of the committee (Sanders and Dukeminier, 
1967, p. 378).  There was some attempt to make the Admissions Advisory 
Committee fair and diverse so as to provide a cross-section of the community, with 
the committee being made up of members from different professions.  However, 
the fact that the cross-section was taken only from the middle-class means that it 
was only the middle class that was represented, and so the committee did not 
provide a true cross-section of society.  The effect of the middle-class selection 
committee can arguably be seen in the selection criteria they used to judge a 
patient's social worth.  The kind of things that were taken into account were a 
person’s level of education, if they were a member of the scouts, went to Sunday 
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school, and contributed to the Red Cross (1967, p. 378).  Indeed, Sanders and 
Dukeminier claim that the deliberations by the committee were polluted by 
prejudices and mindless clichés’ and described the situation as a disturbing 
picture of the bourgeoisie sparing the bourgeoisie (1967, pp. 377–378). 
However, not all of the social worth criteria used was necessarily middle-class.  
Whilst some committee members did suggest criteria such as, whether the patient 
was a Sunday school teacher or scout leader (typically middle-class activities and 
roles), other criteria suggested were whether the patient had a strong will, or if 
they have a family they will leave behind if they were to die, and whether that 
family will be supported with adequate provisions.  These are not criteria that 
immediately conjure up thoughts of the middle-class, but instead are social worth 
criteria that would appeal to people from any social class. 
Nevertheless, it is still a problem that the selection committee was made up of only 
the middle-class, because it allowed the possibility that certain classes and groups 
might not be considered for treatment because of the committee’s collective 
prejudices.  Even if certain groups and classes were never excluded from 
considerations, there was the possibility that they could be.  A committee made up 
from a wider cross-section of society would have ensured that a wider proportion 
of society was represented, so that there would be less chance of certain groups 
being overlooked for treatment.   
Alternatively, if the selection committee were made up of experts from relevant 
fields, there would not be as much need for the committee members to come from 
a wide cross-section of society.  The experts would, ideally, select the social value 
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criteria for objective and justifiable reasons, and not because of their own 
subjective values.  Of course, there is the possibility that the personal backgrounds 
of the experts will have influenced their approach within their field, and even 
experts from the same field come to different conclusions on the same issue.  
However, these conclusions are based on objective research unlike the prejudiced 
views of a lay committee, and an objective compromise may be reached in cases 
of disagreement.  The problem of collective committee prejudice can be avoided 
by using a team of experts to make the social value judgements of patients as they 
can be reasonably relied upon to make objective decisions using objective criteria. 
However, if further safeguards were needed to avoid the possibility of unfounded 
prejudice finding its way into the selection criteria, rather than finding experts 
from a cross-section of society, a number of top experts from each field could 
discuss and decide which values and patients are most valuable, thereby ensuring 
that one expert’s personal bias does not unjustifiably sway the value ranking of a 
patient one way or the other. 
With regards to the Medical Advisory Committee, there was not the same need for 
their members to be from a wide cross-section of society as their deliberations on 
patient selection only pertained to the medical suitability of the patient, and not 
the patient’s value.  As long as the members of the Medical Advisory Committee 
were physicians well versed in the needs and likely prognosis of dialysis patients, 
they could make an objective decision on whether a patient was a suitable 
candidate for dialysis.  And so in a revised system, the same setup would remain; 
patients would be selected for treatment based on their medical suitability by 
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physicians from the field in which the patient seeks treatment.   
 
Conclusion 
There were many problems with the Seattle committee and the process that was 
used for patient selection, but the two main problems with the committee and 
process was that 1) they did not have the relevant knowledge and expertise to 
make their decisions objectively, and 2) that the criteria used for patient selection 
became subjective and based on personal preferences. 
In any system that includes a social value criterion, there will always be the 
problem of accurately predicting the contributions that a person is likely to make 
with relative certainty.  However, because the Seattle committee was made up of 
lay members, the problem of prediction was exacerbated.  An accurate prediction 
of patients’ likely social contributions is even more elusive when it is a lay 
committee that is attempting to make these predictions whilst lacking the relevant 
knowledge and expertise.  Because of this, they did not have any objective and 
reliable information about what is/was valuable for the sustainable functioning, 
growth, and flourishing of society that they could base their selection criteria on.  
As such, their selection criteria became based on their own personal values and 
opinions about what was valuable to society.  This meant that the criteria for 
patient selection was not an objective reflection of the needs of society, but rather 
a subjective appraisal of the social worth of patients by a small group of their 
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peers. 
The Seattle system was the first of its kind and as such, can be seen as a prototype 
for how social value could be incorporated into resource allocation systems.  And 
as is the nature of prototypes, there are problems and obstacles that need to be 
resolved and remedied before there is a final system that is fit for the mainstream.  
A revised version of how a social value criterion could be incorporated into 
resource allocation decisions would address the problems that the Seattle system 
faced, resulting in a more objective, ethically acceptable, and socially beneficial 
version.   
If the selection committee were made up of experts from relevant fields who had 
the knowledge and expertise to identify what the needs of society are, and which 
patients are most apt to contribute to the fulfilment of those needs, then the 
system immediately becomes more objective.  The social value criteria would be 
based on the actual needs of society as determined by experts from the relevant 
fields (such as sociology and economics) rather than the guesswork and subjective 
biases that would occur with a lay committee.  And again, experts from the 
relevant fields (such as sociology and psychology) would be able to identify which 
patients meet the objective social value criteria through the patients’ likely future 
contributions and actions.  The next chapter discusses the ideal candidates that 
would serve on the committees in a revised system. 
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Chapter 5: The Selection 
Committees 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, the case study of the Seattle Kidney Center highlighted the problems 
associated with using social value criteria in a resource allocation system.  One of the main 
problems with the system was that the committee that made the decisions as to who and 
what was valuable to society did not have the relevant knowledge and expertise to make 
these decisions in an objective manner.  In order to avoid the same problem occurring in 
a revised system, in this chapter I will look at who would be suitable to decide what the 
specific needs of society are, and who is best placed to determine which potential organ 
recipient is the most valuable to society by virtue of being able to help fulfil these needs.  
It will be shown that two committees made up of experts from fields such as sociology, 
economics, and psychology, (amongst possible others), will be able to make the required 
decisions in an objective manner.   
The first expert committee would determine what the current and future needs of society 
are, and due to their expert background, will be better positioned than a lay committee to 
make these decisions given their increased level of knowledge and expertise in this area.  
It should be their recommendations upon which the policy for priority setting should 
mainly be based, rather than public opinion.   
It will then be shown that a second expert committee, determining which patients are most 
likely to help meet the needs of society, should make the decisions about who should 
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receive an organ, again due to their increased level of knowledge and expertise over a lay 
committee.  
 
How will the selection committees work? 
With the suggested changes to the organ allocation system that I am proposing, 
there will need to be two committees involved in the organ allocation decision.  
The first committee will be the criteria selection committee who will determine 
what the needs of society are and how important those needs are to society at a 
given time.  The second committee will be the patient selection committee, who 
will decide which patients are most socially valuable by virtue of how much they 
can contribute towards the fulfilment of the needs of society, and how detrimental 
their death will be.  The criteria selection committee would be a single, national 
committee, making decisions about what the needs of society are and what social 
contributions will help to best meet these needs.  However, the committee could 
actually be in the form of a working group or enquiry that produces the criteria 
guidance, much in the same way as the Nuffield Council on Bioethics produces 
reports and guidance (Nuffield Bioethics, no date).  The decisions made here 
would need to be reviewed on perhaps an annual basis to reflect the changing 
needs of society.  The patient selection committees on the other hand, would be 
more numerous, with one being present in each transplant unit, applying the 
selection criteria and deciding on which patients best fit the criteria on those 
occasions when a decision needs to be made, similar to the way in which local 
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research ethics committees make decisions on particular research projects based 
on the terms of reference set out by the HRA (Health Research Authority).  
Both committees will be made up primarily of experts, but there still remains 
room for lay person input, similar to the way that research ethics committees 
function.  With research ethics committees, experts play the primary role in 
determining the criteria which research must meet for ethical approval, and play 
a significant role in appraising research proposals to ensure they are ethically 
sound.  The reason why they play such a role is that they have the relevant 
technical expertise in their domain to be able to make these decisions.   
“In the light of their role in identifying and evaluating the risks and benefits 
of research, research ethics committees must include individuals with 
scientific and medical expertise.  Without such expertise (supplemented, 
when necessary, by consultants in particular specialties), they will not be 
in a position to understand the procedures to be used in the study and their 
potential consequences for participants.” (WHO, 2009, p. 13)   
However, lay people also play a role on research ethics committees as they are 
able to provide a different perspective, or identify issues not considered by the 
scientific and medical expert committee members.   
“Research ethics committees should not…be made up exclusively of 
scientific experts.  Some types of risks and benefits may be more easily 
identified by non-scientific members, particularly those related to social, 
legal or cultural considerations.” (WHO, 2009, p. 13) 
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In the case of the criteria selection committees, there will be room for lay person 
input into the decision-making process in order to partly reflect public opinion, 
but also to help to identify social or cultural issues with the criteria and selection 
process that the specialists may not have considered. 
However, with both the criteria selection committee and the patient selection 
committee, experts will make up the main body in the same way that a research 
ethics committee is made up.   They will have more of the technical knowledge and 
expertise to identify and evaluate the needs of society, and the contributions that 
people can make towards fulfilling these needs, than a lay person does.  It would 
make sense for there to be more than one expert from each of the disciplines that 
would be needed to determine the social value criteria and patient selection 
decision, as one expert is unlikely to have the range of necessary knowledge to 
make such decisions.  There are many branches of sociology, economics, and 
psychology that would be needed to make accurate assessments of social value, 
and so input from each of these specialist experts would be needed to create the 
social value criteria initially.  There may also be a need to have multiple 
representation of different disciplines not only because of the need for expertise 
in the many sub-disciplines, but also because of disagreement and the existence of 
different schools of thought within each sub-discipline.  If there were at least two 
experts from the same discipline helping to make the criteria selection decisions, 
even though there may be disagreement between them at times, it will ensure that 
thorough deliberation is given to the criteria selection and rankings.      
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Who will decide what is valuable to society? - 
(criteria selection committee) 
Experts or laypeople 
As highlighted earlier, when deciding which patients should receive organs for 
transplant under a system that includes the addition of a social value criterion, a 
patient’s medical suitability would be taken into account first in order to ensure 
that transplants are not carried out on patients where such treatment is futile, and 
in order to ensure that patients with a low social value score are not excluded from 
consideration for treatment from the outset.  However, with the inclusion of a 
social value criterion, patient selection decisions are not wholly medical problems.  
They are partly the problems of psychologists, economists, sociologists, and other 
professions, as they will be integral in determining a person’s level of social value, 
and so it is they who should be part of the decision-making process. 
Rescher agrees that incorporating a social value criterion changes the patient 
selection process from a purely medical decision:   
“When there are more than enough places in an ELT [exotic life-saving 
therapy] program to accommodate all who need it, then it will clearly be a 
medical question to decide who does have the need and which among these 
would successfully respond.  But when an admitted gross insufficiency of 
places exists, when there are ten or fifty or one hundred highly eligible 
candidates for each place in the program, then it is unrealistic to take the 
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view that purely medical criteria can furnish a sufficient basis for selection.  
The question of ELT selection becomes serious as a phenomenon of scale – 
because as more candidates present themselves, strictly medical factors 
are increasingly less adequate as a selection criterion precisely because by 
numerical category-crowding there will be more and more cases whose 
“status is much the same” so far as purely medical considerations go.”  
(Rescher, 1969, p. 181) 
However, he goes on to suggest that the non-medical criteria should be based on 
the opinions of lay people: 
 “Once the medical issues have been brought to bear, fundamental social 
issues remain to be resolved.  The instrumentalities of ELT have been 
created through the social investment of scarce resources, and the 
interests of society deserve to play a role in their utilization. As 
representatives of their social interests, lay opinions should function to 
complement and supplement medical vies once the proper arena of 
medical considerations is left behind.”  (1969, p. 181) 
Whilst the patient selection decision is no longer purely medical, I disagree that 
the involvement of other parties and their opinions in at least the criteria selection 
should come from lay people alone.  Instead, I suggest that it should be experts in 
the relevant fields, who know what the needs of society are and which of the 
possible recipients is most likely to help meet them, that should make up both 
committees.  If, as Rescher says, society is investing in a person through the 
allocation of a scarce resource to that person over some other person, then it 
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makes more sense for experts to be involved over lay people.  If how much society 
is likely to benefit from an organ allocation needs to be considered, experts can 
help to make a more insightful decision over which allocation would provide most 
utility to society.  
If an organ allocation system that incorporated social value considerations based 
on the best interests and the needs of society were to be implemented, these best 
interests based on society’s needs should be decided by a team of experts from 
different disciplines, even if their decisions may not necessarily reflect those held 
by society.  It might be argued that doing what is in the best interests of society is 
simply to give society what it wants, given that doing so would be to satisfy the 
voiced interests.  However, it is completely possible (and likely) that certain 
proportions of society might know what they want, but they do not know what 
they need, for the long term at least, or even if they do, they act on their desires 
rather than reasoning and rationality.  Take children for instance, or those 
members of society who are more interested in short term pleasure than concerns 
for long-term sustained pleasure (included, but not limited to, in this category 
would be addicts).  There are many facets to a well-oiled and functioning society, 
from the basics of water sanitation to the luxuries of art, and the majority of 
citizens are not in a position, and do not have the required knowledge or 
experience, to know the relative importance (based on the needs of society) of 
these many facets at any given time.  Furthermore, if the hierarchy of the best 
interests of society were based on the views and opinions of society, the criteria 
would be open to the biases and prejudices commonly held in the public 
consciousness in a way that would be less likely to happen if based on the objective 
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reasoning of the relevant experts. 
Shatin also highlights both options for the formulation of a social value index, but 
like Rescher, suggests that a value index based on a public attitude or opinion 
survey would be preferable to one based on expert opinion as it would “Reflect 
the totality of society’s opinions about the qualities which should enter into the 
value index”  (Shatin, 1966, p. 98).  He says that some would prefer this option as 
it is a “Truly democratic and proportional representation of the values of the 
people; an objective means of arriving at a valid index” (1966, p. 98).  However, 
whilst it might provide an accurate representation of the values that people have 
in society, to what extent can it really be classed as objective?  It may be objective 
in that it represents the values of the people in society, but as Shatin points out 
himself, such a method of creating a social value index can easily be condemned 
for allowing blind prejudice to carry the same weight as critical thought, and to 
allow such blind prejudice to be the basis upon which organ allocation decisions 
are made would be wholly inappropriate  (1966, p. 98). 
NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) uses a similar method to 
help inform its policy recommendations, with public participation actively 
encouraged when creating their guidelines and recommendations.  The public, 
whilst not producing guidance themselves, does have an input into the guidance 
developed by NICE through channels such as the Citizens Council, consultations, 
and meetings in public (NICE, 2015b).  The aim is that by involving patients, 
carers, and the general public in the development of its guidance and other 
products (the very people for whom the guidance will be relevant), the needs and 
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preferences of the patients and public are at the heart of the work (NICE, 2015d).  
However, the NICE guidance development process differs from Shatin’s 
suggestion for the inclusion of public involvement in that NICE simply considers 
the views of the public when drawing up their guidance and only includes these 
views and recommendations where appropriate; the views of the public are not 
necessarily included in the guidelines (NICE, 2015a).  This helps to avoid the 
possibility that the views of the public may be included in policy decisions when 
these views may be based upon blind prejudice.  In the end, policy guidance is 
determined by people who are trained in policy development and have the 
relevant knowledge and expertise to determine how the needs of society can best 
be met whilst maintaining ethical acceptability. 
What this means is that even though the public do have an input into the decision-
making process insofar as their views are considered and incorporated if and 
where appropriate, trained professionals and relevant experts are still the people 
who make the decisions in the end, based on what they think is best.  The reason 
why this process has been adopted and why it works, is for the aforementioned 
reason that it avoids any views of the public that are based on blind prejudice 
forming part of policy, and the experts and professionals who ultimately produce 
the guidelines have the relevant knowledge and expertise to know how to best 
achieve the aims behind the proposed guidelines.  A similar system to this could 
be used in order to determine the specific values that are important for society for 
a social value criterion, with the views of society being taken into account by a 
team of relevant experts and professionals that will make the final decisions.  The 
team of experts would base their decisions about what is socially valuable on 
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objective research about what the functional prerequisites42 for society are, and 
additional factors that are both necessary for, and desired by society, that may 
increase general welfare.  In this way, the presence of biases and prejudices of the 
experts finding their way into the system can be minimised, and the views of the 
public can be included if there were an appropriate place for them within the 
criteria.  
Shatin suggests that opponents of a value index based on a survey of public 
attitude and opinion might prefer to “Limit their survey to the leaders of society: 
the leading statesmen, managers, scientists, artists, humanists and so forth” 
(Shatin, 1966, p. 98).  However, he lacks sympathy for such an approach as he 
claims that it “Smacks of the all-too-prevalent father-knows-best mentality, where 
the professional expert (the professional engineer or chemist or behavioural 
scientist or professional anybody) aspire to be master of rather than consultant to 
the popular totality” (1966, p. 98).  Basson too considers this worry that such an 
approach could be seen as paternalistic.  However, he makes the distinction 
between a paternalistic policy that involves the “Making of decisions on behalf of 
someone fully informed and competent enough to make his own choices”, and a 
paternal choice that “Simply implies the making of a decision for someone without 
reference to the competency of the person for whom the decision is made” 
(Basson, 1979, p. 319).  He says that the committee making decisions on behalf of 
                                                      
42 “Functional prerequisites refer broadly to the things that must get done in any society if it is to 
continue as a going concern, i.e., the generalized conditions necessary for the maintenance of the 
system concerned. The specific structural arrangements for meeting the functional prerequisites 
differ, of course, from one society to another and, in the course of time, change in any given 
society.”… “Thus all societies must allocate goods and services somehow. A particular society may 
change from one method, say business enterprise, to another, say a centrally planned economy, 
without the destruction of the society as a society but merely with a change in its concrete 
structures” (Aberle et al., 1950, p. 100). 
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the public is merely paternal in the latter sense, and is warranted because: 
“[I]t may be argued that the average American today is simply not 
sufficiently informed to make decisions regarding the relative social value 
of a minor poet and a fifty-two-year-old top-level executive with two 
children. Furthermore, there is no way in which the average American 
could be so informed for every possible comparison likely to arise. There 
is just too much relevant information. A SMLR [scarce medical life-saving 
resources] allocation committee could at least be better informed, more 
thoughtful, and more rational than the average member of society, even if 
not perfectly so.”  (1979, p. 319) 
A team of experts and professionals from disciplines across the board are in a 
better and more informed position to determine the relevant needs of society, 
both in the short and long term.  They are in a position where they have the 
adequate knowledge, experience and foresight to know what society requires, 
even if it may not please society in the short term.  Contrary to what Shatin claims, 
such a team of experts, rather than aspiring to be masters of society and deciding 
what is to be deemed socially valuable based on their own biases and prejudices, 
would simply be highlighting what the needs of society are at a specific time 
period based on research from their field.  The public may know what their own 
preferences and values are, however, they may not have sufficient knowledge and 
understanding as to what society needs to function and flourish to allow them to 
make an informed decision were they to be surveyed, and if they possessed such 
knowledge and understanding, their decision may well be different.  For example, 
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there may be some individuals that are valued by society simply because they and 
their roles are known, but there may be other individuals who are not valued by 
society because society is not aware they exist, and that the role they fulfil exists, 
or of the extent of the contribution they make.  There may be those “unsung 
heroes” that do a lot for society behind closed doors in roles that are not widely 
known, and who cannot be replaced.  If the public were asked who to save, they 
would obviously choose to save only the known person as they are not even aware 
that the second exists.  However, if the public were aware of the unsung hero and 
the contributions that they make, their decision of who to save may well be 
different. 
A multi-disciplinary team of professionals from the relevant fields on the other 
hand can fill this gap, drawing on their expert knowledge.  And, even if their 
judgement may not be perfect, they are surely in more of a position than the 
layperson to make an informed decision of what is socially valuable based on the 
needs of society due to their deeper knowledge of the subject. 
 
Place for laypersons 
Even though specialist experts are better able to make decisions within their 
particular domain due to their deeper understanding and their explicit and tacit 
knowledge, lay people and novices might still have a role to play in the decision-
making process as a whole for policy decisions.  Collins and Evans make a 
distinction between the technical and political phases of decision making (Collins 
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and Evans, 2002, pp. 261–262), and I suggest that it is in the political phase where 
the layperson might be able to play a suitable role. 
“Collins and Evans’ [(Collins and Evans, 2002, 2007)] theory of expertise 
only states that whilst technical expertise possesses authority in respect of 
technical matters, it does not hold determinative authority in respect of 
broader policy decisions (that deploy technical knowledge) which ought to 
be made by the appropriate policy-making institutions.”  (Priaulx, Weinel 
and Wrigley, 2016, p. 402) 
Part of the policy-making institutions’ processes for deciding on what policies 
should be implemented will be to look at what the public thinks of a particular 
policy and what its reception and effects might be.  This is where the opinions of 
the layperson could be considered.  Whilst the technical phase of the decision 
might be best left up to the experts within the relevant domain if it is a purely 
technical decision, if this technical decision affects wider society, then there is a 
case for allowing novices and laypeople to have an input in the political phase of 
the decision, whether by being part of a committee, or wider public consultation.   
Feyerabend, whilst perhaps holding an overall position that I don’t support, does 
make an appealing suggestion that when it comes to policy decisions, scientists 
and experts should play only an advisory role, with the final decision being made 
by democratically elected committees (Feyerabend, 1982, p. 89; Sorgner, 2016, p. 
115).  This suggestion also aligns with that of Collins and Evans (cited in (Sorgner, 
2016, p. 117)).  They say that the decision-making rights in purely scientific or 
technical debates should be limited to certified and experience-based experts, and 
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that the democratic vote and public involvement be limited to the political phase 
of the decision-making processes.   
“[T]he outcome of the technical phase [should depend] exclusively on 
experts’ judgment [,but f]or the values of democracy to be maintained, the 
political phase must be granted predominance.  Policy-makers can still 
reject scientific advice, but only if they are well-informed and justify their 
decisions publicly [(Collins, Weinel and Evans, 2010, p. 193)].”  (Sorgner, 
2016, p. 117) 
Depending on the circumstance and setting, the democratically elected 
committees making the policy decisions might be made up of politicians who will 
draw on the opinion on their constituents, or might also include lay people as well 
as those with a fuller understanding from their interactional expertise in a similar 
way that research ethics committees are often made up  (WHO, 2009; NHS, 
2015a).  In relation to the suggestions from the experts about what is socially 
valuable and the criteria for assessing which patients are most socially valuable, 
the findings and advice of the specialist experts will be weighed up in the political 
phase of the decision-making process to determine what a particular policy should 
be.  Certain aspects of their recommendations, or elements of the social value 
criteria might not be implemented due to budget constraints, political party ideals, 
and public opinion.  And it is the feedback from lay people about these 
recommendations that will help to guide policy decisions by reflecting the views 
of the public, as well as providing an outside opinion to reduce the effects of 
groupthink (Liljegren, Höjer and Forkby, 2017).  
 177 
 
What makes an expert? 
Before moving on any further, it is worthwhile discussing just what constitutes 
expertise, and what it takes to be an expert, given that it is experts who will be 
determining what is socially valuable, and the relative social value between 
patients. 
Experts possess certain skills in a particular domain that laypeople do not, as well 
as more knowledge and a deeper understanding of their domain, and as such, are 
better placed to make decisions in their domain than lay people are. “[T]he 
primary distinction that separates experts from novices appears to be the breadth 
and depth of their domain-specific knowledge”, and that competence in making 
predictions within the experts particular domain is inherent in the definition of 
expertise (Phillips, Klein and Sieck, 2008, pp. 299–300).    Phillips et al. claim that 
we can distinguish experts from others by describing what they know that others 
do not, and what they can do that others cannot (2008, p. 300); Anderson calls this 
the declarative and procedural knowledge (Anderson, 1983).  Below is a list of the 
types of knowledge that experts possess that novices do not, which is taken from 
Phillips’ article (Phillips, Klein and Sieck, 2008): 
 
• Perceptual skills: in particular the ability to make fine discriminations, 
seem an essential component of expertise in many settings (Klein and 
Hoffman, 1993). 
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• Mental models: Experts are able to create mental models of “how things 
work” which means they are better able to describe, explain, and predict, 
than journeymen and novices.  They are able to make these mental models 
due to their broader and deeper knowledge and experience (Rouse and 
Morris, 1986). 
• Sense of typicality and association: experts can rapidly recognise and 
interpret complex patterns in a set of information in order to assess the 
situation more quickly and accurately than non-experts (Chase, 1983; 
Gentner, 1988; Dreyfus, 1997).  The repertoire of patterns that allow 
experts to recognise situations as typical, also enables them to spot 
information that is expected but missing from the picture, as well as 
enabling them to detect anomalies that are present but not expected. 
• Routines: Experts know a wider variety of tactics for getting things done.  
This category corresponds to the “knowing how” discussed by Anderson 
(Anderson, 1983). 
• Declarative knowledge: Experts know more facts and details, and have 
command of more explicit knowledge to go along with their tacit 
knowledge. 
 
In addition to what experts know and what they can do, Klein and Militello suggest 
several other categories of knowledge related to expertise with a focus on what 
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experts can do with this knowledge (Klein and Militello, 2004; Phillips, Klein and 
Sieck, 2008, pp. 301–303):   
 
• Run mental simulations: experts can use their detailed mental models, 
coupled with their understanding of the current state of the situation, to 
construct simulations of how the situation is going to develop in the future, 
and thereby generate predictions and expectations.  
• Spot anomalies and detect problems: the richer mental models of experts 
enable them to identify atypicalities and therefore adjust the story they are 
developing to explain the events.  
• Find leverage points: Klein and Wolf hypothesized that people can generate 
novel courses of action by identifying and capitalising on unapparent 
opportunities for useful interventions, i.e., leverage points  (Klein and Wolf, 
1998).  Mental simulation is a powerful tool for using leverage points to 
support improvisation, and experts are able to improvise better than non-
experts when the situation is novel by forming new, effective strategies 
(Klein, 1998). 
• Manage uncertainty: expert decision makers tend to use their mental 
models to fill in gaps with assumptions, to mentally simulate and project 
into the future, to formulate information seeing tactics. 
• Take one’s own strengths and limitations into account (i.e., metacognition): 
Several studies indicate that experts are better self-monitors than non-
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experts, and more able to judge the difficulty of problems given to them 
(Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1980).  Experts are more likely to consider the 
underlying principles addressed in the problem at the problem features, 
whilst novices more often consider characteristics unrelated to the 
problem (Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981). 
 
These skills and traits that experts possess mean that they are better suited to 
make decisions in their domains than a lay person is.  However, that is not to say 
that people who have not gone through any specialist training will not possess 
these skills or traits, or that they should not be classed as experts.  It is entirely 
possible that lay people without professional training, or novices, may have an 
interest in a particular field or domain and be able to make valuable contributions, 
and possess some of the explicit and tacit knowledge or traits that experts also 
possess, through some kind of experience-based, yet uncertified specialist 
contributory expertise (Sorgner, 2016, p. 118).  Unlike the relative model of 
expertise, where experts are identified through their superior or evaluative ability 
when compared to novices (Priaulx, Weinel and Wrigley, 2016, p. 399), the 
sociological model of expertise is able to account for novices that can make 
valuable contributions to a field, but who have not had any specialist training.  If 
these novices possess the tacit knowledge relevant to a domain, not just the 
explicit knowledge, then they too can be classed as experts (Priaulx, Weinel and 
Wrigley, 2016, p. 401).   The area where this has the most impact is in moral 
expertise, where at least some of the skills needed to be a moral expert are 
ubiquitous.  On the sociological conception of expertise, Collins and Evans are able 
to make distinctions between ‘ubiquitous expertises’ and ‘specialist expertises’ 
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(Collins and Evans, 2002, 2007) by defining specialist expertises as being related 
to domains of knowledge “which form around particular activities and are 
associated with particular subgroups of larger collectives.  Scientific disciplines 
are paradigmatic examples of such ‘domains of knowledge’, but in principle any 
meaningful activity that is not widely shared might be regarded as a ‘domain’ that 
may give rise to specialist expertises” (Priaulx, Weinel and Wrigley, 2016, p. 
402).43 
So even though some “novices” might be able to make valuable contributions to a 
field or domain, they might just have what is termed, interactional expertise; 
“…the ability to master the language of a specialist domain in the absence of 
practical competence” [(Collins and Evans, 2007, p. 14)].  Interactional expertise 
is what e.g. journalists, peer-reviewers and sociologists of science must possess to 
accomplish their tasks” (Sorgner, 2016, p. 116).  A specialist expert on the other 
hand, will have contributory expertise, which is what you need to be able to do an 
activity with competence (Collins and Evans, 2007, p. 14).  They will have a deeper 
knowledge and understanding of the field/domain as a whole, and so in general, 
will be better able to make decisions with competence within that domain than a 
layperson or a novice would.  For example; a deliberative body deciding the best 
fuel mixture for a manned spacecraft would be better if it were made up of 
specialist experts rather than lay people, novices, or those with interactional 
expertise in space fuel, given the need for precision, detail, and risk management.  
                                                      
43 “For example, to become a competent astrophysicist, it is not sufficient to just live in a country 
where astrophysics is practised by a subset of the population. What is needed to gain ‘fluency’ is 
to immerse oneself into the community of astrophysicists, either by enrolling in a University 
course and then working in the field or by talking to astrophysicists on a regular basis about 
domain-relevant ‘stuff’.”  (Priaulx, Weinel and Wrigley, 2016, p. 402) 
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And with regards to a social value allocation system that includes a social value 
criterion, experts with specialist expertise from the relevant fields will be better 
able to competently assess the needs of society, and make predictions about which 
patients might best meet these needs. 
Their deeper understanding of the issues in play, as well as their 
interconnectedness, will enable them to make more accurate and objective 
assessments and predictions.  And their assessments are more likely to be 
grounded in facts and data due to their declarative knowledge (Phillips, Klein and 
Sieck, 2008, p. 301), rather than the potentially more uninformed opinions of 
laypersons.  Their sense of typicality and association (Chase, 1983; Gentner, 1988; 
Dreyfus, 1997), along with their ability to create mental models (Rouse and 
Morris, 1986), means that they will be better able to make accurate predictions 
about who and what is socially valuable based on their previous experience of 
causal chains in their field.  Building on this, as Klein and Militello point out, 
experts are able to use their deeper knowledge and understanding to run mental 
simulations, and spot anomalies and detect problems.  This means that they will 
be able to construct mental simulations of how well their initial assessments of 
social value would function and play out, and then revise them based on any 
problems and anomalies that arise, thereby making their final assessments more 
accurate and reliable.   
If the decisions about what is socially valuable and which patients are most 
socially valuable were to be made by lay people alone, or mainly lay people, as was 
the case with the Seattle committee, the decisions would be a lot less reliable and 
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accurate than those made by relevant experts, and would undoubtedly be of a 
more subjective nature (as evidenced in the actual Seattle case).   
 
Objective Decisions 
It might be argued that deciding what is socially valuable is a subjective decision 
no matter who makes the decision, whether it be a lay person or an expert.  
However, as will be explained in more detail in the next section (Basic needs of 
society), objective decisions about what is socially valuable can be made once you 
identify what the needs of society are.  The criteria selection experts can make 
objective decisions about what the needs of society are by looking at what the 
basic societal functions are, such as those outlined by the Task Force on Quality 
Control of Disaster Management (Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster 
Management, 2014a, pp. 39–42).  They can then make an assessment of which 
needs should have most value attached to them based on how well they are 
satisfied, or not, at any given time by using indicators of function to assess the 
performance of the basic societal needs (Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster 
Management, The World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine and 
The Nordic Society for Disaster Medicine, 2003, p. 74).  Then, using their 
knowledge and expertise, they will be able to make predictions about the future 
needs of society and their relative importance, as well as which patients are most 
likely to be able to meet these needs.     
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Once an objective decision about what society needs has been made, a social value 
score can be determined for these needs depending on how urgently they need to 
be fulfilled.  A social value score for patients can then be determined based on the 
needs of society that they can contribute to.  As discussed earlier in this section, 
experts are better placed to make these decisions because they have access to the 
information and tacit knowledge that is needed to make these kinds of social value 
assessments, making their assessment more objective and accurate than would be 
the case if a lay person made these assessments. 
Of course, there may still be disagreements between the experts on what the needs 
of society are, which needs are most important, or which patients will best meet 
these needs.  This does not necessarily mean that these decisions are subjective, 
but simply that there is a difference in the way that the data has been interpreted.  
In such circumstances, these differences will be resolved in the way that other 
differences in policy preferences and social science are resolved: by further 
research, better arguments, or compromise.  With any type of committee, there 
may not be agreement on particular issues when a decision needs to be made.  
However, through delving deeper into the details of the issue and with further 
discussion, a final decision can often be made.  
 
Summary 
When it comes to deciding what the needs of society are and determining which 
patients are most socially valuable, it is better that experts from the relevant fields 
 185 
make these decisions rather than relying solely on a lay committee.  Experts will 
be able to make more accurate and reliable assessments of the needs of society 
than a lay person, and make a better assessment as to how far a patient 
contributes towards these needs given their fuller and deeper subject knowledge.  
One of the main problems with the Seattle patient selection committee was that it 
was mainly made up of lay people, with only a couple of medical experts on hand 
to advise of the medical suitability of the patients.  This led to relatively arbitrary, 
or misinformed reasons, for patients being selected for transplant based on their 
perceived social value.  If experts were to make up the criteria selection committee 
and the patient selection committee, their specialist expertise will allow them to 
make more accurate predictions about the current and future needs of society, as 
well as which patients might be best able to meet these needs.  Their ability to 
create mental models, their mastery of routines, and ability to spot trends and 
anomalies, means that they can make an assessment of not only what the needs of 
society are, but what skills and contributions will help to best meet these needs.    
Economists have a better idea than a lay person about what the current needs of 
the economy are, as well as its short and long-term needs.  They will also be able 
to make more accurate predictions about what the consequences might be if these 
needs are not met, and so make a decision about which needs should be given 
priority.  The sociologists will know what the current and future needs of society 
are, as well as a deeper and fuller understanding of what society needs to function 
and remain sustainable.  And when combined with the expertise of the 
psychologists, they will also have an idea of which patients might be best able to 
meet (or not meet) the needs of society, based on the patient’s background, 
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attitude, and circumstances.  (A more detailed discussion on the specific 
disciplines of the experts that will be used to make the criteria and patient 
selection decisions will be given later in this chapter: Why these areas of expertise?)  
As such, these subject-matter specialists are able to make decisions about what 
the needs of society are and what is socially valuable, and then create the criteria 
upon which potential organ recipients can be measured to determine which 
patients’ continued life will best help to meet those needs.  It is because of their 
increased and deeper specialist knowledge and abilities, that experts from the 
relevant fields should make the decisions, or at least recommendations, about 
what is socially valuable, without lay people playing a significant role within this 
technical phase of the decision.  The political phase of the policy decision is where 
the opinion of lay people is better placed, and where the recommendations of the 
experts can be implemented or rejected to varying extents based on budget 
restrictions, party goals, or public opinion.   
 
How would the needs of society be decided? 
The way in which the panel of experts will decide on the ranking order of the 
different values to begin with, will be based on what the needs of society are at 
any given time, in terms of proper functioning, growth, and stability in different 
areas.  The time period that the committees will be judging the needs of society 
for could differ depending on the practicability of doing so, but should be reviewed 
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periodically to ensure that the ranking of the different criteria maintains its 
reflection of the needs of society.  This will ensure that patients’ social values can 
be judged accurately, and the organs are allocated to those patients who can 
contribute more welfare to society. 
The kind of disciplines that will be useful in determining the needs of society for 
the criteria selection committee may come from areas of economics, city planning 
and future studies, and sociology.  They will be able to determine what the needs 
of society are at any given point and suggest where things could be improved.  In 
turn, the patient selection committee will be able to determine which patients are 
in the best position to meet the needs of society highlighted by the criteria 
selection committee, and minimise the detriment that will be caused by the death 
of patients.  A panel of experts from the relevant fields will have more insight into 
the kinds of skills and values a society needs to continue to function and grow and 
what circumstances should be avoided, than a lay committee would, given the 
multitude of components that go towards ensuring the smooth, stable, and 
sustainable functioning of society and promoting growth and welfare. 
 
Basic needs of society 
When I refer to the needs of society, what I am referring to are the basic needs that 
are required to be fulfilled in order for society to function effectively, and the 
needs that must be fulfilled before other less important needs should be fulfilled.  
There have been a number of attempts by authors to provide an account of needs 
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for individuals in general, as well as the more specific needs for the functioning of 
society.  It is the functional needs of society that are of relevance to this thesis, and 
as such, the discussion of needs will be mainly limited to this aspect.  However, I 
will give an overview of the other accounts of human and societal needs in order 
to show why they are less useful than the specific functional needs in creating 
criteria for a patient instrumental social value assessment.   
I will begin by outlining Nussbaum’s human functional capabilities, which is an 
account of needs that is comparatively general in terms of the more specific list of 
needs that is required for this thesis (Nussbaum, 2000).  I will then move on to 
outline the prerequisites for society given by Aberle et al. which is more useful for 
the purposes of the thesis, but still not specific enough  to build social value criteria 
on (Aberle et al., 1950).  Finally, a detailed list of the specific needs of society 
drawn up by the Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management will be 
discussed, which is an ideal tool for assessing a person’s social value (Task Force 
on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 2014a).   
 
Human functional capabilities 
Nussbaum gives a general idea of the needs of members of society when she refers 
to capabilities in her work (Nussbaum, 2000).  When she is referring to 
capabilities, she is essentially referring to the needs of a person, but framing her 
discussion around the idea of human functional capabilities; those functions that 
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a human should be capable of fulfilling in order to increase their welfare.  She gives 
a list of ten “central human functional capabilities”: 
 
Life:  Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length: not 
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth 
living.   
Bodily health:  Being able to have good health, including reproductive 
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.   
Bodily integrity:  Being able to move freely from place to place; having 
one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure 
against assault…; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for 
choice in matters of reproduction.   
Senses, imagination and thought:  Being able to use the senses, to 
imagine, think and reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, 
a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by 
no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training.  
Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing 
and producing self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice, 
religious, literary, musical, and so forth.  Being able to use one’s mind in 
ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to 
both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise.  Being 
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able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way.  Being able 
to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain.   
Emotions:  Being able to have attachments to things and people outside 
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; 
in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude and justified 
anger.  Not having one’s emotional development blighted by overwhelming 
fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect.  (Supporting 
this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be 
shown to be crucial in their development.)   
Practical reason:  Being able to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life.  (This entails 
protection for the liberty of conscience.)   
Affiliation:  A. Being able to live with and towards others, to recognize and 
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social 
interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have 
compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and 
friendship.  (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that 
constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the 
freedom of assembly and political speech.)  B. Having the social bases of 
self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified 
being whose worth is equal to that of others.  This entails, at a minimum, 
protections against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual 
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orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin.  In work, being able 
to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into 
meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.  
Other species:  Being able to live with concern for, and in relation to, 
animals, plants and the world of nature.   
Play:  Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.   
Control over one’s environment:  A. Political.  Being able to participate 
effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of 
political participation, protections of free speech and association. B. 
Material.  Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not 
just formally but in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights 
on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an 
equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and 
seizure.   
(Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 78–80) 
 
The list that Nussbaum has given does highlight some important functions that 
humans should be able to carry out, and indeed, perhaps need to be able to fulfil 
in order to live a life with an acceptable level of welfare.  However, when it comes 
to incorporating these kinds of factors to the kind of proposal that I am making, 
the specifications for each category of need, or for each capability, need to be more 
detailed, and able to be used more straightforwardly.  Furthermore, the 
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capabilities that Nussbaum refers to apply more to the needs of individuals in 
society and the goals to which they have.  What is needed first is an account of 
what the needs of society as a whole are in terms of its basic functions that allow it 
to continue over time.  It is then that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach could be 
used to shape the structure of society so that the central human functional 
capabilities are free to be exercised. 
 
Functional prerequisites 
Aberle et al. wrote an article in the 1950’s (Aberle et al., 1950) describing what 
they thought were the prerequisites needed for society to continue and function 
over time.  They justified the inclusion of each prerequisite by the demonstration 
that in its hypothetical absence, the society could not survive, since at least one of 
the four conditions terminating a society would occur.44  They also point out that 
“There is no reason to believe that the list of functional prerequisites offered here 
is definitive.  It is subject to revision with the growth of general theory and with 
experience in its application to concrete situations” (1950, p. 100).  Below are the 
9 functional prerequisites that they highlight:  
A. Provision for adequate relationship to the environment and for sexual 
recruitment – This includes modes of adapting to, manipulating, and 
altering the environment in such ways as (a) to maintain a sufficient 
                                                      
44 The four conditions they claim will lead to the termination of a society are A) The biological 
extinction or dispersion of the members, B) Apathy of the members, C) The war of all against all, 
D) The absorption of the society into another society (Aberle et al., 1950, pp. 103–104). 
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number and kind of members of the society at an adequate level of 
functioning; (b) to deal with the existence of other societies in a manner 
which permits the persistence of the system of action; and (c) to pattern 
heterosexual relationships to ensure opportunities and motivation for a 
sufficient rate of reproduction.  In the absence of these provisions, the 
group will suffer biological extinction or failure to reproduce or it will 
suffer absorption into another social system. 
B. Role of differentiation and role assignment – This signifies the 
systematic and stable division of activities…  In any society, there are 
activities which must be regularly performed if society is to persist.  If they 
are to be done dependably, these extensive and varied activities must be 
broken down and assigned to capable individuals trained and motivated to 
carry them out…  While a given individual is often the locus of several roles, 
he can never combine all the roles of his society in himself. 
C. Communication – Evidence from deaf-mutes, “wolf children," and 
bilinguals shows that speech, the basic form of communication, is learned 
and that only rudimentary communication is possible in the absence of 
shared, learned linguistic symbols.  Without learned symbolic 
communication, only a few highly general emotional states – e.g. anger, 
sexual passion – in one individual can evoke an appropriate response in 
another; only a few skills may be conveyed by imitation.  
No society, however simple, can exist without shared, learned symbolic 
modes of communication, because without them it cannot maintain the 
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common-value structure or the protective sanctions which hold back the 
war of each against all.  Communication is indispensable if socialization and 
role-differentiation are to function effectively.  
D. Shared cognitive orientations – In any society the members must share 
a body of cognitive orientations which (a) make possible adaptation to 
and manipulation of the situation; (b) make stable, meaningful, and 
predictable the social situations in which they are engaged; and (c) 
account for those significant aspects of the situation over which they do not 
have adequate prediction and control in such a way as to sustain and not 
to destroy motivation.  
E. A shared, articulated set of goals – Because there is role-differentiation 
in every society, we must consider a set of goals rather than a common goal.  
The facts of scarcity and of differential individual endowments, features of 
all societies, also make it necessary to speak of a set of goals.  It is the range 
of goals, however narrow, that provides alternatives for individuals and 
thus reduces one serious source of conflict in societies.  (The possibility of 
universally sought goals in a society is not ruled out.) 
F. The normative regulation of means – This functional prerequisite is the 
prescription of means for attaining the socially formulated goals of a 
society and its subsystems. It complements but does not overlap the 
functional prerequisite of "effective control of disruptive behavior."  The 
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"normative regulation of means" defines positively the means (mostly 
noncoercive) to the society's goals. 
G. The regulation of affective expression – In any society the affective states 
of the members must be mutually communicable and comprehensible.  
Furthermore, not every affect can be expressed in every situation.  Some 
must be suppressed or repressed.  Lastly, there are affects which must be 
produced in the members if the social structure is to survive.   
In the absence of the first of these conditions, stability of expectation 
between individuals is destroyed, and apathetic destructive reactions will 
occur.  This is true alike of states of anger and affection, of love, lust and the 
like.  Without comprehensibility and communicability, mutually 
inappropriate responses in effectively charged situations can only result in 
the destruction of the relationship.  In a love affair, if one member's 
expression of affection has the intended meaning of a flirtation, while to 
the other it signifies willingness to consummate the affair, the relationship 
is headed for a crisis.  The same state of affairs with respect to the 
expression of affect in an entire society is clearly incompatible with the 
continuation of that society. 
H. Socialization – A problem is posed for any society by the fact that its 
structure of action must be learned by new members.  To each individual 
must be transmitted so much of the modes of dealing with the total 
situation – the modes of communication, the shared cognitive frame of 
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reference, goal-system, attitudes involved in the regulation of means, 
modes of expression, and the like – as will render him capable of adequate 
performance in his several roles throughout life, both as respects skills and 
as respects attitudes. Socialization thus is a different concept from the 
maintenance of the child in a state of biological well-being.  
I. The effective control of disruptive forms of behavior – Prominent among 
disruptive modes of behavior are force and fraud.  The extent to which such 
behavior will occur is dependent on the way that various other functional 
prerequisites are met: role-allocation, goal-system, regulation of means 
and of expression, and socialization being the more obvious cases in point.  
All these functional prerequisites, it is clear from the preceding argument, 
tend to prevent the occurrence of disruptive behavior.  In addition to, and 
separate from, these is the effective control of such behavior when it 
occurs.  
(Aberle et al., 1950, pp. 104–111) 
The list of functional prerequisites given here provides the base layer for what 
society needs to function, whereas Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is akin to a 
second layer built on top that comes into play once this functional base system is 
in place.  The functional prerequisites are what allows a society to form and 
continue, and the functional capabilities are what allow a good life for the 
individuals in that society. 
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As useful as the list of functional prerequisites given by Aberle et al. is, in that it 
highlights what society needs to function and continue, it again only gives the 
broad headings for the categories of need for societies, and their discussion does 
not give an indication of a way in which the different categories could be assessed 
in terms of how in need society is of each category at a given point in time.   
 
Basic societal functions 
A more practical account that improves on the previous two lists, whilst still 
incorporating their main themes however, can be found by turning to a report by 
the Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management relating to health 
disaster management (Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 
2014a).  The items on the list they give bear similarities with the lists given by 
Aberle et al. and Nussbaum, however, it differs in that they go into more detail 
about what the basic needs of society are, not by including more headings in their 
list, but by making their headings more specific to the functions of society, such as 
water and sanitation, energy supply, and logistics and transport.  Their list more 
closely reflects the basic societal functions (BSFs) over the other two lists, as they 
identify the specific functions of society that need to be in place for it to continue 
over time, rather than simply giving general headings of the categories of needs:  
 
1. Public Health: this BSF has a collective focus, as it is concerned with the 
health of groups of people or a population. The responsibility of Public 
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Health is the protection and improvement of the health status of a society. 
Its goal is dominantly prevention; it deals with some direct activities, such 
as immunisation, but mostly with normative, control, education, 
promotion, and coordination activities. Public health components are 
dependent on most of the other BSFs.  
2. Medical Care: this BSF comprises the medical care of individual patients.  
The Medical Care BSF is responsible for the detection of symptoms and 
signs, and for the diagnosis and treatment of patients.  It includes primary, 
secondary, and tertiary care, as well as psychosocial support and 
treatment.  Its main goal is the provision of curative medicine.  
3. Water and Sanitation: in the context of these guidelines, the Water and 
Sanitation BSF is responsible for:  
a. Provision of adequate supplies of water suitable for drinking and 
preparation of food.  Water includes any means or processes used 
to provide clean (uncontaminated) water; and   
b. Application of measures and techniques aimed at ensuring and 
improving environmental health in a community through the 
collection, evacuation, and disposal of liquid and solid wastes with 
or without prior treatment.  Hygiene also is part of the Water and 
Sanitation BSF. 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4. Shelter and Clothing: the Shelter and Clothing BSF encompasses the 
responsibility for the provision of protection against harmful 
environmental elements.  
5. Food and Nutrition: the Food and Nutrition BSF is responsible for the 
provision of any edible substance containing nutrients that, on ingestion, 
helps to maintain the vital functions of a person or other living organism.  
Nutrition is the assimilation and metabolism by which living organisms 
utilise food for maintenance of life, including growth and maintenance of 
body tissues.  It also includes the interaction of foods with health and 
disease, and improvement of health standards through prevention and 
treatment of nutritional diseases.  Food security means enough food. Food 
safety means good quality through proper handling (i.e. properly collected, 
processed, stored and distributed).  
6. Energy Supply: the Energy Supply BSF includes any property with the 
capability to transform or change a function or parts of the environment or 
the society for energy; it is what is needed to keep the technical aspects of 
society operational.  This includes fuels (wood, gas, diesel, kerosene, etc.) 
and electricity used for the provision of heat and cooking.  It also includes 
the provision of light necessary for daily activities, including medical 
evaluations (assessments) and surgery, and the fuel needed for transport 
and operation of equipment required for the overall functions of a society.  
7. Public Works and Engineering: the Public Works and Engineering BSF is 
responsible for the application of technical knowledge and assistance to 
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develop and maintain the infrastructure of the society.  It includes the 
infrastructure and all physical structures needed for a society to function 
(railroads, roads, buildings, power plants, etc.).   
8. Social Structure: the Social Structure BSF encompasses the relationships 
within a group of people and the key elements that influence and dictate 
such relationships: e.g. religion and its systems, hierarchical structure, 
population density, social, political, and governmental systems, cultural 
practices, and living conditions as given within the environment.   
9. Logistics and Transport: the Logistics and Transport BSF includes the 
range of activities concerned with the supply, procurement, storage, 
transport, and evacuation of persons, equipment, supplies, wastes, etc.  It 
describes all means and modes of transportation, both public and private: 
street-cars, subways, trains, buses, private cars, bicycles, oxcarts, donkeys, 
horses, ferries, ships, etc.   
10.Security: Security is the BSF responsible for the safety of a given (defined) 
population.  In this context, Security includes the state of being protected 
from injury inflicted directly or indirectly by other living beings or events.  
11.Communications: the Communications BSF includes the interchange of 
data and information.  Communications include all public and private 
communication facilities (e.g. fire, police, military, government, private 
radio (HAM) operators, news- papers, other news media, television, 
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telephone and telex, facsimile, the Internet, satellite, runners, text 
messaging, the social media, etc.).  
12.Economy: the Economy BSF includes the means for providing the 
resources essential for establishing and maintaining all of the functions 
and infrastructure of a society.  It includes how resources are used by the 
society and the sources of these resources: e.g. agriculture, crops, industry 
and the products produced, jobs, foraging (searching for food by hunting, 
fishing or the gathering of plant matter), trade and transport 
(import/exports), humanitarian aid, value of the currency, per capita 
income.  Economy consists of the wealth and resources of a community, 
especially in terms of production and consumption of goods and services.  
13. Education: the Education BSF is responsible for the education and training 
of the citizens of the society.  It includes all resources used in educating and 
training the population: the teachers, libraries, training facilities, 
structures, tools, and equipment.  Thus, it also includes the education and 
training of the responders or potential responders, coordination and 
control personnel, etc. 
(Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 2014b, pp. 39–42)  
The list given here was developed as a way to categorise the basic functions of 
society and to assess their level of functioning after a disaster, or before an 
imminent disaster, to minimise the amount of detriment that is caused by the 
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disaster, by putting more effort and resources into restoring the basic functions 
that are operating below their functional threshold.   
For example, if the basic societal function of logistics and transport was operating 
below its functional threshold of being able to adequately allow the movement of 
people and supplies to where they are needed following a disaster, then more 
resources would be spent to restore this function over another function that is 
operating at or above its functional threshold.  Similarly, if the basic function of 
water and sanitation was functioning below its functional threshold, with less 
drinking water being available than is needed to meet the minimum water 
requirements of its citizens, then resources would be directed to restoring this 
function.  
A society is made up of many parts and by looking at the transectional structure 
of society, it provides a way to organise a complex society into components: 
“These components of society are the basic societal functions that can be 
further subdivided into functional subcomponents.  By using this 
framework, evaluators can devise appropriate indicators of function and 
assess how well each function of society is operating at a given time, 
tracking the impact of a disaster on society, and the effectiveness of 
interventions.  This kind of assessment opens the field of disaster 
management to repeatable and generalisable structured research.”  (Task 
Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 2014b, p. 47) 
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Whilst this list was developed to be used in disaster management situations, it is 
also useful for this thesis as it has highlighted the basic needs of society, which is 
at least part of what is required when assessing the instrumental value of a person 
based on how well their contributions meet the needs of society.  These basic 
functions of society still need to be fulfilled whether there is a disaster or not, and 
so the outline of these needs is still a useful tool for prioritising resources in non-
disaster situations.  Of course, people can be valuable to society in other ways and 
make contributions to society that don’t go towards meeting the basic functions 
and needs of society, and these too should be taken into account where possible 
when making an assessment of a person’s social value.  As such, the useful list 
given here can be supplemented with other criteria that can be used to assess a 
person’s instrumental social value, such as the effects on a person’s proximate 
individuals in the form of how detrimental their death will be to their immediate 
family members. 
 
How would it be decided which needs are most important 
Even though the basic needs of society have been identified, and even when the 
non-basic needs, and the contributions that a person can make to society have 
been identified, there still needs to be a way to assess how important those 
different needs are to society at any given point.  There needs to be a way to assess 
which functions of society, and which contributions that a person can make to 
society, are most important.  This assessment would also need to be reviewed over 
time to reflect the changing needs of society.   
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The Taskforce on Quality Control of Disaster Management again gives a useful 
approach to making these kinds of assessments by drawing on the idea of 
indicators of function, and looking at the elements that go towards contributing to 
the overall operation of the function.  They suggest that a baseline could be taken 
to establish a threshold at which each function is operating effectively to fulfil its 
overall function, with indicators giving an idea of when the function is operating 
below, at, or above this threshold.  They give a table with the kind of indicators 
that could be used to identify whether the function is operating effectively:   
 
(Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 2014b, p. 41) 
The indicators of any function must be open to review and appraisal to ensure that 
they are suitable markers of the performance of the corresponding function; 
“Assessment of the functional state of any of the BSFs [Basic Societal Functions] 
depends upon the selection of the best possible indicators of function” (Task Force 
on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 2014b, p. 44).  If the indicators of a 
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function show that the function is not operating at its ideal performance level, then 
it can be said to be operating below its functional threshold, and as such, resources 
should be directed at restoring it to, or above, its functional threshold.   
“When a deficit exists between the level of available supplies of goods 
and/or services and a requirement, a need exists. This level of supplies 
necessary to maintain the function of the BSF or functional component, is 
the functional threshold.  Any level of supply of that good or service that is 
below the functional threshold, prevents that component or element from 
meeting all of its required functions” (Task Force on Quality Control of 
Disaster Management, The World Association for Disaster and Emergency 
Medicine and The Nordic Society for Disaster Medicine, 2003, p. 74).  
However, even if it can be determined which needs of society are not being 
adequately fulfilled, it still needs to be determined which of these needs are most 
important to society at a given time and should attempt to be fulfilled first.  In this 
way, value points can be assigned to the different contributions that a person can 
make to society corresponding to how far they go towards meeting the different 
needs of society, and how important the needs are that their contributions help to 
fulfil.  The basic needs and functions of society may remain fixed over time, 
however, the priority in which they need to be fulfilled may change.  The Taskforce 
on Quality Control of Disaster Management point out that in a disaster situation, 
the climate of the locale will affect whether protection against cold weather should 
have a higher priority than the provision of water, and similarly, sometimes 
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circumstances within society may mean that educational contributions are more 
socially valuable than economic contributions. 
Coming to an agreement on the priorities of these needs is a task which I suggest 
should be undertaken by the criteria selection committee.  This committee would 
be made up of a selection of experts from fields relevant to assessing what the 
different needs of society are, and would be able to assess the priority that each 
need should be given based on codified knowledge and tacit knowledge.  The 
Taskforce on Quality Control of Disaster Management make a similar suggestion 
when they say that when making a qualitative estimate judgement about the 
severity of an event, “[a] severity score attempts to assign a numeric value to the 
severity of the damage.  Generally, the weights attached to qualitative judgments 
have been derived from achieving consensus from panels of experts who assign a 
Likert-type [scale] to their judgments of severity, based on case reports or upon 
their respective knowledge of the science associated with the topic” (Task Force 
on Quality Control of Disaster Management, The World Association for Disaster 
and Emergency Medicine and The Nordic Society for Disaster Medicine, 2003, pp. 
95–96).    This approach to assessing the priorities of functions in disaster 
situations could be used or adapted to assess the needs of society in a non-disaster 
state.  Experts from fields such as sociology, economics, and psychology can draw 
on their respective knowledge of their sciences to determine a hierarchy of the 
needs of society for any given time, using indicators of function to determine how 
urgently they need fulfilling, or, if no urgent fulfilment is required, which needs 
could benefit from more human investment.  From this, the patient selection 
committee, made up from similar fields, will be able to draw upon their scientific 
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and technical knowledge regarding causal relationships to assign a value score to 
each contribution a person makes to society dependent on the level of need their 
contribution helps fulfil. 
 
Non-basic societal functions 
So far, the focus has been on what the basic needs of society are, but there are also 
contributions that a person can make to society which might not go towards 
meeting any of these basic needs.  For example, someone who runs a cinema, a golf 
course, art gallery, or hairdressers, might make contributions to the basic need of 
the economy through the taxes that they pay, but they also contribute towards the 
happiness of their customers through the entertainment and services they 
provide.  Entertainment may not be classed as a basic need of society, but it is 
surely something that we value and so people that make contributions towards 
this need are making a contribution to society.  As such, contributions to society 
that might go towards the non-basic functions/needs of society should also be 
taken into account ideally. 
The problem with accounting for these kinds of contributions however, is that 
assessment of their importance is more subjective than that for the basic functions 
of society where there are thorough and established indicators of function that 
can be drawn upon to gauge their fulfilment (The Sphere Project, 2011; Task Force 
on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 2014b, p. 41).  Broad strokes can be 
made however, in gauging which areas of entertainment need more investment or 
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are fully catered for.  For example, a particular area might have plenty of shops, 
but few bars.  If there was more demand for bars in the area, but less for shops, 
then contributions made towards improving the provision of bars would be more 
valuable than those that go towards the provision of shops.  As such, if there were 
two patients who were equal in all regards apart from their contributions to 
entertainment, the patient who owns a bar in the local area would be more 
valuable to society than the patient who owns a shop in the local area, and so might 
be given priority for an organ transplant. 
Creating a hierarchy of the entertainment needs of society that could be referred 
to when assessing a patient’s contributions to society however, would prove a 
difficult task.  The subjective nature of entertainment means that every person 
would have differing opinions on whether more bars were needed, or less shops, 
or more golf courses.  The basic needs of society can be measured in a much more 
objective way.  E.g. the energy needs of society can be assessed based on whether 
there are power outages or fuel crises. 
Because the non-basic needs of society are less amenable to objectivity, but 
contributions towards them might still remain valuable, they should only be used 
in a tie-break situation where two patients have the same social value score once 
all of the other criteria have been applied.  Leenen makes a similar suggestion of 
applying those criteria which are more amenable to objectivity before using the 
criteria which might be more subjective (Leenen, 1982, p. 35).  In this way, the risk 
of someone being rejected for an organ based on subjective criteria is minimised.  
Whilst this approach might not be suitable if a perfectly accurate assessment of a 
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person’s overall social value is to be made, it might still be suitable for the rare 
social value tie-break situations that may occur.45 
 
Valuable to vs. valued by 
It is worth noting again that the specific criteria that are deemed to be important 
for society may not necessarily reflect the views of the public.  The views and 
opinions of the public may be ill informed or based on unfounded prejudices such 
as race or sexuality which would unfairly disadvantage some patients.  As such, 
the social value criteria will be based on the needs of society as determined by the 
experts on the criteria selection committee.  The experts will make these decisions 
in an objective manner (as far as is possible), with the patient being given a social 
value score based on the things that are valuable to society, rather than those 
things that are valued by society.  
It might be claimed that allocating organs to society based on the values that the 
members of society hold would also be benefiting society, as the organs would 
have been allocated to society in a way that conformed with their opinions.  
However, this may not always be the best course of action when it comes to the 
                                                      
45 As will be explained in Chapter 6: Narrowing down or informed selection?, I do not support a 
linear approach in general in the application of the social value criteria as a way to narrow down 
the possible recipients; it results in the exclusion of patients who might make valuable 
contributions to a different criterion.  However, in this case, because contributions to the non-basic 
needs of society are open to subjectivity, but might still be useful, they should be used as a last 
resort in tie-break situations.  A random selection of patients could also be used in this 
circumstance; however, this approach would undermine the aims of the social value criterion to 
increase the amount of welfare created with each organ transplant.  There stands more chance of 
increasing overall welfare with the application of partly subjective criteria than if a patient 
selection was made randomly.  
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basic needs of society, given that lay members of society may not have the relevant 
knowledge to know what the actual needs of their society are, and will have 
different views on the needs of society based on their experiences.  Lay members 
of society are not as sufficiently aware compared to the relevant experts of the 
causal links between the different parts of society to be able to make a fully 
informed decision on what is in the best interests of society as a whole.  The 
majority of society may feel that a certain course of action is right, however, if they 
were in possession of all of the facts of the situation, they may very well make a 
different decision.  For example, the majority of society voted recently for Britain 
to leave the European Union (EU), based in part on economic reasons.  However, 
if they were in possession of all the relevant information needed to make a 
decision to leave the EU on economic grounds, their decision may have perhaps 
been different. 
Three well respected economic institutes (the Centre for Economic Performance 
at the London School of Economics, CBI/PwC, and Oxford Economics) wrote 
reports on the economic impacts on Britain of leaving the EU, all concluding that 
leaving the bloc will have a significant cost for British households (Centre for 
Economic Performance, 2016; Oxford Economics, 2016; PwC, 2016).46  If more 
people had been aware of these reports and facts, their decision may well have 
been different.   
                                                      
46 “For the Centre for Economic Performance, drops in trade with the EU “is likely to cost the UK 
economy far more than is gained from lower contributions to the EU budget”.  The CBI/PwC report 
concludes that leaving the EU “would cause a serious shock to the UK economy”, while Oxford 
Economics reports that “our scenario modelling does not give much cause for optimism about the 
impact of Brexit”” (Giles, 2016).   
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The problem with trying to discover all the relevant facts to make an informed 
decision is that it often requires much time and effort.  In the case of the economic 
reasons for remaining in, or leaving the European Union, it would involve reading 
extensive reports such as the ones given by the Centre for Economic Performance 
at the London School of Economics, CBI/PwC, and Oxford Economics, which many 
people either do not have time for, or simply are not inclined to do.  Because of 
this, it would be better to let those with the relevant knowledge and expertise of 
particular areas to be the ones to make major decisions in those areas.  If the views 
and values of the public were the main guiding principles by which resource 
allocation decisions were made, it may result in misguided policies being 
implemented due to their lack of knowledge.  It is for these reasons that the social 
value criteria should be based on that which experts determine to be valuable to 
society rather than those things that are actually valued by society.  (Note that 
there may still be alignment between the two on certain criteria, with something 
being valuable to society, and society valuing it.) 
 
Who decides which patients are most 
instrumentally valuable to society? - (patient 
selection committee)  
Because the public are not always in the best position to know what the needs of 
society are, how to meet those needs, and who is integral in helping to meet those 
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needs, an impartial team of experts from different fields, predominantly from 
economics, psychology, and sociology, would better achieve the aims of the 
system.  They would be able to make objective decisions on which patients can 
help fulfil the needs of society outlined by the criteria selection committee. 
 
Why these areas of expertise?   
The reasons why I suggest that experts from the fields of economics, sociology, 
and psychology should make up at least part of the team of experts for the criteria 
selection committee as well as the patient selection committee is because it is 
these fields which possess the relevant knowledge to determine the needs of 
society, and can assess social value in order to select the right organ recipient.  In 
the case of the Admissions Advisory Committee in the Seattle case study, one of 
the reasons why their decisions about which patients should receive dialysis were 
so biased and discriminatory was that they were under-qualified to determine the 
social value rankings of potential recipients, and so considered factors that were 
irrelevant.  With experts from the relevant fields making up the criteria selection 
and patient selection committees in a revised system, such bias and discrimination 
can be avoided.  They would be able to identify key areas, such as skills shortage, 
that would warrant prioritising patients that make particular contributions to 
these areas.   
Economists would have a role to play on the committees, especially the criteria 
selection committee, as they would be able to contribute in ways such as making 
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assessments about current skills shortages in the labour market, and forecasting 
for the likely skills shortages in the long term (Boswell, Stiller and Straubhaar, 
2004, pp. 16, 18).  The most widespread method for estimating current labour and 
skills shortages is through the use of surveys, with employer surveys in particular, 
being used to ascertain vacancy rates.  These can then be compared to 
unemployment rates to derive a picture of labour mismatches (2004, p. 16).  In 
the UK, this is done through the Employer Skills Survey (ESS), and is a valuable 
tool for informing short-term policy responses to skills or labour shortages (2004, 
p. 18).  “It is important to understand the prevalence and nature of skill-shortage 
vacancies as an inability to recruit appropriately skilled labour may act as a brake 
on business growth and hinder productivity” (Vivian et al., 2016, p. 36).  It is this 
kind of information that can be used in assessing a person’s social value, with 
those skills and occupations that are in shortest supply but highest demand being 
the most socially valuable in this category. 
Sociologists and psychologists would also be required on the committees, 
especially on the patient selection committee, as they will be able to assess which 
patients might be most likely to contribute to society in particular ways.  Whilst 
the fields of sociology and psychology are separate, there are overlaps in many 
places, and the field of social psychology is well established.  Walker highlights the 
overlap of the two disciplines when he says that:  
“The facts of psychology and sociology are inevitably coexistent.  Indeed, 
as has often been pointed out, they are the same phenomena seen in 
different frames of reference…  The recognition of the relativity of 
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psychological generalisations to particular sets of sociological conditions is 
indeed one of the major advances of psychology in the last few years.  But 
this does not involve the reduction of psychological laws to sociological 
laws.  Under certain sociological conditions, certain uniformities of 
behaviour may be discovered.  Under other conditions of social structure, 
other uniformities may hold.  The discovery of these uniformities is the 
primary business of psychology.  Once discovered, they may be used to 
predict (and control) behaviour under certain observed sociological 
conditions.”  (Walker, 1941, p. 448) 
He continues to say that, 
“The importance of sociology for psychology lies, therefore, in the identity 
of the material with which the two sciences deal, namely human behaviour.  
Each science studies this same material from different viewpoints, and 
each meets the technical difficulty of isolating its variables.  No scientist 
who wishes to predict as well as explain can hope to do so without going 
beyond the boundaries of his science.  Psychologists, therefore, have much 
to learn from studies of current social trends and the prevailing social 
structure, and without a knowledge of the facts will be unable either to 
predict behaviour or even formulate explanations of behaviour.”  (Walker, 
1941, p. 449) 
By looking at social trends and attitudes, alongside personal attitudes, predictions 
can be made as to the likely future contributions of individuals and groups.  To 
highlight the need for experts in these professions to be part of the patient 
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selection committee, take an example of how their input may be needed in the 
category for the effects on proximate individuals, where the death of a parent will 
undoubtedly have an effect on their children. 
The general member of the public will not know the likely extent of the 
detrimental effect on the individual children of the deceased patient, and how that 
detriment may vary depending on age.  This is an important consideration 
because, if parents are going to be given extra value points because they have at 
least one child and have a unique relationship with their child, then there needs 
to be some distinction as to when the offspring is no longer classed as a dependent, 
and when the unique relationship is not as vital to a child’s development.  Experts 
from the field of psychiatry and psychology will be able to make much more 
informed decisions on what effect the interplay between a child’s age and 
circumstances will have in the bereavement process, and which individuals will 
suffer most harm.  In turn, these differences in these effects can be reflected 
accordingly in the amount of value points given to parents awaiting a transplant.  
They are in the best position to know the likely effects that a person’s death may 
have on another, and the level of detriment that it might cause, especially in 
comparison to another person, and so make a judgement as to which patient’s 
continued life can avoid the creation of the most detriment. 
For example, a very young infant is likely to be affected less by the death of a 
parent than a slightly older infant due to them not being able to grasp the concept 
of what has happened.  Beverly Raphael, who has a background in psychology and 
psychiatry, points out that,  
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“The death of a loved one means not only the loss, but also the nearness of 
personal death, the threat to self.  One is close to death and may be touched 
or contaminated by it.  All of the personal and internalised meanings of 
death will be evoked by the death of a loved one.  All the personal 
vulnerabilities associated with death will be aroused by its closeness to the 
self.”  (Raphael, 1992, p. 23) 
However, because a young infant only starts to hold the image of their relationship 
to the parent towards the end of their first year of life, the relationship before then 
is based purely on “The here and now, composed of the gratification and 
frustration, the actuality of interaction and the primordial affectual experiences 
attached to such interaction” (1992, p. 17), and involves no such comprehension 
of the nearness of death.  If a child’s mother dies in the first few months of life, “He 
may show crying and distress because of the removal of vital supplies, but good 
mothering by a surrogate may settle this quickly” (1992, p. 76). 
Contrast this with the bereavement of an older child, and the detrimental effects 
are more severe.  For a child aged between 6 months and 2 years old, the child is 
increasingly able to hold their parent (specifically the mother) in their absence, as 
a representational image within them and as a concept of a person (1992, p. 78).  
However, because they cannot yet conceptualise the permanence of death, the 
nature of the dead state, the child may search for the mother and experience their 
death in terms of separation and absence from the image of their mother as a 
source of good feelings and interactions.  As such, the child protests for the mother 
to return, but to no avail, and so their feelings of despair supervene, and the 
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mother’s image is now that of longing and pain (Raphael, 1992, p. 79). 
Raphael also explains the effects that children up to the age of twelve experience 
from bereavement, with the children experiencing different levels of suffering in 
different ways, with older children no longer experiencing the death of a parent 
purely in terms of pain and abandonment, but due to a greater understanding of 
the future, “they are much more likely to be aware of what the loss will mean in 
the future, of how it will continue, and the possibilities of life ahead without the 
lost person” (1992, p. 107)  The long-term effects of bereavement on a child can 
range from general ill health, psychosomatic effects, and depression amongst 
others.  However, the likelihood of these occurring and the role that they will play 
can differ depending on the circumstances of both the bereavement and the 
support network for the child after the bereavement. 
Bowlby lists the variables he believes to be associated with the more favourable 
outcomes of childhood bereavement: 
1. The causes and circumstances of the death, including what the child is 
told and what opportunities are given to him subsequently to enquire 
about what has happened. 
2. The family relationships after the loss, especially whether or not the 
child remains with the surviving parent and the quality of those 
relationships and family life following the loss.  
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3. The patterns of relationship within the family before the loss, 
particularly the relationships between the parents and between each 
of them and the bereaved child.   
(Bowlby, 1980, p. 311) 
Understanding the interplay between the different variables on the effects of 
bereavement is something that the layperson just does not have, but that 
particular experts from psychology and sociology might have.  I have outlined a 
brief account of how children may be affected by bereavement, and it is by no 
means a comprehensive account of the ways in which a child can be affected by a 
death.  However, it serves to show that the ways in which different age groups are 
affected differs dramatically, as well as depending on the circumstances of the 
death itself, and the quality of the support network afterwards.   
The effects of a person’s death are also felt by adults, whether it be the death of a 
child or spouse.  Raphael outlines the effects that bereavement of this nature will 
have on an adult, and again, there are numerous variables that would need to be 
taken into account in order to make an accurate judgement about the level of 
detriment that may be caused in each situation in order to make a social value 
judgement (Raphael, 1992, chaps 5–6).  And again, it is this level of detail that 
requires the involvement of experts in psychology and sociology to be involved in 
the decision-making process.   In order to accurately make a judgement about 
which patients’ deaths will cause most detriment, someone with a deep 
understanding of the interplay of these variables and the effects they have is 
needed.  They may not be able to know the exact effects that the death of an 
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individual will have on someone and how this will affect their social contributions 
in the future, but drawing on research, they will be able to make better predictions 
about future contributions and increase welfare.  
Similarly, regarding the category of active social contributions (both positive and 
negative), experts from fields such as psychology can make predictions of people’s 
future behaviour, and so in turn their likely active social contributions.  Ajzen and 
Fishbein are proponents of the theory of reasoned action and state that humans 
are, “Usually quite rational and make systematic use of the information available 
to them” (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, p. 5) when making decisions.  These decisions 
are based on their intentions which are formed by the relationship between two 
basic determinants, one personal in nature and the other reflecting social 
influence (1980, p. 6).  “The personal factor is the individual’s positive or negative 
evaluation of performing the behaviour; this factor is termed attitude towards the 
behaviour…  The second determinant of intention is the person’s perception of the 
social pressures put on him to perform or not perform the behaviour in question.  
Since it deals with perceived prescriptions, this factor is termed subjective norm” 
(1980, p. 6).  It is the relative importance that an individual places on the attitude 
towards the behaviour and the subjective norms that will make their intentions 
differ and so alter their behaviour.  Of course, there are other factors that will 
influence a person’s behaviour, however, Ajzen and Fishbein claim that these are 
external variables that affect the beliefs a person holds or the relative importance 
they attach to attitudinal and normative considerations rather than affecting 
behaviour directly.   
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Ajzen and Fishbein explain how the theory of reasoned action can explain and 
predict a person’s behaviour in any number of fields, ranging from weight loss, 
occupational orientation, and family planning behaviours, to consumer behaviour 
and voting behaviour, and even how an understanding of the relationship between 
attitudinal and normative considerations can change a person’s behaviour in 
relation to alcoholism (1980, chaps 8–15).  They even go as far as to outline the 
steps needed when creating a questionnaire, suggesting questions that need to be 
asked in order to gain an insight into the person and their beliefs and values, and 
predict their behaviour (1980, chap. 261).  Whilst having a questionnaire to aid in 
making predictions about a person’s behaviour is useful and can be carried out by 
almost anyone, the interpretation of the data and its place alongside the other data 
would need to be carried out by experts from the field in order to ensure an 
accurate value judgement is made. 
The input of sociologists and psychologists is also integral when making 
predictions about the likely future negative contributions that a person may make 
from a criminal standpoint.  There have been many studies and papers written 
explaining the circumstances under which a person may continue a life of crime, 
and how likely or unlikely it is that a person will commit further individual crimes 
(Laub and Sampson, 1993, 2001; Sampson and Laub, 2003; Forrest and Hay, 2011; 
Fazel et al., 2012; Mullane, 2012).  There are also tools already in use in the UK 
criminal justice system to enable the probation service to make assessments and 
predictions of the risk of reoffending and the risk of harm to the public that a 
convicted offender presents.  Such tools are the Offender Group Reconviction Scale 
(OGRS) (Copas and Marshall, 1998; Howard et al., 2009), Risk of Serious 
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Recidivism Score (RSR) (Moore, 2015, p. 334 Appendix H), and the Offender 
Assessment System (OASys) (Moore, 2015).  By including these considerations in 
the decision-making process, sociologists and psychologists are better able to 
make social value judgements about a person than a lay committee ever could. 
  
No role for laypersons 
The role for a layperson in the patient selection decision would be relatively small 
due to their lack of expertise.  The only possible place for a lay committee in the 
patient selection decision would be if criteria could be laid out by the experts from 
the relevant fields and used by the lay committee to base their decisions on.  They 
would make their decisions based on the criteria that the experts have outlined 
with regards to how likely it is that a person will contribute to society.  For 
example, people with certain skills are more likely to contribute in particular ways 
in some categories, and people in other circumstances will contribute in different 
ways.  There are some small benefits to such an approach, as it means that there 
is at least some public involvement in the selection process.  It means that the 
public are not completely removed from the process and are involved in the 
application of the criteria, even if not in the selection of the criteria.  However, a 
group of laypersons applying the criteria would not be the best way to achieve the 
aims of the system in terms of maximising the welfare created from each organ 
transplant.  Their application of the criteria may not be accurately applied to each 
patient given that they may not have the necessary insight to judge each case 
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adequately enough to come to a decision that accurately reflects a patient’s social 
value.   
Furthermore, there will undoubtedly be situations in which there will be patient 
selection decisions to be made for which the selection criteria may not be 
comprehensive enough or detailed enough for a layperson to make an accurate 
appraisal of a potential recipient’s likely future contributions.  There may also be 
criteria that will not be able to be applied in a straightforward manner, as it may 
need experience to make certain decisions, e.g. when it comes to psychology.  The 
professional psychologist will be able to see and explain why a person has acted a 
certain way, whether this is likely to affect their behaviour and future 
contributions, and highlight the factors and criteria that influence their prediction 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, p. 58; Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Mischel, 2004, p. 3).  
However, if a layperson were to attempt to apply the criteria highlighted by the 
expert in this manner, they would have to become well versed in psychology 
themselves to ensure that the criteria were being applied correctly and that the 
patient wasn’t ‘mis-assessed’ in terms of their potential social value.  They would 
either have to become experts themselves in the different fields, or frequently 
draw on the advice of experts in many cases.   
It would be more time efficient and yield better predictions if it were experts in 
the first place that made the decisions about which patients are most likely to 
make different contributions and in turn, determine their social value rank.  In this 
way, we can ensure that the patient’s social value is being judged accurately, and 
not on the half-informed knowledge of a layperson.  It is more plausible that the 
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role of lay people would be to simply give their input, and for the expert committee 
to consider these views, but only incorporate them where appropriate.  If a team 
of experts were to make the decision as to which patient was most valuable to 
society, at least the patients who do not receive an organ could rest assured that 
the procedure had been applied correctly and that they were not unfairly put to 
the bottom of the list. 
 
Problems with the committees 
Disagreement on the needs of society 
With regards to the criteria selection committee, there could be concerns with 
how feasible it is to suppose that the committee will be able to come up with a 
workable list of skills and values that are important to society in fulfilling its needs 
and how they can be ranked.  It is possible that even if the experts do come up with 
a list of skills and values that are important for society, they may not be able to 
agree on the order that they should be ranked. 
Whilst it might be a fair argument that the committee may not be able to agree 
what is valuable from the ranking perspective, it is unlikely that the committee 
will not be able to agree what things are valuable overall.  There are certain basics 
in the form of (but not limited to) the basic societal functions outlined earlier 
(Task Force on Quality Control of Disaster Management, 2014b, pp. 39–42), that a 
society needs to function and flourish, and certain things, that will obviously cause 
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detriment to society, and a team of experts can be reasonably expected to agree 
on what these things are.  It is in the relative value that the experts may place on 
this criteria where disagreement may lie, due to the potential bias for criteria that 
comes under their professional heading.  However, given that this team of experts 
are well educated and rational, scientifically minded people, it is unlikely that they 
will hold completely opposing views on what are essentially facts about the needs 
of society.  It is unlikely to be the case that one expert will judge something to be 
beneficial to society, whilst another judges it to be detrimental.  A more likely 
scenario is that two professionals from the same field, e.g. economists, will have 
differing opinions on what type of need is more valuable to society.  Economist A 
might think that Person A is more economically valuable because they can 
contribute to society in the immediate future, but Economist B might think that 
Person B is more economically valuable to society because they can contribute 
more in the long term.  However, despite this difference of opinion, the experts on 
the committee will know that their aim is to arrive at a consensus of ranked values, 
and so will aim to reach a valid and objective compromise between their views 
through a process of reflective equilibrium based on a thorough reading and 
discussion of the facts involved and whether the current or future needs of society 
outweigh one another in each circumstance. 
However, even supposing that the committee will not be able to agree upon the 
way in which the values should be ranked, this would not necessarily pose a 
problem to the implementation of the policy.  Despite the fact that the agreed upon 
contributions that are valuable for society might not be able to be ranked, they 
would still be useful in helping to determine a patient’s value, at least to some 
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extent.  If the experts cannot decide that some needs are more important than 
others, then it could be supposed that those needs are as important as each other, 
and determining which patient is most likely to meet these needs will still help to 
reveal their value to society compared to other patients who may meet more or 
less of the criteria.  If there are at least some value criteria to go by, the social value 
allocation method provides a better alternative than what is currently used. 
 
Conclusion 
It has now been shown that the people who are in the best position to determine 
just what the needs of society are, and which patients are most likely to help meet 
the needs of society, are a team of experts from the relevant fields, namely, 
psychology and sociology for the patient selection committee, and economics, 
sociology, and psychology, for the criteria selection committee.  However, what 
still needs to be discussed are the ways in which a person can be valuable to 
society, and how this could be incorporated into a social value criterion from both 
an ethical and practical perspective.  The next chapter will look at the ways in 
which a person can be valuable to society, and the extent to which these 
considerations should be included when making a social value judgement of a 
person.   
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Chapter 6: The ways in which 
people are valuable  
Introduction 
It has now been shown that a resource allocation system that takes into account a 
patient’s value to society can put resources to better use than allocation systems 
that do not, and that a committee of experts making decisions about what and who 
is valuable to society would mean these decisions could be made more objectively 
than if they were made by a lay committee.  However, what has not yet been 
discussed in detail, is the ways in which a person can be valuable, and the types of 
contributions they can make that will go towards meeting the needs of society. 
In this chapter, I will begin by looking at the ways in which a person can be 
valuable, and then in Chapter 7, I suggest how the different contributions could be 
incorporated into a social value assessment to give a final value rank to each 
patient.  The reason for looking at the ways a person can be valuable to society, is 
that they can then be mapped on to what the needs of society are in order to 
determine a final value rank for a person based on how far they go towards 
meeting these needs.   
The lessons that can be learnt from the Seattle system discussed in Chapter 4 will 
help to shape the specific social value criteria, narrowing down the scope of a 
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patient’s contributions included in the system, to keep the process objective and 
practical. 
 
The ways in which people are valuable 
It is important to note that when making a judgement about how valuable 
someone is to society, it is simply on their instrumental value which a judgment is 
being made; there is no judgement being made about the person’s moral worth.  
Even if it is the case that every person has equal moral worth by virtue of being 
human, their instrumental value to society is still different, and it is this 
instrumental value that is of concern when allocating scarce resources.  In order 
to make the best use of the resources that are available, it is important to look at 
what can be gained from the allocation of each resource, which in this case, means 
looking at the contributions that a person makes to society.  It is these 
contributions that are being assessed, not the person themselves.  Each person 
may have equal moral value, but the contributions that they make to society will 
differ, and as such, so too will their instrumental value.  Even if each person’s life 
is no more valuable than someone else’s life, the contributions that a person 
makes may be.  
To take an extreme example, if there was only one suitable organ available and the 
choice of who to allocate the organ to was between a low-functioning alcoholic 
and the prime minister on the eve of World War 3, taking into account the 
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instrumental value that each has would likely result in the prime minister being 
allocated the organ given that his contribution to society would hopefully be to 
avert the war through negotiations, whereas the low-functioning alcoholic is 
unlikely to be able to make such beneficial social contributions to avert the war.  
However, if these potential recipients were treated equally based on their moral 
value as persons, and the organ was randomly allocated, the alcoholic may receive 
the organ, the prime minister would die, and there is every chance that 
negotiations to avert WW3 would breakdown.  In this case, greater harm would 
be caused by not taking into account the patients’ instrumental value.  Even 
though their value as persons may be the same, the instrumental value of their 
contributions to society is different, and taking this value into account will help to 
make better use of the resources available by increasing welfare and minimising 
detriment.  Whilst this is an admittedly improbable example, it serves to show how 
taking into account a person’s instrumental value to society when allocating 
organs in tie-break situations can increase overall welfare.  
In this next section, I will be looking at the ways people can be instrumentally 
valuable to society and where these would figure in an organ allocation policy that 
included a social value criterion, and the considerations needed to determine a 
person’s overall instrumental value.  
In the following sections, I will discuss in detail the three main ways in which a 
person is instrumentally valuable to society; through their: social contributions, 
effects on proximate individuals, and morality.  All the things that make a person 
instrumentally valuable can be categorised under one of these three broader 
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categories.  For example, Shatin suggests a list of things which might be taken into 
consideration when judging a person's social value, and each of these things (bar 
one) will fit under one of the categories that I have mentioned (Shatin, 1966, p. 
99): 
Shatin’s suggested considerations Respective category 
Medical prognosis and outlook for full recovery Medical selection47 
Economic productivity of the person when well Social contributions 
Age and productive years left Social contributions 
Considerations based upon potential 
contributions to society 
Social contributions 
Society’s need for his services Social contributions 
Contribution to the cultural stream of humanity 
in all areas of human endeavour: arts, sciences, 
humanities, economics, governance 
Social contributions 
                                                      
47 This is an exception in his list as even though Shatin considers “medical prognosis and outlook 
for full recovery” a consideration that should enter into the determination of the social value of a 
person, I feel that it fits more naturally within the medical suitability criteria. 
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Responsibility of the welfare of others Effects on proximate individuals 
Children, friends, social and community 
relationships 
Effects on proximate individuals 
Marital and family status and responsibilities Effects on proximate individuals 
History of anti-social behaviour Morality, and social contributions 
Table 2.48 
Shatin admits that his list of considerations is not in any order of importance, 
however, this would need to be taken into account were it to form part of a 
resource allocation system, with the more important contributions being given a 
higher social value score.  His list may also not be comprehensive enough to cover 
all of the considerations which should be taken into account when determining 
someone's social value, but it does provide a starting place.  It states which 
considerations could go towards determining a person’s social value, and 
highlights how any of those considerations would fit into one of the three broader 
categories that I suggest. 
Below is a more detailed account of the three main categories, and some of the 
more specific criteria that would be considered within each.  The categories are 
broad enough to include any of the specific criteria that would be taken into 
                                                      
48 Table 2: Shatin’s suggested social value considerations placed into three broad categories 
(Shatin, 1966, p. 99). 
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account when determining a person’s social value, however, the specific criteria 
that will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter will not be a 
comprehensive list of all of the criteria that would be included, but rather 
suggestions of the kinds of criteria that the selection committee could/should look 
at.   
The reason why this is not going to be a comprehensive list is because I do not 
have the relevant expertise to make a comprehensive list of the needs of society 
and the ways in which a person can be valuable to society; however, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, the experts on the selection committee would.  The 
criteria that I will outline will show that the main ways in which a person can be 
valuable to society can be accommodated within organ resource allocation 
decisions, and that the 3 main categories should be able to encompass any of the 
specific criteria that the selection committee may include in their decisions.  
 
Social contributions 
The difference between active and passive social contributions 
A person's social contributions in general could be understood to include a whole 
multitude of things ranging from what they do for a job, to how much they buy at 
the supermarket, or how friendly they are to strangers.  It could also include how 
much they are loved by others, how happy they make other people, and how much 
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others rely on them.  However, there is a distinction to be made between different 
kinds of social contributions in that some are active, whilst others are passive. 
The active social contributions that a person makes are those contributions a 
person makes by giving up their time, or consciously going out of their way to 
make a contribution.  The kind of active social contributions that would come 
under this category might be their profession, or how much tax they pay, or 
organising events that benefit the community, etc.   
Drawing on the basic societal functions (BSF) given by the Task Force on Quality 
Control of Disaster Management, the items within their list can help to highlight 
what type of contributions are classed as active or passive (Task Force on Quality 
Control of Disaster Management, 2014a).  Most of the functions on their list would 
mainly accommodate the active contributions that a person makes.  For example, 
the basic needs of public health, medical care, water and sanitation, energy supply, 
public works and engineering, logistics and transport, and education would 
mainly involve the active contributions that a person makes through their 
profession.  However, people may also make contributions towards these basic 
societal functions through other active means.  They may volunteer their time to 
help run education programmes, or help meet the BSF of shelter and clothing by 
helping to help those who are homeless. 
Passive social contributions on the other hand, are those contributions a person 
makes simply by virtue of being in particular relationships or circumstances, e.g. 
contributing to another’s life by being their object of affection or role model.  As 
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such, passive contributions are better placed in the category “effects on proximate 
individuals.” 
The way in which a person lives their life may inspire other people to live their 
lives in a similar manner.  If someone makes active contributions to society, they 
may also passively contribute to society by inspiring others to also make positive 
active contributions to society.  They are making a passive contribution to society 
by virtue of others wanting to emulate their behaviour.  E.g. a celebrity who 
actively supports a charity through their active contributions, may inspire others 
to also participate in charitable acts, even though this is not the celebrities aim.  
They have passively contributed to society by inspiring others to make a positive 
contribution.  A youth group leader may inspire good behaviour in the children 
and teens.  Or a friend or family member registering to donate, or donating, an 
organ may inspire others to also donate their organs.   
However, determining whether or not a person has made a passive contribution 
through inspiring others to make positive social contributions, and to what extent 
a person has been an inspiration would be difficult and costly.  The costs of this 
investigation would almost certainly outweigh the benefits.  As such, the scope of 
a person’s passive contributions would need to be limited to those easily 
accessible and verifiable factors when being included in the social value 
assessment.  One passive contribution that meets this criteria, is a person’s value 
to their family. 
A person is valuable to their family not necessarily because of their active 
contributions to the relationship, but because of the nature of the relationship 
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itself.  They passively contribute to society by virtue of being valuable in the eyes 
of their family, and so, if this person could be saved from death by receiving an 
organ transplant, the detriment that would be caused by their death would be 
avoided.  The effect that a person’s death would have on their immediate family 
are the kind of passive contributions that could be taken into account, as the 
number of immediate family members that a person has is easily verifiable, and 
the detriment that might be caused due to the death of the person may also be 
partially quantifiable.49   
 
Active contributions  
I will now discuss some of the main considerations that would come under the 
category of active social contributions, and how they would figure in a social value 
resource allocation system. 
 
Profession 
A person’s profession will be a key factor in helping to determine their overall 
instrumental value to society as this is one of the main ways in which a person 
does contribute to society.  A person spends a substantial proportion of their day, 
                                                      
49 See earlier discussion of the effects of bereavement on different aged family members. 
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and their life, working, and each person's job contributes to society in some way.  
As such, it should be a main consideration in determining their social value. 
Different professions offer different amounts of social benefit, and so not all 
professions are equally instrumentally valuable to society.  These differences will 
need to be accounted for in a resource allocation system that incorporates social 
value considerations, and should be based on the needs of society at the time.  For 
example, a job that gives people the opportunity to bungee jump is arguably not 
as valuable to society as a job that involves maintaining a water sanitation facility 
so that people can have clean drinking water.  Both offer a benefit to society, 
(bungee jumping gives (some) people an exciting and fun experience in their life, 
and clean drinking water ensures that people stay free from disease), however, 
only the water sanitation facility employee is contributing to one of the basic 
necessities of society; the bungee jump employee is offering what might be seen 
as a luxury.   
Of course, the relative importance of these professions also depends on how well 
particular needs of society are covered already, and how ir/replaceable a person 
is within their professional field.  In a country such as Britain, the basic water 
sanitation needs of society are well met; there are adequate facilities, a steady 
supply of skilled employees, and an efficient water distribution infrastructure.  
However, in less developed countries, water sanitation may not be so well 
implemented, and safe drinking water can be in short supply.  Between these two 
countries, the relative value of the water sanitation professional will be 
significantly different.  In some developing countries, a water sanitation 
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professional will be highly valued as they are helping to produce a scarce and 
necessary commodity, and people with the relevant skills to do so are also in 
shorter supply.  In Britain however, because the water sanitation process is so 
established and well catered for, and there are many skilled workers that, with a 
little training, could step into a vacant position at a facility, the value of the 
employee will not be as high as it would be in the developing country.  
Nevertheless, even in Britain, safe drinking water is still a necessity, whereas 
bungee jumping is not, and so it might be argued that based on profession alone, 
someone that offers bungee jumping opportunities for a living is not as valuable 
to society as someone that produces clean water.  However, this line of thought 
stems mainly from a worry about future provisions of resources rather than 
catering for the needs of society at the current time.   
If the basic necessity of water sanitation really is well catered for in terms of 
facilities and there was an excess of water sanitation professionals, including a 
reasonable number of future potential employees, someone in this profession 
might be less valuable than the bungee jump instructor if bungee jumping was in 
high demand, and qualified instructors were in short supply.  The current and 
future needs for water sanitation are catered for and so ensuring that the other 
needs of society are catered for becomes more important and as such, those 
professions more valuable.  A person's ir/replaceability will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7: Ir/replaceability and value to society, but for now it should 
simply be noted that there are varying levels of importance to professions 
depending on what the current and long-term needs of society are, and how easily 
these needs can be met in terms of people to fulfil the job. 
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I am not making a claim here about the size of the role that that each of these 
considerations (of necessity and ir/replaceability) should play in determining the 
social value of a person, only that they both need to be taken into account in order 
to determine how instrumental they are for higher level goods (such as preventing 
disease in the case of the water sanitation employee, and providing pleasure in the 
case of the bungee jump instructor) by estimating how much welfare will be 
forgone in the absence of that employee.   
   
Problems with this criterion 
Career choices 
Besides the issue of balancing a person's contributions against how ir/replaceable 
they are (which will be a problem present in most, if not all, of the criteria), there 
are a couple of other problems that might occur and will need to be overcome 
when using a person's profession as part of their social value ranking.  One of these 
problems is that if people know what professions the selection committee class as 
valuable to society, people may start training for, and taking up these professions 
in order that they may stand a better chance of increasing their own value ranking 
should they require an organ.50  The problem with this lies in that, because so 
many people will be taking up what are considered, at the time, valuable 
professions, the surge in the number of people within these professions may in 
                                                      
50 This is not to say that criteria that the selection committee will use to make their patient 
selections should not be available to the public (as an open and transparent selection process 
would be preferable), but rather that simply being aware of the relative values of different 
professions may have an impact on people’s career choices.  
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fact make those professions less of an asset to a person due to employees in that 
field becoming easily replaceable. 
Imagine, for example, there was a shortage of plumbers in the country, and so the 
few plumbers that did exist were hugely valuable to society.  Multitudes of people 
may start to train as, and take up the plumbing profession, hoping that they too 
will become more instrumentally valuable (from a purely professional 
perspective) in the eyes of the selection committee should they require an organ 
or other scarce resource.  However, because there will now be a huge number of 
plumbers within society, whatever value was added to the profession and the 
individual by virtue of the skill being previously in short supply, will have been 
significantly lowered now that it is a common profession in an oversaturated 
market.  Because of this, people may now be in a worse position than before their 
initial career choice or career change.  Their original profession may now be more 
valuable given the overall change in career choices.  The inclusion of a person's 
profession in social value considerations may have the effect of influencing their 
life decisions, and end up actually steering the person to worse circumstances 
where they are not as socially valuable as they had expected to be. 
However, even if this were to be the case, should this really be a reason to not 
include profession in social value considerations?  People frequently change 
professions because they believe that it may be good for them in some way, but 
sometimes it does not work out that way.  Regardless of whether it would affect 
their social value ranking, a person may decide to take up a scarce profession in 
order that they can earn more money (supply and demand) to support their 
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family, but end up earning less money should thousands of other people also have 
the same idea.  These are simply considered choices and risks that people take, or 
do not take in life.  The possible negative consequence of the profession criterion 
tempting people into particular career paths should be no reason to not include 
profession in the social value criteria; people already willingly make this choice 
for purely financial gain and not as a possible insurance policy for their survival 
should they require an organ transplant. 
It is also unlikely that people will make their career choices on the basis of the 
remote chance that they might require an organ transplant at some unforeseeable 
time in the future in the first place.  People don’t often think in the long-term when 
it comes to making these kind of insurance decisions in the short term.  E.g. 
smoking, health insurance, and pensions.  People are aware that smoking will 
damage their health in the long term, that health insurance will be hugely 
important were some significant illness to affect them, and that a pension will be 
their main source of income when they retire.  However, people still persist to 
smoke, forego health insurance, and do not start contributing to a pension until 
they are closer to reaching retirement age, as the long-term effects of their actions 
(or inactions) have little impact on their circumstances and situation in the short-
term.  Given this, it is reasonable to think that people will also have the same 
attitude to making their career choices for the short-term with the long-term 
possibility that they may require an organ transplant in mind.  The probability of 
requiring an organ transplant is quite remote for most people, and so it is unlikely 
that people will make their career choices based on this remote possibility.  
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Unemployment 
Another problem with the inclusion of profession in social value considerations is 
that unemployed people will obviously (and sometimes unjustifiably, or at least 
undesirably, if the aims of a social value system are to be met) fare worse than 
those in employment as the unemployed are not contributing to society through 
their job.  However, this does not have to be the case, as the reason behind the 
unemployment can be examined, as well as the skills they possess and their desire 
to get back into work.  Is the person unemployed through no fault of their own 
(redundancy) or do they simply not have the motivation to work?  People who do 
not wish to work can be said to not be unfairly worse off as they would make their 
decision not to contribute to society in this respect knowing that it may negatively 
affect their chances of receiving an organ should they require one.  However, 
people who do wish to work, and people who do have a useful skill set could have 
their skills and motivation taken into account so they will not be unfairly worse 
off.  This would also ensure that those people who are likely to be most valuable 
to society if they were in employment are not deprioritised as this would 
undermine the aim of the allocation system.   
This is not to say that those people who are not in employment despite having a 
useful skill set, will be favoured for treatment at the same level or above those who 
are employed, but simply that their skills, motivation and potential could be taken 
into account.  There may be plumbers who are employed despite an over-
saturated market, and builders who are unemployed despite an under-saturated 
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market, but seek employment, e.g. redundancy from a failed company due to poor 
management despite demand for the business.  People from both professions 
would have their skills taken into account along with their current state of 
employment, but also their ir/replaceability.  Even though the builder may not 
currently be employed, the fact that people in this high demand profession are in 
short supply makes their skills more irreplaceable and so will have added social 
value.  Saving the unemployed builder over the employed plumber in this 
circumstance may make the most positive difference due to saving the more 
valuable skill set and the high chance of the motivated builder getting back into 
work.  But if the builder’s skill set was poor or they lacked the motivation to work, 
then their social value from a professional perspective may be lower than the 
plumber, even in a saturated market.  Simply because a person is unemployed 
does not have to mean they will be disadvantaged if social value were included in 
organ allocation decisions.  And equally, valuing certain people in unemployment 
does not necessarily mean that the aim of the system is undermined (especially as 
they can also be instrumentally valuable to society in other areas of their life: see 
section Effects on proximate individuals). 
There will, of course, still be people who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own and wish to work, but there may not be a need for their skill set due to an 
oversaturated or obsolete market.  These people will be worse off because of 
circumstances outside of their control, however, this is an unavoidable 
consequence of a social value system, but a necessary one if the aims of the system 
are to be realised.  Under any system there are going to be certain individuals and 
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groups who fare worse, but the overall welfare that would be created by the 
inclusion of social value criteria into organ allocation outweigh these exceptions.  
When it comes to people who are unable to work through no choice of their own, 
e.g. a disability, these people will be at a disadvantage with regards to this 
particular criterion, but they may still have an advantage under the other criteria.  
Not being able to make active social contributions through employment does not 
mean that a person cannot be socially valuable in other ways.  Alternatively, a set 
number of base points could be given for the profession criterion for those 
members of society who are unable to work. 
 
Where this criterion would figure in the organ allocation policy 
Now that it has been shown that a person's profession is a useful and acceptable 
criterion to include in social value considerations, I will briefly outline how it could 
be included and used in the deliberations. 
Given that not all professions are equally valuable to society, there needs to be 
some sort of ranking system for professions that reflects their relative importance.  
Different countries already have a system for ranking how important they feel 
different professions are to their country when it comes to accepting people for 
immigration.  For example, Australia and New Zealand have the Australia and New 
Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2009) which details the different skill levels of a vast number of professions, and 
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the Migration Occupations in Demand List (Australian Department of Immigration 
and Citizenship, 2013) which details those occupations and specialisms identified 
by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) 
that are in short supply.  Depending on the level of need within the country for 
different professions and the skill level of the profession, a person is awarded a 
certain amount of points that will go towards their overall point score for 
immigration suitability.  In doing so, the country can ensure that some of their 
economic and societal needs are met by managing who can apply for immigration. 
A similar ranking system could be used in the social value resource allocation 
policy for professions, with those professions that are more valuable to society 
being given more points. The fact that there are already systems in place that rank 
the importance of professions to countries and societies shows that the profession 
criterion could be implemented relatively easily.  These pre-existing ranking 
systems may not be based directly on social value, however, the fact that they exist 
and are in frequent use means that such a list can be easily constructed and used, 
mapping on the relative social value of different professions once they have been 
determined.  Each of the other social value criteria would also be given points 
relative to their importance, with a person's total score determining their final 
social value rank amongst the other potential organ recipients.  This means that 
even if a person has a job that is not particularly valuable to society, they are not 
necessarily excluded from receiving consideration for an organ since they may 
still be instrumentally valuable in other ways.51 
                                                      
51 A more detailed account of how an immigration points system could be adapted to capture social 
value will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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It might be argued that using an immigration criteria template for the provision of 
essential healthcare is problematic given that immigration criteria are in place for 
deciding whom to admit from a group who are non-citizens and therefore (on the 
conventional view) are not the responsibility of the government.  Whereas in the 
organ allocation case on the other hand, the decision as to who will get the service 
is between different citizens, the provision of which is among the key duties that 
governments have to their citizens.  In response to this criticism, the government 
may have a duty to provide healthcare provision to its citizens, however, in the 
case of organ transplantation, the provision of transplants cannot be given to all 
those who require it.  As such, the government is not neglecting its duties by using 
an immigration criteria template, but rather deciding how best to meet their 
duties given the limitation of resources.  Furthermore, the immigration template 
is simply a way to show that it is possible to rank professions and skills, and is 
used because of its transferable structure; the motivation behind the two systems 
is different.   
 
Income 
Income should play a part in the social value criteria as the income that a person 
earns directly relates to how much tax they pay, and the more taxes that a person 
pays, the more money that the government has to provide services to society to 
increase welfare.52  As such, with the inclusion of a person’s income into the social 
                                                      
52 People or companies may sometimes evade or avoid taxes, and so not make the tax contributions 
that they should, however, these are often criminal or legally dubious in nature. 
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value criteria, it means that those who earn the most and pay the most tax will 
have a higher social value score on this criterion than those who pay less taxes.  
However, the needs of society will change over time, and so the value of the 
contributions that a person makes will also vary.  The importance of tax 
contributions and income will alter depending on the economic needs of the 
country, and so it is not necessarily the case that economic contributions will 
prevail, as was the worry of Leenen (Leenen, 1982, p. 35). 
Economic growth generally correlates with overall improvements in quality of life, 
and as such, is significantly valuable to society for promoting welfare (Strange and 
Bayley, 2008, p. 49).  The British government tax system is based on a scheme 
whereby those who earn more pay higher taxes, and whichever government is in 
place, it is likely to remain the case that those who earn more will continue to pay 
higher rates of tax.  To do otherwise would mean that there would not be enough 
financial resources to meet the needs of society without increasing taxes to such 
an extent on the lower earners that they are financially crippled.  It is the higher 
rates of tax that the higher earners pay which makes them more valuable to 
society given that one of the biggest sources of revenue for the government is 
through income tax; the top 10% of income taxpayers contribute over half of all 
the income tax paid, and the top 1% contributing 27% of all that is paid (Pope and 
Roantree, 2014, p. 46). 
There are also other forms of tax that could be taken into account when 
determining someone's social value.  Someone may run or work for a business that 
pays corporation tax, and as such, their social value may be affected by whether 
 246 
the company they work for pays corporation tax in this country or abroad, and the 
amount of this tax contribution.  However, such detailed discussion of the 
interplay between these essentially economic factors takes me beyond the issues 
at the level of moral principle and into the realms of microeconomic cause and 
effect, which is outside the scope of this thesis.  It would be the work of 
professionals with the relevant expertise in these areas to determine the 
appropriate value to be placed on the different economic contributions of 
individuals and companies, however, it will suffice to say here that at least 
economic contributions in the form of income tax could have some social value 
placed on them in order to help determine an overall social value rank of an 
individual.   
Even though it is the wealthy that make the highest tax contributions,53 perhaps 
ideally, everyone (under a fair government) contributes to a level of tax that is 
affordable for them, and so whether someone earns a large or small amount, they 
still “feel the pinch” equally.  From this perspective, to value someone that pays a 
higher rate of tax more than someone that pays a lower rate is unfair as the higher 
rate taxpayer sacrifices no more of their personal wellbeing or security for the 
good of the country than the lower rate taxpayer.  However, even though the 
higher rate taxpayer may not sacrifice any more of their personal security and 
wellbeing from a financial perspective than the lower rate taxpayer, it still remains 
the case that they do contribute more money to society through taxes.  And so, 
from a governmental point of view, one higher rate taxpayer is more 
                                                      
53 I am assuming here that the wealthiest members of society are not participating in any tax 
avoidance or evasion schemes. 
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instrumentally valuable to them than one lower rate taxpayer (purely in economic 
contributions) as the increased amount of money they contribute helps to ensure 
the security of a greater number of people in society, including other low rate 
taxpayers.  If the opposite approach were taken with the lower rate taxpayer being 
valued more than the higher rate taxpayer and being given priority for lifesaving 
treatment, because the income from tax contributions from those paying the lower 
rate would obviously be less, the government would be losing out on potential 
income.  It may be a sobering thought to some to think that the government views 
it citizens as a form of income (if only partly and not entirely), but it is true; “The 
people are the riches of a nation”.   
However, it is not a one-way relationship; the government do offer services in 
return, and the higher the income from the citizens in society, the higher the 
income for the government, and the higher the quality and range of services 
available to society.  So those citizens who have a higher income and pay more in 
taxes are more of an asset to the government (at least from an economic 
perspective) and as such, their health should be protected more than those paying 
lower tax in order to ensure their continued contribution.  
Of course, there may be people who do not earn as much or make fewer tax 
contributions, but make equally, or more socially valuable contributions under 
another criterion.  E.g. some charity workers may eschew the pursuit of high 
incomes so that they can help others, or some people may enjoy their job even 
though it has low wages.  Their professional contributions may be more socially 
valuable than someone who makes significant tax contributions.  Simply because 
 248 
someone earns more or makes more economic contributions, does not necessarily 
mean that they will receive an organ over someone who makes less economic 
contributions.  However, working out how valuable someone is to society involves 
taking into account all the contributions that a person makes to society, and in 
order to make an accurate assessment of their overall contribution, a person’s tax 
contribution also needs to be taken into account.  But this is just one of the ways 
in which they make a socially valuable contribution. 
A person’s profession and income are not the only two ways in which a person can 
make active social contributions; they are just two possible suggestions of the 
criteria that could be included under the category of active social contributions.  
There are many other ways in which a person can make positive contributions to 
the welfare of society, and these would be determined and elucidated by the 
expert criteria selection committee.   
 
Problems with this criterion 
This criterion too is not without its own problems.  When thinking about the 
economic loss to the government when an affluent citizen dies, the question 
emerges as to whether the economic gain from saving an affluent citizen is enough 
to warrant the effort of implementing the criterion, and the negative social effects 
that it may cause, such as resentment towards the affluent from the less affluent.  
The overall amount of money that is lost through rich people dying due to organ 
failure may be small when compared to what is brought in through taxes from 
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people dying from other illnesses, even if they are on a low income and paying a 
low rate of tax.  With 88% of taxpayers paying the lower rate of tax, and only 12% 
paying the higher rate, the numbers could be interpreted so that the combined 
income of the higher rate taxpayers that die due to the lack of an organ is likely to 
be just a drop in the ocean compared to the combined amount of those who pay 
the lower tax rate and die due to the lack of an organ (Pope and Roantree, 2014, 
p. 45).  And so, including income as a selection criterion may not offer any real 
economic gain to the government. 
However, there is the other side of the argument that overall, those who pay more 
income tax do, when combined, contribute more money than the combined lower 
rate taxpayers despite the fact there are significantly less individuals; the top 1% 
of taxpayers contribute 27% of all the income tax paid, and the top 10% 
contributing 59% (2014, p. 46).  This goes to show that those people who pay 
more income tax really are instrumentally and economically valuable to society; it 
takes just the top 10% of taxpayers to make up over half of all the government’s 
income tax revenues.  So even though there is the possibility that the amount of 
income tax lost through the death of a high rate taxpayer may appear insignificant 
compared to the overall loss of income tax from all those who die whilst waiting 
for an organ transplant, it doesn't change the fact that those higher rate taxpayers 
really do make an important contribution to society, and as such, this should be 
reflected in the patient selection process.  It is not that higher rate taxpayers 
deserve to receive an organ because they make a bigger contribution, but simply 
that their larger contribution means that it makes them more instrumentally 
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socially valuable (purely from an economic perspective) and as such could be 
given priority for an organ transplant based on this criterion.  
Of course, not everyone who pays more in income tax will automatically be the 
most valuable once other considerations, such as passive social contributions and 
morality, are taken into account alongside how ir/replaceable the person is.  The 
death of someone who is a high rate taxpayer that can be easily replaced by 
someone else who will also earn as much money and pay as much tax will have 
less of a detrimental economic effect on society than the death of a high earner 
and taxpayer who cannot be as easily replaced.  
The use of an income criterion might also face the same criticism posed against 
the Seattle system in the last chapter, in that preferring those for treatment who 
earn more might be construed as the bourgeoisie sparing the bourgeoisie (Sanders 
and Dukeminier, 1967, p. 378), but this would not be the case under a revised 
system.  Those who are wealthier would not be preferred based on the personal 
preferences of the selection committee (as was the case with the Seattle 
committee), but simply because they are more instrumentally valuable to society 
by way of tax contributions.  However, the sentiment behind the objection of the 
inclusion of such criteria may still prove a problem for the implementation of the 
system by potentially undermining the benefits that the criteria aim to promote.  
Preferring those members of society who have the highest income may lead to 
social resentment of the more affluent members of society by the less affluent.  Is 
this a trade-off that we are willing to make, and would the detriment of resentment 
outweigh the benefits of economic stability and increased services for society that 
 251 
would be created?  Perhaps not.  One of the main sources of income for the 
government is the income tax paid by the very affluent, and it is this income that 
helps to fund the provision of infrastructure for society which the less affluent 
benefit from, and rely on.  The benefits here are so widespread and entrenched in 
life, that the absence of these is bound to be more detrimental than the occasional 
resentment felt towards an affluent citizen who receives a transplant.  
Furthermore, the affluent patient would not even necessarily be receiving the 
transplant on the basis of their income alone; it would be in conjunction with the 
other selection criteria. 
 
Where this criterion would figure in the organ allocation policy 
Quite simply, those people who pay more income tax would be awarded more 
points than those people who pay less.  In this way, the relative importance of each 
person's income tax contribution is reflected.   
 
Other active social contribution criteria 
Other active social contributions that a person might make to society could include 
those contributions that a person makes outside of their professional 
commitments and contributions.  A comprehensive list of the ways in which a 
person can make active social contributions to society would be far too extensive 
to discuss here, however, such contributions would include organising or 
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contributing towards charitable events, or activities which benefit society in other 
ways, such as running activities for the old or young, whether they be for pleasure 
or education.  This would make a person more instrumentally valuable to society 
due to the welfare that they are helping to create.  Again, the level of instrumental 
value for these contributions would differ depending on the current needs of 
society and would be determined by the relevant experts.  Whilst some of these 
other active social contributions might not be as necessary for society as the basic 
societal functions, they may still have an important role to play in enhancing the 
quality of life of members within society; even during the Second World War, a 
number of bombed British theatres were rebuilt and repaired whilst ensuring the 
more basic needs of society were met.  
 
Passive contributions 
Effects on proximate individuals 
The difference between active social contributions, and passive contributions in 
the form of effects on proximate individuals, is that the former looks at the value 
that an individual can offer to society through the contributions that they actively 
make.  The latter however, focuses on a person's value to their immediate 
relations and the proximate individuals within their life.  Here, inter-human 
connections are at stake (Leenen, 1982, p. 35), and a person passively creates 
value by the nature of their relationships and their value in the eyes of others.   
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Whilst a person can be instrumentally valuable to society through their 
professional, economic, and other active social contributions, they can also be 
valuable to other members of society on a personal level.  A person’s death, or 
continued life may have an effect on society as a whole, even if only in a small way, 
however, it is on the smaller scale that the effects of a person's death are felt more 
intensely.  E.g. a citizen’s death may mean that society loses someone who is 
skilled in their profession, and the government will lose the individual’s continued 
tax revenue; these are small consequences when viewed in the context of society 
as a whole.  However, the effects of a person's death are felt more acutely within 
the personal relationships the individual had with others.  Rescher makes a 
suggestion for the inclusion of the effects on proximate individuals to be included 
when allocating scarce medical resources and says that the nature of the 
relationship between a patient and their spouse, children, and parents, and the 
issue of their financial and psychosocial dependence upon them are obviously 
matters that deserve to be given weight (Rescher, 1969, p. 178). 
The death of a doctor who was also a mother, wife, and active member of the local 
community will be seen to the wider society as just another death of a citizen, and 
by the government as the death of a doctor who can be replaced by another doctor.  
However, to those proximate individuals who knew the deceased personally, the 
death will have more serious effects.  The child who has lost their mother, the 
husband who has lost their wife, and the close-knit community who has lost one 
of their most active members, have suffered a greater loss by the doctor’s death 
than other members of the wider society have.  For the proximate individuals, the 
deceased cannot be replaced in the same manner as they could be in a professional 
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capacity.  A replacement mother for the child may fulfil all of the roles and duties 
that the child’s actual mother did, however, the child will still be left unsatisfied 
(Raphael, 1992, pp. 76–79).54  It is not simply the motherly duties that are lost for 
the child; it is the actual person that is missed.  The mother is instrumentally 
valuable to the child because of who they are, not because of what they do.  It is 
this kind of value that is covered under the heading passive social contributions; 
the passive contributions that a person makes by virtue of being personally 
valuable in the eyes of another.  It is mainly her relationship to her child that 
makes the mother valuable to them rather than simply the active contributions 
she makes, e.g. taking the child to football, ballet, parties, providing food, 
reassurance, etc.  The value of a parent to their child occurs passively through the 
on-going relationship and is not wholly dependent on the active contributions the 
parent makes.  The instrumental value of the parent lies in the happiness, security, 
and comfort (amongst other things) that the child finds by virtue of their unique 
relationship.  Children often love their parents regardless of whether or not the 
parent makes valuable active contributions to the relationship (some people are 
bad parents, but their children still love them), and children often grieve when 
their parent dies, but it is not simply the loss of the active contributions the parent 
made that they are grieving. 
 
Friendship 
                                                      
54 Depending on the age of the child. 
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One of the other major groups that would come under the term proximate 
individuals would be a person’s friends.  The number of friends that a person has, 
as well as the level of that friendship, will play a role in how detrimental an 
individual’s death will be.  However, despite admitting that a person’s life is not 
only valuable to himself, but also to his friends, colleagues, and neighbours, 
Rescher neglects to include these groups in his suggestion to include 
considerations regarding the effects on others in patient selection decisions.  He 
gives no reason why he chooses to only include considerations for family 
members apart from the fact that these relationships are a thing of “unique 
intimacy and significance” (Rescher, 1969, p. 178).  Yet, a person’s friends, as well 
as their immediate family will also be affected by their death, and are often also a 
thing of unique intimacy and significance.  Close friends are more likely to be 
affected by someone’s death than a more distant friend, and the higher the number 
of close friends that a person has, the more detriment that will be caused by that 
person’s death.  Although Rescher ignores the possibility of considering the effects 
that a person’s friends may feel by their death, he may be right that such 
considerations should be limited to immediate family members.  Even though the 
number of friends that a person has will undoubtedly play a role in how 
detrimental a person’s death would be, it would simply not be practicable to 
include this as a criterion due to the variables between people in what constitutes 
a close friend, general friend, distant friend, or acquaintance. 
For some people, they may class someone as a close friend if they see them a 
specific number of times a week, whereas for someone else, a close friend may be 
someone with whom they have shared particular experiences or where their 
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friendship has a certain level of depth, despite rarely being in contact (imagine old 
friends who are rarely contacted due to difficult circumstances).  The problem 
with ascertaining each individuals’ views on what constitutes a friend, a close 
friend, or an acquaintance, would be difficult enough in itself, however, the more 
serious issue lies in actually determining how many people would be classified in 
each group.  A person may say that they feel that they are close friends with almost 
everyone they have met in order to help their chances of receiving an organ if they 
knew that a having a large number of close friends would make their death more 
detrimental.   
An ideal approach would be to contact all of the people that the potential recipient 
knows and determine what they feel their level of friendship with the patient is, 
as the level of detriment that might be caused could be accurately assessed.  
However, such an approach is not practicable given that, firstly, it might not be 
possible to reach, or even know, everyone who would be classed as a proximate 
individual to a person, and secondly, to know whether the proximate individuals 
were actually telling the truth when questioned about their relationship with the 
possible recipient.  It is easy to imagine the majority of proximate individuals 
saying that they felt they had a close relationship with the potential recipient, 
regardless of whether this was true or not, simply in order to try and help save the 
patient’s life.  And indeed, many people may feel that they should attempt to save 
a friend’s life, even if not a close friend, especially if it requires little effort. 
Because of the problems associated with determining how many friends a person 
has, and in what capacity, it is not practical to include this as a criterion in 
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determining how valuable a person is to society, and instead, the extent of 
inclusion for proximate individuals should be limited to immediate family 
members.  
When it comes to family members, for most people, it will be their immediate 
family that feels the biggest loss, and this loss can be expected to lessen towards 
the extended family.  That is not to say that extended family members will not feel 
the loss, and for certain individuals, this loss might be the same as can be expected 
to be felt as that by an immediate family member.  However, in general, it is a 
person’s partner, parents, siblings, or children that feel the most loss in the family.  
Because accurately determining which extended family members are also feeling 
such a significant loss is just as problematic as determining which of a person’s 
friends will also feel a significant loss, it makes more sense to limit the inclusion 
to only immediate family members where definite lines can be drawn.  Of course, 
there will be circumstances in which a person does not get along or even talk to 
their immediate family anymore, and so, determining the level of detriment that 
might be caused to proximate individuals if inclusion is limited to immediate 
family will create a number of exceptions, but in general, this limitation will 
provide a suitable measure.  
 
Problems with this criterion 
Manipulation of the system 
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Whilst it is undeniable that people do have social value with regards to proximate 
individuals, there is the worry that if this criterion were included in the decision 
of a person's overall social value, people may put themselves in precarious 
positions in order to make themselves more valuable by virtue of their death being 
more detrimental.  As mentioned earlier, this type of criteria abuse was also a 
potential problem with the Seattle system, as the Seattle committee placed as 
much, if not more, value on family as it did on societal contributions.55  If a person 
wanted to increase their value ranking, they would be “well­ advised to father a 
great many children, then to throw away all his money, and finally to fall ill in a 
season when there will be a minimum of competition from other men dying of the 
same disease” (Alexander, 1962, p. 125).  In a sense, the patient would be holding 
the system to ransom by actively manipulating their circumstances so that their 
death would have a serious detrimental impact on the people around them, and 
the only way to avoid this detriment would be to give the patient an organ.  This 
kind of reckless behaviour is obviously something that should not be encouraged, 
and so there would have to be a safeguard in place to discourage these kinds of 
actions, otherwise the selection criteria may end up rewarding immoral 
behaviour.   
To safeguard against people taking advantage of the system and manipulating 
their personal circumstances to make their death more detrimental at the expense 
of others, any patient who is found to be doing this could be removed from the 
waiting list, or at the least, placed further down the list.  This may cause detriment 
                                                      
55 “Other factors equal, the group chooses those with dependents...” (Sanders and Dukeminier, 
1967). 
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in these particular cases, however, overall in the long-run, it would lead to 
increased benefit as people would know that they will not be prioritised for 
treatment if they actively create a situation in which their death would be 
detrimental at the expense of others through a malicious action.  Dealing with the 
potential problem in this way is similar to the way of dealing with the demands of 
terrorists.  If the demands of terrorists were met to avoid the short-term 
detriment caused by their actions, it would be likely to increase the long-term 
detriment by encouraging other terrorists to do the same, by making demands and 
threats that cause fear and terror in society.  However, by not negotiating with 
terrorists, the threat of future demands and actions are lessened as they are aware 
that there is little chance that their demands will be met, whatever the threat.   
The parallels between this and the manipulation of the social value criteria in an 
allocation system, are that if patients purposely create situations in which other 
people will be detrimentally affected by their death56 and are then given 
preference for treatment to avoid this detriment, other patients will be 
encouraged to do the same in the hope that their engineered situation will result 
in their “demand” for an organ being met.  This could lead to a situation in which 
anyone who is waiting for an organ transplant, engineers their circumstances so 
as their death causes as much detriment as possible.  Because organs are a scarce 
resource and only one person’s demand for an organ can be met at a time, the 
detriment that would have been caused by the death of the recipient will have 
been avoided, but the engineered detrimental situations of the other potential 
                                                      
56 Such as by putting the family in a large sum of financial debt and cancelling any life insurance 
policies so that their death would leave the family in financial ruin.   
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recipients will have not, bringing about an overall net detriment rather than the 
overall net benefit as the system was designed to deliver.  By placing patients who 
manipulate the system in this way lower down the list or by excluding them from 
the list altogether, other patients will be discouraged from manipulating the 
system and the risk of net detriment can be minimised. 
However, it should be pointed out that patients who make their death more 
detrimental by actually making positive contributions would not need to be 
penalised.  For example, even if Patient A were to intentionally pursue a socially 
valuable career path, or do valuable charity work simply because they know they 
require an organ transplant or were at risk of needing one, they would be making 
positive social contributions, despite “playing” the system.  However, if Patient B 
placed their family in deep financial debt and their continued earning would be 
the only way to repay this debt, they would, in a sense, be making a negative social 
contribution by creating a situation where the wellbeing of others is at risk.  The 
family of Patient B will gain no benefit from being in massive debt, but society does 
benefit from the charity work and socially valuable profession of Patient A. 
 
Discrimination against certain groups 
There is also the worry that certain groups of people may be unfairly 
discriminated against due to their lack of proximate individuals.  For example, 
parents may be preferred over bachelors, extroverts over introverts, and 
socialites over hermits; these are not necessarily factors that people have any 
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control over.  It might be seen as unfair to effectively penalise someone because 
they have not found someone to raise a child with, or do not have many friends 
because they are shy, or prefer to keep themselves to themselves rather than mix 
within the community.  Of course, again, these people may be socially valuable in 
other areas of their life, but under the application of the criteria “effects on 
proximate individuals”, those patients who have fewer social interactions, 
dependents, and friends, may in general, fair worse than those who have more. 
However, even though certain types of groups will be discriminated against under 
this criterion, the discriminations that are present are not based on unfounded 
prejudices.  They simply reflect the level of detriment that can be expected to occur 
from the death of particular individuals based on different criteria, in this case, the 
harm that would be caused to proximate individuals.  The death of people who 
have more dependents, friends, and social interactions is likely to have a bigger 
detrimental effect on society as they play a part in the lives of more people.  If 
bachelors, introverts, and hermits were to be discriminated against, it would not 
be because of subjective societal preferences and prejudices, but rather on the 
grounds of objective instrumentality.   
Granted, not all proximate individuals will be affected to the same extent by the 
death of their mutual friend/dependent/family member/social interactor, and 
ideally, this is why the actual likely effects on all proximate individuals would be 
taken into account and not simply the number of immediate family members that 
a person has.  The death of one introvert patient may have a huge effect on the few 
close friends that they have, whereas the death of a fleeting socialite may have 
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only a small effect on each of the multitude of people they know.  Even though 
more people will be affected by the death of the socialite, the level of harm is much 
lower for each individual.  However, as previously discussed, due to the nuances 
of what constitutes friendships of different kinds, including friends into the social 
rank decision would be impractical.  This is why the scope for proximate 
individuals would need to be limited to the number of immediate family members 
that a person has, as in general, it is these individuals who are likely to be the most 
detrimentally affected compared to the effects on the extended family.   
 
Where this criterion would figure in the organ allocation policy 
Including proximate individuals into the social value criteria would mean that 
those people with more immediate family members, are more instrumentally 
valuable, as their continued life helps to avoid the increased negative social effects 
that would be caused by their death, compared to those of someone who had fewer 
immediate family members.  As such, they would be ranked higher under this 
criterion.  However, the ir/replaceability of the person could still be taken into 
account, just as was the case with the considerations under the social contributions 
category, even though it is reasonable to think that on the whole, people are 
irreplaceable within personal relationships in a way that they generally aren’t in a 
professional capacity.  The age and nature of the familial relationship to the 
patient will vary the response that relations have to the bereavement, and this too 
will need to be taken into account based on the recommendations of experts from 
the relative fields, such as sociology and psychology.  E.g. as discussed in Chapter 
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5, people of different ages will respond differently to bereavements, and 
bereavements within different types of relationships. 
 
Morality 
Morality is the last category of social value considerations, and it would include 
such things as the type of actions a person makes or the motivation behind them, 
the views they may hold, and their personality traits.  The moral considerations 
would serve as a guide to how good a person is as a human being in terms of the 
benefit or detriment their character will have on society.  Whilst it would be ideal 
to include morality in the social value assessment, it will be shown that ultimately, 
it should be rejected as a social value criterion due to problems in actually 
assessing a person’s level of morality.  Instead, the morality criterion should be 
reframed, and the focus narrowed down to the likely negative contributions that 
a person will make to society. 
If a morality criterion were to be incorporated, the things that would be included 
under moral considerations are to do mainly with the person’s character.  It is not 
what they have to offer to society in the same sense as their profession, but it is 
how they conduct themselves within society.  The reason why moral values should 
ideally be included is because they can serve as an indicator and predictor of social 
utility.  It is reasonable to believe that the more people there are that do good, the 
more good will be present within society, and the more people that do bad, the 
more bad there will be within society.  What is referred to here when talking of 
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the good and the bad in relation to morality are the choices and actions that a 
person makes and the extent to which they create welfare, or cause harm.  Based 
on purely moral criteria, those members of society who are more moral, are more 
valuable than those who are immoral.  However, if those people who have a better 
level of morality were preferred for a scarce resource, again, it would not be 
because they are more deserving, but because they are more instrumentally 
valuable in creating welfare within society.   
If moral considerations are to be taken into account, they should only be done so 
as a means to an end, with that end being to promote welfare.  People who behave 
immorally would not be denied organs because they do not deserve them or 
because they are judged to have a poor character, and similarly, people who do 
behave morally would not be given organs because they do deserve them.  Those 
who have a higher moral standing would be more likely to receive an organ simply 
because their morality would be more beneficial to society. 
If we take the case of a paedophile, their actions are immoral in that they cause a 
non-necessary harm to another person; this harm is something that will obviously 
not benefit society, and actually has a detrimental effect on it.  Accordingly, the 
utility from morality for this person is less than that from someone who does not 
cause such harms, and so they are less valuable to society.  They may even be given 
negative points for their action when it comes to deciding their value rank.  Other 
actions that a person makes that cause harm could also be taken into account, even 
if the harm caused by these actions is comparatively smaller.  A husband who 
commits adultery harms his wife emotionally when she finds out, and even though 
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this harm might not be on the same scale as the harm caused by someone who 
abuses children, it is, nevertheless, still a harm to a member of society, and so 
could be included, and the level of harm reflected accordingly in the points given 
and the final rank value. 
On the other end of the scale, if a person upholds morality and behaves well, they 
are going to be more valuable to society because they are promoting a good.  From 
being polite and cordial with others, to handing in a large bag of money found in 
the street to police so the rightful owner can claim it, to helping to house the 
homeless, these actions promote a good by creating happiness, ultimately making 
the person who makes these actions more valuable to society. 
Furthermore, looking at a person’s level of morality can serve as an indicator of 
the kind of impact that person will have on society.  If people generally behave 
morally, or immorally, or a mixture of the two, then depending on the 
circumstances, it can be expected that they will carry on in the same manner in 
the future, and so this can be factored into the value rank decision (this will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section) (Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Mischel, 
2004). 
 
Problems with this criterion 
Prediction  
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It might be questioned as to how the likelihood of future detriment to society can 
be determined by looking at a person’s immorality, and who should make that call 
to begin with.  Simply because a person has committed an immoral action in the 
past, why should this make him less valuable to society?  The answer to this is 
simply that his past actions don’t necessarily make him less valuable, but rather 
that it is the relative likelihood of him making future immoral actions that impacts 
his value ranking depending on how detrimental the effects will be for society.  If 
someone generally behaves immorally, or morally, or a mixture of the two, then 
they might be expected to carry on behaving in that manner in certain 
circumstances and situations (Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Mischel, 2004).  
“Generally speaking, strong attitudes and personality traits are expected to 
predict behaviour better than their weaker counterparts” and can be expected to 
remain stable over time and be resistant to persuasion (Ajzen, 2005, p. 58).  By 
aggregating an individual’s behaviour on a given dimension (e.g. 
“conscientiousness,” “sociability”) over many different situations, it is possible to 
estimate an overall “true score” of someone’s personality.  “These correlations 
document that people differ significantly on virtually any dimension, showing 
stable overall individual differences: on the whole, some people are more sociable 
than others, some are more open-minded, some are more punctual, and so on. 
Such aggregate information is useful for many goals…” (Mischel, 2004, p. 3).  This 
kind of information could be used to make predictions on how likely it will be that 
an individual will make future detrimental contributions to society. 
There are of course many variables that affect a person’s actions in different 
situations despite their overall personality traits, such as how a person appraises 
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“Situations (including people and the self), [their] beliefs, expectancies, goals, and 
[their] self-regulatory competencies” (2004, p. 4).  However, Mischel claims that 
once the variables that affect a person’s psychological processes are understood 
and how these lead people to interpret the meanings of situations in different 
ways, links can be made to their distinctive patterns of behaviour in particular 
conditions and situations in potentially predictable ways (Mischel, 2004, p. 4).  
“Thus, individuals are characterized by distinctive and stable patterns of 
behaviour variability across situations” (2004, p. 7).  By using the available data 
and research into personality and behaviour carried out by the likes of Mischel as 
a way of attempting to maximise social welfare from each organ transplant, there 
is a better chance of actually achieving that increase in social welfare than if the 
research that is available was not used and the current system remained 
unchanged. 
Making decisions based on predictions about a person’s future behaviour are 
made frequently within the law as it stands now in terms of criminal punishment, 
and rehabilitation and release/parole from prison.  The effect that certain 
actions/values will have on society and the frequency with which they will occur 
is used regularly when deciding the fate of criminals in the courts and deciding 
whether someone should be released from prison.  Assessments can be made 
about the likelihood of committing future criminal actions, and the seriousness of 
those crimes , using tools such as the Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS) 
(Copas and Marshall, 1998; Howard et al., 2009), Risk of Serious Recidivism Score 
(RSR) (Moore, 2015, p. 334 Appendix H), and the Offender Assessment System 
(OASys) (Moore, 2015).    History, psychology and criminology can be used to 
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inform decisions on how best to deal with people who hold certain values and 
commit certain actions.  Values and ideas can spread and may lead to unfavourable 
consequences, as happened with the London riots in August 2011; people who 
would never have usually participated in a riot ended up doing so through the 
influence of others and the spread of an idea (BBC News, 2011).  Other values and 
ideas that may have a detrimental effect on society could be due to inspiring 
religious extremist terrorist acts, or people inciting racial hatred.  The fact that 
people are prosecuted for “inciting” racial hatred shows that there is a risk that 
immoral ideas and values can spread, and also a precedent to stopping the spread.  
People can also make immoral actions on an individual basis and negatively affect 
the lives of other people, e.g. stealing and abuse.  Making a decision as to which 
actions and values may be detrimental to society is not a new or novel proposal; 
it happens often.  Using the evidence available, an estimate can be given of the 
likelihood of a person making future moral or immoral actions and the likely effect 
of those actions, and these estimates can be reflected in the final value rank 
accordingly.  People who are more likely to have a detrimental effect on society 
through their immorality are less valuable to society on this criterion than people 
who will make a positive contribution to society through their morality.  
 
Impossible assessment 
Another problem with the inclusion of moral virtues into the allocation criteria is 
that it might be impossible to comprehensively assess the morality of an 
individual without some sort of “morality-team” investigating every aspect of a 
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person’s life.  Every aspect of a person’s life would need to be investigated 
thoroughly as some people may be better at hiding their immorality than others, 
and if we only took account of moral wrongs that we happened to know about, this 
is potentially unjust.  It would be unfair to deny the opportunity of life-saving 
treatment to someone because their moral wrongs were known, whereas 
another’s are well hidden.     
If the whole morality of a person were to be taken into account in organ allocation 
decisions, then a full investigation of their life would be needed to ensure that 
there were no hidden immoralities that the selection committee did not know 
about that would give the patient an unfair advantage over other patients whose 
immoralities were not so well hidden.  However, such an investigation would be 
highly intrusive into the life of each patient, and as a whole, vastly expensive due 
to the time and resources that would be needed to conduct each investigation.  The 
costs of such an investigative element to the system may well outweigh, or at least 
significantly diminish the potential gains in social utility.  The same problems also 
exist for the positive aspects of a person’s morality.  To make a full assessment of 
a person’s positive moral contributions, it too would require a resource intensive 
investigation, the costs of which would be sure to outweigh the potential benefits. 
If a person’s morality is to be taken into account in the allocation system, then the 
morality criteria needs to be less comprehensive and more straightforward, whilst 
still providing enough insightful and useful information to make an instrumental 
social value judgement.  What is needed, is a simple, and easily accessible list of a 
person’s significant moral contributions and actions.  However, what constitutes 
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a moral and immoral action is highly contested between both the same and 
different societies due to diverse moral theories and because the existence of 
objective moral truths is itself highly contested. This means that a list of moral 
actions is realistically unattainable.   On the other hand, an easily accessible list of 
actions that have a negative effect on society and cause detriment is something 
that is attainable in the form of a criminal record.  
 
Rejecting the morality criterion 
Taking a person’s morality into account when assessing their value to society is 
not feasible on the grounds that it would require a resource heavy investigation 
to comprehensively scrutinise every aspect of a person’s life in order to determine 
their relative level of morality.  Moreover however, the moral judgements on a 
patient’s behaviour will, by their very nature, be subjective at their basic level.  
Leenen worries that the subjective nature of these judgements means that people 
would be excluded from selection simply because their social behaviour is not 
approved of by someone on the selection committee. 
“Chronic alcoholism, drug addiction, a bohemian way of life, create major 
problems when used as criteria for selection.  Their evaluation is strongly 
connected to subjective convictions and moral judgments, which differ in 
society.  Is a lifestyle unacceptable to a doctor a reason for exclusion of a 
patient?  And if social behaviour were accepted as a criterion would it then 
not be a matter of justice to give the patient with 'bad behaviour' a chance 
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to 'improve his life'?  Has the prison population less right to such treatment 
than the rest of society?  Selection on the basis of social behaviour would 
lead to the imposition of predetermined ways of conduct, because 
everybody would know that certain sorts of behaviour could exclude him 
from treatment.  Bourgeois conduct would be encouraged and the creative 
nonconformists and unrecognised geniuses would have less chance, 
despite possibly making important contributions to the progress of society 
– even if this were often recognised only posthumously.”  (Leenen, 1982, 
pp. 34–35) 
Because of this subjectivity, he instead believes that a patient’s social behaviour 
should only be taken into account if it is medically relevant, e.g. if a person's 
alcoholism is likely to stop them from being able to comply with treatment 
requirements (1982, pp. 34–35).  Whilst Leenen is correct in pointing out that 
certain types of social behaviour are relevant from a medical suitability 
standpoint, the subjectivity of judgements on social behaviour can be minimised 
if made by the right selection committee and based on sound evidence about 
which types of social behaviour were detrimental or beneficial to society.  In this 
way, judgements about a person’s social behaviour can be made objectively, and 
used in determining a social value score. 
As a way of including these judgements into the system in an acceptable and 
practical way, removing the subjectivity as far as is possible, the morality criterion 
would need to look at only the harms that a person makes within society that 
appear on a criminal record, removing any moral judgements within the social 
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value assessment as far as possible.  The reason for drawing on a person’s criminal 
record is that it partly captures the essence of the morality criterion, but can be 
used in a much more objective way.   
The aim of the morality criterion is to try and quantify how good or bad a person 
is, and factor that into their social value score, but due to the problems with 
assessing a person’s morality, it is the essence of the morality criterion that needs 
to be captured and incorporated into the social value criteria.  The positive 
contributions that a person makes are akin to the good of morality, and are already 
taken into account in the first category of active positive social contributions.   But 
the bad moral actions that a person makes still need to be accounted for, and could 
be thought of as active negative social contributions.  A person’s criminal record is 
an easily accessible record of their negative social contributions, and so provides 
a practical way of incorporating the essence of that part of the morality criterion 
into a final social value score.     
Including the essence of the morality criterion in this way takes the criterion 
further away from moral judgements and closer to judgements about a person’s 
active detrimental contributions to society.  However, this is not necessarily a bad 
thing, as the patient’s social value score should be based on criteria that are as 
objective as possible.  But what it does mean, is that even though a person can be 
valuable to society through their relative morality, when it comes to making social 
value judgements about a patient, the closest thing to an acceptable and practical 
inclusion of a morality criterion is to consider a person’s criminal record as a way 
of determining their active detrimental contributions and the likelihood of future 
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active detrimental contributions.  
 
Active detrimental contributions 
A person’s criminal record would serve to highlight the significant actions that a 
person has made that negatively affect society.  The law provides a more objective 
framework than morality does, in that the court system give us a procedure for 
making socially endorsed judgements about people’s behaviour.    Whilst not every 
conviction necessarily equates to an immoral action, and not every immoral action 
is necessarily criminal, a criminal record gives a suitable level of information to 
base a social value judgement on, and to make a judgement about the likelihood of 
the patient making future similar active detrimental contributions whilst not 
requiring an intrusive and costly investigation.  Different crimes have different 
levels of severity present in the action, and so a criminal record can be looked at 
to determine the level of importance the convictions will play in deciding a social 
value rank.  However, since the social value criteria as a whole is forward looking, 
simply because a person has a criminal record, does not mean that they will 
automatically be ranked lower than someone who does not have a criminal record.  
The forward-looking nature of the system means that it is a combination of the 
crime committed and the likelihood of the person committing future crimes that 
have a detrimental impact on society, and how detrimental those actions will be, 
that is important.  These judgements can then figure into the overall social value 
score as negative points, reducing the score depending on the type and likelihood 
of future detrimental contributions being made. 
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For instance, if Person A had killed someone but was now completely 
rehabilitated, and Person B had never killed anyone, everything else being equal, 
both patients would receive the same value rank for this criterion.  But if there 
was a high likelihood that Patient A would kill again, then they would be given 
negative social value points, reducing their overall social value score.  
   
Collapse into other criteria 
It might be pointed out that once the debate has shifted from morality to the 
avoidance of detriment to society through criminal actions, the criteria replacing 
that of morality are not significantly distinct from the criteria under the other 
main headings.  In effect, the morality criterion has simply collapsed into the 
criteria present under the other two main headings, especially, active social 
contributions. 
When the scope is limited to criminal activities that cause detriment to society, 
this criterion does indeed more closely align with that of active social 
contributions, rather than warranting a separate category of its own like a pure 
morality criterion would.  When looking at the criminal record of a person, it is a 
way of helping to determine how likely it is that they will make further negative 
contributions to society, with less of a focus on morality itself.  As such, it would 
be better to include considerations of serious criminal activity under a sub-
heading of active negative social contributions under the broad category of active 
social contributions and to not use morality as a criterion category when 
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determining a person’s social value rank.  
 
Where this criterion would figure in the organ allocation policy 
If a person's level of morality were to form part of their social value ranking, those 
people who had a higher level of morality would receive more points as a higher 
morality is, in general, more valuable to society than a low level of morality.  When 
trying to gauge the level of a person's morality, guidance could be taken from the 
other value categories and the actions the person made in those categories.  For 
example, the type of profession they have may be one that speaks of their morality, 
e.g. a charity worker who willingly accepts a poor wage in order to dedicate their 
lives to helping others, or the head of a business conglomerate that cares more for 
profits than the effects their business is having on the environment, and the poor 
wages and working conditions of their employees. 
However, because it is only the criminal actions of a person which negatively affect 
society that will be considered, it makes more sense to allocate negative value 
points to the patient to reflect their potential future negative contributions and 
the severity of them, and the effect that this will likely have on society.  This would 
reduce their overall value rank.   
As mentioned previously, simply because a person may have made detrimental 
contributions to society and have a criminal record, this does not mean that they 
will not be considered for an organ.  The points system would still be used, taking 
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into account the points scored in the other categories, and the person's overall 
score would determine whether they were to receive an organ.  Take the 
businessman for example; he may have a criminal record and care more for profits 
than he does about the environment and his employees.  However, the value he 
has in the other categories, of social contributions and effects on proximate 
individuals, may make him the most socially valuable potential organ recipient.  
 
General ethical objections 
Equality and justice 
The issue of equality and fairness has already been touched upon in Chapter 4, and 
it was shown that the social value selection criteria for patients can still be thought 
of as maintaining these values when seen as being analogous to “genuine 
occupational requirements” with the side effect that the criteria are simply 
indirectly discriminatory rather than directly discriminatory.  However, whilst the 
inequality of healthcare based on instrumental social value might be justifiable in 
this way, there is the objection that a person’s social value itself may be based on 
previous unjust inequalities.  If a person has achieved their social value (whether 
of high or low value) through previous injustices and inequalities that have, or 
have not, allowed them to make more valuable contributions, then it might also 
make the allocation of organs based on their social value unjust.   Is it just to allow 
those who have been lucky in income terms (and hence are lucky to have been 
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able to contribute to society through tax) to therefore also be advantaged in terms 
of lifesaving medical treatment? It seems that one unjust inequality may lead to 
another.  The inequality in healthcare based on social value may then be just (even 
if unequal) in its own terms, but unjust because of its linkage with another 
injustice. 
Michael Walzer describes this concept as complex equality in which:  
“…no citizen's standing in one sphere or with regard to one social good can 
be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard to some 
other good.  Thus, citizen X may be chosen over citizen Y for political office, 
and then the two of them will be unequal in the sphere of politics. But they 
will not be unequal generally so long as X's office gives him no advantage 
over Y in any other sphere – superior medical care, access to better schools 
for his children, entrepreneurial opportunities, and so on” (Walzer, 1983, 
p. 19). 
In relation to the spheres of a social value organ allocation system, the inequalities 
between people with regards to the different spheres in their life that are judged 
on the social value criteria outlined earlier in this chapter, will give people either 
an advantage or disadvantage in another sphere.  If someone does have a bigger 
income, or larger family, or more important job, then their fortune in these 
spheres will give them an advantage in the sphere of healthcare when it comes to 
organ allocation under this proposed system.  And those people who have lower 
incomes, smaller families, and less important jobs will be at a disadvantage in the 
sphere of healthcare.  
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Admittedly, there is an issue here with equality.  The inequality with regards to 
healthcare and organ allocation that would occur in the patient selection process 
under the proposed system, will be related to the patients’ lives, circumstances, 
and history.  But maintaining equality is not the only thing that is of concern when 
allocating scarce medical resources.  And when it comes to the spheres of justice, 
is it even possible to separate one sphere from another? 
Some spheres, if not every sphere, will play a part in the role of another sphere.  
For example, in the case of the politician being elected, it will be their employment 
history sphere that has given them an advantage over someone else, and when it 
comes to their employment history, this will have been affected by their education 
sphere, which will/may have been affected by their parent’s income sphere.  
Should these spheres be allowed to have an effect on each other?  It seems that if 
Walzer is OK with citizen Y being chosen over citizen X for office, this must 
presumably be because they are better for the job, and this is due to their previous 
employment sphere, and any other spheres that have contributed to their 
suitability for the job.  And so, in this circumstance, one sphere has given them an 
advantage in another sphere over someone else.  However, it makes sense that 
someone’s education and career history can give them a better chance of being 
elected to political office, and we might even think it appropriate that their 
education, career history, and track record is considered when deciding who to 
elect.  Their previous experiences and how they may contribute will affect their 
ability to promote general wellbeing in their role, which is one of the same goals 
that I argue an allocation system for organs ought to be promoting.  So when it 
comes to resource allocation, is it not also acceptable that a person may be at an 
 279 
advantage for healthcare because of one of their other spheres?  Their social value 
sphere makes them more suitable for the position of organ recipient because they 
are more suitable for the job of promoting welfare and minimising detriment.   
Whichever criteria are used in resource allocation rationing, inequalities will be 
created due to the shortage of resources, with some patients receiving treatment, 
whilst others will miss out.  The worry here is that the inequality will be due to 
something (other than the shortage of resources) based on the patient’s personal  
circumstances but which may be outside of the patients’ control.  When it comes 
to giving a value rank to people, it may seem unfair, even if objective, to give a low 
value rank to someone who is of low value to society due to circumstances that 
are out of their control.  For example, if the person’s low motivation to work was 
due to their upbringing and the morals and values instilled in them throughout 
childhood; are they really to blame for their poor motivation and their choice to 
depend on state hand-outs?  Who they are, their values, their personality, are all 
products of their environment and upbringing, and so whilst it might be objective 
to give them a low social value score based on these things, putting the person at 
a disadvantage because of them might be seen as unfair and unjust because they 
are outside of the individual’s control. 
However, even if this is the case, the social value criterion is at the least, no more 
unfair or unjust than the waiting time criterion that it would be replacing.  The 
waiting time criterion is also subject to the same influencing factors of some social 
spheres and circumstances affecting patient prioritisation.  But as demonstrated 
earlier in the thesis, there is a moral reason for the use of a social value criterion 
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that the waiting time criterion does not have. 
Furthermore, equality is not the only value that needs to be taken into account 
when allocating resources, especially scarce medical resources.  That is not to say 
that equality should not be considered at all, but rather that it needs to be 
considered alongside other values such as effectiveness, risk, and, of most concern 
in this thesis, the promotion of social benefit, so that an appropriate balance can 
be struck.  Any alternative tie-break criterion that avoided social value affecting 
healthcare treatment, such as random allocation, would be inconsistent with the 
partly utilitarian aims of the organ transplant system, and would not promote the 
increase of welfare created with each organ transplant.  What is important is that 
these concerns and values, and the criteria that aims to maximise social benefit, 
need to be appropriately balanced and justified so that they do not produce 
unacceptable and arbitrary inequalities. 
 
Equality is not an intrinsic moral value 
As a further reply to the fact that the social value score might be based on previous 
inequalities, the approach used here is utilitarian in nature, and so this potential 
inequality is not necessarily a problem as social equality is not an intrinsic moral 
value for a consistent utilitarian. 
“To be sure, other things being equal, a more equal distribution of 
economic and noneconomic benefits is always preferable to a less equal 
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distribution. But the main reason for this lies in the law of diminishing 
marginal utility of money and of most other good things in life.  Thus, 
greater economic equality is morally desirable mainly because a poor man, 
who is likely to spend any extra money on important necessities, is also 
likely to derive a much higher utility from an extra $100 than will a rich 
man, who is likely to spend any extra money on relatively unimportant 
luxuries.”  (Harsanyi, 1985, pp. 124–125) 
When it comes to other social benefits however, if social equality was an intrinsic 
moral value, it would mean prioritising resource allocation to a poor person (or 
an otherwise disadvantaged person) even if they are not expected to gain as much 
benefit from it as if it were allocated to a rich (or otherwise more fortunate) 
person.  Harsanyi gives an example to help demonstrate this point.   
“Consider a distribution of a scarce lifesaving drug, or a distribution of 
scarce university admissions, when the available supply of either falls very 
much short of existing demand. Suppose that, in the case of the drug, we 
have to choose between a rich patient and a poor patient, both of whom 
badly need this drug. Suppose, also, that the rich patient is definitely 
expected to benefit more from the drug. Or suppose that, in the university 
admissions example, we have to choose between a rich candidate and a 
poor candidate both of whom have the qualifications required for 
admission. Suppose, also, that the rich candidate is clearly better qualified 
and can derive a greater benefit from university education.  
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Then, statement A [that social equality is an intrinsic value] would imply 
that we should give the lifesaving drug or the university admission to the 
poorer person, even though the richer person would derive a greater 
benefit from it - except, perhaps, if this richer person would derive a very 
much greater benefit from the lifesaving drug or from the university 
admission. Yet, even if the richer person is expected to derive only a 
moderately greater benefit from the drug or from the university admission, 
he will have a stronger moral claim to it. It would be morally unjustifiable 
discrimination against him if he were denied the drug or the university 
admission merely because he happens to be rich.”  (1985, pp. 125–126)  
From this example, he concludes that in the distribution of social benefits, 
prioritising a poor person over a rich person, even if for a given benefit the former 
is not expected to derive a higher utility than the latter is, is a completely 
unacceptable moral value judgement. 
“Utilitarian theory is right to take the view that economic and social 
inequality is not an intrinsic moral value, and that it is morally wrong to 
discriminate against a rich or an otherwise fortunate person in order to 
reduce the difference between him and the poorer or otherwise less 
fortunate members of society.” (1985, p. 126). 
So the fact that the elements of the social value score attributed to a person might 
be based on entrenched social inequalities is not necessarily a problem for a 
utilitarian approach to resource allocation, as social equality is not an intrinsic 
moral value.  That is not to say however, that social equality is not valuable, but 
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rather that it is only valuable insofar as it goes towards maximising overall 
welfare, which for the utilitarian, is an intrinsic moral value.  Social equality does 
not need to be aimed for in every action or rule, but it does need to be factored 
into decisions and social rules to determine whether its inclusion in different 
circumstances would yield more welfare. 
For example, in my suggestion for the way in which the social value criterion could 
be included into the current allocation system as a replacement for the waiting 
time criterion, it is not necessarily a problem that a person’s social value score 
may be partly based on previous social inequalities.  However, social equality still 
needs to be taken into account to ensure that people have equal access to the 
waiting list for a transplant in the first place.  If particular people or groups were 
prohibited from having access to the waiting list from the beginning, the social 
inequality here would be needless and offer few, if any, benefits and would likely 
reduce welfare.  Again, whilst social equality is not an intrinsic moral value, it is 
something that most people do value, and so it’s inclusion in social rules can 
increase overall welfare when implemented at the right times. But it remains that, 
“Even though equality and justice (including fairness) are of fundamental 
importance from a utilitarian point of view, they cannot always be the decisive 
considerations for framing social policies” (1985, p. 127). 
When the social value criterion is used, I am suggesting that rather than always 
prioritising people with a particular background that makes them advantaged or 
less advantaged, we look at what their social contributions are, and prioritise them 
for treatment on this basis.  In this way, no one group of people, or people from a 
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particular background, will always have priority for an organ.  Under the social 
value criterion, sometimes those who are commonly thought of as advantaged will 
have priority for an organ and sometimes they might not.  Who gets priority for 
an organ under this criterion will depend on their circumstances and 
contributions, the specifics of which vary both between and within groups of 
people.  It might be the case that some people who are commonly thought to be 
advantaged, such as the rich and powerful, are easily replaceable, or their death 
will cause little detriment to society, and so will not get priority for an organ if the 
other potential recipient is less wealthy, but has a larger family and so less easily 
replaceable.  The reverse might also be true, in which a less advantaged person 
might be more easily replaceable and have no family, compared to another patient 
who is wealthy and has a large family.  In this way, no one is given priority over 
anyone else for treatment for reasons other than that it will help to create more 
overall welfare, and there is not one type of patient who will always gain priority 
over another, or who will always be at a disadvantage. 
 
Too costly to determine social value 
Morality 
The costs that would be incurred in attempting to determine comprehensively the 
level of morality of a person would almost certainly outweigh the potential social 
benefits that might have been expected to occur from the inclusion of a morality 
criterion in deciding a social value rank.  If a comprehensive investigation of a 
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person’s life were to take place, so that all of the good and bad things that they 
have done/do are taken into account, not only would it be hugely intrusive into 
each person’s life, but it would also be a huge undertaking for the investigation 
itself.  The entire life of the individual under investigation would need to be 
examined, and each action and decision they have made would need to be 
interpreted as to whether or not it was a moral or immoral decision.   The time 
that would be needed to do this would be massive, and possibly even take longer 
than the time the patient may have left to live before a decision has been made. 
Whilst the main cause of rationing when it comes to organ transplants is not 
financial in nature, but rather a shortage of the actual physical resources, the 
financial implications of conducting such an in-depth investigation into the 
morality of each possible transplant recipient would make the investigation too 
costly due to the resources and the wages that would need to be paid for such 
lengthy investigations; this money could be better spent elsewhere in the health 
service.  The financial costs would outweigh the potential social welfare benefits, 
and these financial costs could create more social welfare if spent elsewhere. 
However, this objection is only applicable if it is a comprehensive investigation 
into a person’s morality that is to be carried out.  It is possible that a less 
comprehensive investigation could be carried out that only focuses on those 
known socially detrimental actions that have been serious enough to appear on a 
criminal record.  Relying on the criminal record of a person means that an intrusive 
and costly investigation into morality is not needed, and so the inclusion of the 
criterion becomes more feasible again.  It must be noted that I am not claiming 
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that if someone has committed a crime, that their action is necessarily immoral; 
looking at a person’s criminal record simply narrows down the scope of an 
investigation into the actions of a person that have had, and may have, a 
detrimental effect on society, saving a costly investigation into morality. 
The other two main criteria of active social contributions and the effects on 
proximate individuals can also be determined without requiring an intrusive and 
costly investigation.   
 
Active social contributions 
The majority of the information needed to know the extent of someone’s active 
social contributions is readily available and can be found out by simply looking at 
their employment and financial records.  A person’s profession and other 
significant activities that they participate in that contribute to society are easy 
enough to assess without requiring a time-consuming verification process.  A 
patient’s other significant active social contributions that do not have such an 
easily accessible and verifiable record could be assessed by collecting references 
from, and conducting a handful of interviews with, the patients’ friends and 
acquaintances who can testify to the contributions.57 
                                                      
57 The structure of these interviews would need to be well designed and the questions 
comprehensive but objective in nature so as to avoid putting certain patients at an unfair 
advantage or disadvantage.  If not carried out correctly, the interviews might leave room for the 
patient’s friends, family, and acquaintances skills (or lack of) in articulation and persuasion to 
affect the outcome of the interview rather than it being based solely on the patient’s real 
contribution. 
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Other ways in which a person may make active contributions to society will be 
harder to assess and verify, and so perhaps should not be included in the final 
social value criteria.  The kind of criteria that might be harder to assess are the day 
to day activities that a person makes/does that might help to contribute to society, 
but which are only minor contributions and will be harder to verify.  For example, 
whether or not a person regularly recycles, or reduces their energy and water 
consumption when possible, so as to limit their impact on the environment and 
contribute to a more sustainable society.  Not only will determining whether 
someone does actually recycle regularly or attempts to reduce their energy 
consumption be difficult to assess accurately, but the relatively minimal positive 
effects of these contributions might be outweighed by the costs of time 
consumption and intrusiveness of the verification process.  It is these kinds of 
smaller active contributions that it might not be practical to consider when 
determining someone’s overall value to society.  
As such, the active social contributions that a person makes should be limited to 
their profession and their economic contributions, as well as their other major 
active contributions.  In this way, the process is only minimally intrusive and not 
time intensive.  The exact active contributions that would be taken into account 
would need to be decided by the criteria selection committee based on whether 
the benefit to society of the contribution can be quantified and verified, and 
whether or not the costs of the verification would outweigh the expected benefits 
of considering the contribution. 
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Effects on proximate individuals 
With regards to the criterion of effects on proximate individuals, there are a 
number of options available as to how to determine the likely level of detriment 
that will be caused by a patient’s death.  Ideally, a comprehensive investigation of 
the people the patient knows, and their relationship to them, would be 
undertaken, and various interviews and tests given to determine the likely effects 
the patient’s death will have on the proximate individuals.  However, such a 
comprehensive investigation would be expensive and time consuming enough 
that the costs may outweigh the potential benefits that might be gained.  A less 
comprehensive implementation of the criterion could still prove useful though if 
the criteria were limited to only immediate family members as outlined earlier in 
this chapter.   
Taking into account only the number of immediate dependents and family 
members, and excluding friends, would help to make the investigation less 
resource intensive, but still provide a useful amount of information to make a 
social value judgement about the effects on at least some of the proximate 
individuals that will be affected, especially those who will be affected the most.  In 
general, it is the family of a person who is most acutely affected by their death, as 
well as their closest friends.  Determining what makes someone a close friend is 
again, a task that would require a huge amount of resources given that the nature 
of close friendships differs from person to person, and so working out which 
friends constitute a close friend would undermine the aim of the allocation criteria 
due to the costs outweighing the potential benefit.  Determining the number of 
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immediate family members that a person has faces no such problem as this 
information is readily available.   
Of course, there will be cases in which a person is not close to their family, have 
certain family members that they do not talk to or are on bad terms with, or are 
only close to a small section of their family, and so there will be some family 
members who will not be significantly affected by the death.  But for the most part, 
people are close to their parents, grandparents, siblings, offspring, and spouses, 
and so this is an ideal way to take into account the effects of a death on proximate 
individuals without requiring a prohibitively costly and intrusive investigation.  
Applying the rule across the board will create more benefit (despite there being 
some cases where certain family members are included in the value judgement 
despite not being close to the patient) than would be created if time was spent 
identifying the exceptions to the rule.58 
 
                                                      
58 A similar situation may be found in the case of government bursaries for students based on 
parent income.  If a student’s parents’ income is below a certain threshold, the student is entitled 
to a government bursary, whereas a student whose parents have an income above this threshold 
is denied the bursary on the grounds that the parents are more likely to have the available funds 
to help the student financially, and that parents with a lower income are not in such a position to 
financially assist their child.  This reasoning might hold true for the most part, however, there will 
be exceptions where parents with a higher income are not in a position to financially assist their 
child due to pre-existing debts and commitments, and parents with a lower income who are in a 
position to help their child due to frugal spending habits or wise investments.  Attempting to 
identify these exceptions would require an investigation into the personal financial circumstances 
of each family and their spending habits, an investigation that would use vast amounts of resources 
given the number of students that attend universities, and the cost of doing so would mean that 
there would be significantly less money available for those students who were eligible for a 
bursary after this investigation.  So the application of the threshold to everyone, without a 
comprehensive investigation, creates more benefit than would be created if an investigation were 
carried out in order to identify the exceptions. 
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Children in the system 
When it comes to allocating organs to children under the system that I suggest, 
there might be a worry that children would receive low priority for an organ given 
that they often make less socially valuable contributions than adults.  They do not 
have jobs and so make no economic or professional contributions to society, and 
adults are more likely to be able to make more valuable contributions.  If this were 
the case, children would be being penalised for not making contributions to 
society even though they cannot make these contributions in the first place.  At 
least with adults, the criteria that are taken into account when assessing their 
social value are wide enough that even if someone is not valuable in one category, 
there is a good chance that they are valuable in another category, and so are not 
the subject of blanket discrimination.  Children on the other hand are likely to only 
be valuable in terms of how many family members they have. 
Whilst there is the possibility that children will receive lower priority for an organ 
transplant because of their generally fewer social contributions, it is unlikely to 
occur as a trend in practice.  If an organ does become available that is suitable for 
a young child, it is likely that it will only be suitable for a young child as it is not 
enough to support an adult.  Given that child organs become available so rarely 
(Health Resources & Services Administration, 2014, pt. 5), it makes sense to 
transplant them into children when they do become available because the child is 
more medically suitable for the organ than an adult would be.  Furthermore, 
because the social value criteria are only used when there are 2 or more patients 
who are equally medically suitable for an available organ, a child will be given 
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priority over an adult for child organ, even if both are a medical match, as the child 
will be more medically suitable for the organ given their relative size, e.g. heart 
transplants (NHSBT, 2017a).  However, with certain organs, there is more 
flexibility between the size disparity between the child and the organ, with adult 
kidneys generally being able to be transplanted into children above 2 years old 
(Stanford Children’s Health, no date), but paediatric patients are still given 
priority for kidney transplants due to the potential for a growth boost from an 
early transplant (Salvatierra, Millan and Concepcion, 2006; NHSBT, 2017b).  
In those cases, however, where an organ would be equally suitable for a child or 
an adult, the social value criteria could be taken into account.  It is likely overall 
that the adult would be making more socially valuable contributions than the 
child, and in these types of cases where the organ is equally suitable, the adult may 
well receive priority.  Even though the child is likely to not be making any 
professional contributions, they will be valuable to their families.  But the adult on 
the other hand, will be valuable to their family as well as making social 
contributions.  The child may have a longer time left in their life to make socially 
valuable contributions if they received the organ over the adult, but knowing 
whether this will actually occur or not, and the extent of those contributions is too 
unpredictable to include in an assessment.  One possible option to resolve the 
slight possibility of children being systematically scored lower on the social value 
criteria would be to give them a base score to begin with, given that they will 
hopefully have a longer time to contribute in the future as adults.  
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Risk of lower donation rates 
Public opinion 
Even though I have argued that the implementation of a social value criterion into 
the organ allocation system can be ethically justifiable, one of the main remaining 
barriers to its introduction is whether or not the public would support such a 
policy.  If the public does not support the policy, then the expected benefits that 
would be created from the policy would be outweighed by the negative 
consequences of its introduction.  For instance, if the criteria, or the system itself, 
is perceived as unfair in some way, this may lead to lower donation rates.  People 
may be more unwilling to donate their organs for transplant if they do not agree 
with the principles upon which the allocation of organs is based for some reason 
or another.   
One example of this is from Brazil where a presumed consent law was introduced 
for organ donation, and it was expected that this would lead to a rise in the number 
of organs available for transplant.  However, because the public did not support 
the policy for a number of reasons, it actually led to a dramatic decrease in the 
number of donated organs (Csillag, 1998).  Part of the downfall of the policy was 
due to popular imagination where a part of the population feared that their organs 
would be removed even before they were clinically dead.  The public did not have 
faith in the government and did not support the policy, so the public actually opted 
out of donating their organs, partially as a sign of protest, and partially as a 
safeguard to their own health; they did not trust the medical profession to give the 
same amount of care to them if they were registered organ donors.  Many rushed 
 293 
to the public offices to register themselves as non-donors to avoid such a risk, and 
instead of the presumed consent system increasing organ donation rates, it 
actually had the effect of reducing them (Csillag, 1998).    Because the public did 
not support the policy, the aims of the policy were not achievable.  It is possible 
that the same could happen with the aims of the introduction of the social value 
criterion.  If the public do not support the proposed policy, then a situation similar 
to Brazil may occur.  Any benefit that was expected to arise from the inclusion of 
the social value criteria would be outweighed by the increase in harm from the 
increased number of people that would die waiting for an organ transplant due to 
the reduced number of donors. 
For this reason, before the policy is introduced nationwide, there would need to 
be a full assessment of the public opinion towards the policy to gain an idea of 
what its reception might be, and what would need to be changed in order to make 
the policy acceptable.  Public forums and focus groups could be used to determine 
the likely public attitude to the overall policy as well as the different elements of 
the policy, and once obtained, a trial could be introduced for a short period, taking 
into account the feedback from the public meetings.  Kidneys could be used for 
this trial given that the life-threatening nature of kidney failure can be better 
managed through dialysis than the failure of other organs.  
There are 3 main benefits from introducing the system as a small trial at first.  1) 
The location of the trial could be selected based on the feedback of the public 
forums.  If there was one area that showed they were more amenable to the policy 
than other areas, then it would be likely to gain approval in that area for a trial 
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easier than other areas.  2) By carrying out a trial at first, it will allow potential 
problems with the policy and procedure to be highlighted and resolved before it 
was rolled out to a wider area.  3) If the policy is introduced on a small scale first, 
it gives time for the wider public to become accustomed to the idea of having a 
social value criterion included in organ allocation decisions.  Over time, the public 
become more accustomed to ideas and policies that were once considered 
unfavourable, e.g. abortion and euthanasia (Calman, 2004, p. 367).  Even though a 
policy might not be suitable for introduction at one point in time, once the 
discussion is started and people become used to the idea that this is a possibility, 
the introduction of the policy becomes less controversial with the public being 
more amenable to it than they were originally. 
The criteria themselves might be ethically acceptable, but if the reception of the 
criteria and system by the public is poor, then their ethical acceptability counts for 
little, especially if the implementation of the system ends up reducing organ 
donation rates.  In the case of the Brazilian presumed consent system, its failed 
implementation perhaps could have been avoided with adequate marketing, and 
public consultation and information.  Such an investigation into the possible 
public reception of the inclusion of social value criteria in organ allocation 
decisions would need to be the focus of a separate project due to the level of 
investigation that would be needed.  However, it is worth highlighting a couple of 
issues that will affect how well received the policy will be: 1) sensationalist 
reporting, 2) the framing of the policy. 
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Media Sensationalism 
Whilst gauging what the public reception might be to the introduction of the policy 
is important, it is only one aspect of the public view that needs to be considered 
when introducing this policy.  The other aspect is the presentation of the policy 
itself, ensuring that it is presented in such a way that the public is likely to be 
amenable to the proposal.  It needs to be presented in a positive light, with 
sensationalist reporting on the implications of the policy kept to a minimum as far 
as possible. I am not suggesting that the media would need to be censored when 
reporting the policy introduction, but simply that they would need to be 
encouraged to present the policy and discussion around its introduction in a less 
sensationalist way than might be usually expected, especially from the tabloid 
media.  (How effective that encouragement is likely to be is debatable however).   
“The 24-hour news cycle means that media organisations are battling for 
audience share, which in turn means that “the press has moved towards 
sensationalism, entertainment, and opinion (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 1999, 
p. 193).””  (The PLoS Medicine Editors, 2008, p. 681)  
Reporting in this manner might be good for business, but it does present a 
situation whereby the facts can’t always be easily separated from opinions and 
speculation.   
“Headlines are often written by news editors, rather than the article’s 
reporter, and are particularly prone to exaggeration.  All of this 
sensationalism strays far from the reality of biomedical research, a slow 
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process that yields small, incremental results based on long-term studies 
that always have weaknesses.”  (2008, p. 681) 
Whilst any study and policy will have weaknesses, it will be important for the 
revised organ allocation policy to be presented in a way that avoids sensationalist 
claims in the media in order for the public to be able to appraise the policy 
themselves based on the facts of the policy rather than speculative opinions.  The 
way in which an issue is presented in the media can have a huge effect on the 
public’s opinion of the issue, even if the presentation of the issue is inaccurate.  For 
example: 
“Gilens (1996) examined the discrepancies between the actual and media-
portrayed racial makeup of America’s poor.  Gilens sampled every story on 
poverty in America from the nation's three major news magazines (Time, 
Newsweek, and US News and World Report) from 1988 through 1992, and 
then analysed the content of the accompanying pictures.  Of those persons 
pictured in poverty, 62% were African American, which is more than twice 
the actual proportion of blacks who make up the American poor (29%).  It 
is likely that such an overrepresentation may lead to exaggerated 
impressions of how many blacks are in poverty.  In fact, several surveys 
show that the majority of Americans overestimate the proportion of poor 
blacks, with the majority of Americans believing that there are more blacks 
than whites in poverty.”  (Anastasio, Rose and Chapman, 1999, p. 153) 
If the media present the revised social value organ allocation policy in this kind of 
way, by reporting heavily on the possibility that a wealthy person will receive or 
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has received an organ over a poorer person due to their perceived higher social 
value without reporting on the other possibility of a poorer person receiving an 
organ over a wealthy person due to their other social contributions, then the 
public may gain exaggerated impressions that the wealthy will always receive an 
organ over the poor, when this is not the case.  If media outlets cannot be 
encouraged to report the policy introduction in a straight, non-sensationalised 
way, a government public information campaign might also need to be used as this 
would enable greater control over the presentation and framing. 
 
Issue Framing 
A similar way in which the public opinion can be swayed, and often used in politics, 
is using the technique of issue framing.  This is slightly different to the 
sensationalist and entertainment aims of the tabloid media, and instead focuses 
more on the presentation of the actual facts of an issue.  By altering the way in 
which the facts of an issue are presented to the public, their opinions can often be 
changed.  It is well known that people will respond differently to questions in 
public-opinion surveys when those questions are worded differently (Schuman 
and Presser, 1996).  Previous studies have treated this tendency as a question-
wording effect with methodological, rather than substantive, importance, but 
more recent studies have shown that focusing on the specific effects of an issue 
rather than the more general effects can also affect people’s responses (Jacoby, 
2000, p. 758).  Jacoby found that by framing issues of government spending in a 
way that highlighted exactly who would benefit from the spending rather than 
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framing the issue in more general terms e.g. there will be more money to spend, 
people would not only give different responses, but would actually change their 
mind on the issue. 
“The framing effects revealed in this analysis do not merely show that 
varying issue presentations produce different levels of aggregate public 
support for government spending.  Instead, alternative frames can actually 
induce individual people to change their responses to the spending issue.  
These opinion shifts have directional bias, and their magnitude is sufficient 
to easily achieve statistical significance.”   
“The evidence shows unambiguously that the specific formulation of the 
issue – the one that mentions specific recipients of federal outlays – moves 
public opinion toward greater support for government spending.”  (2000, 
p. 758)   
“This study…demonstrates that framing effects are extremely powerful – 
probably more so than previously recognised.  All of the previous work on 
this topic has shown that differently-framed stimuli correspond to 
different kinds of responses, among different subsets of people. The 
findings reported above go far beyond this: Differing frames produce 
widespread changes in the ways that people respond to a single issue, with 
systematically lower support for government spending in the general 
presentation and greater support in the specific frame.”  (2000, p. 763)   
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If the addition of the social value criteria to the organ allocation policy can be 
framed in such a way that it highlights or gives examples of situations where 
specific people or groups might benefit rather than simply saying that society as a 
whole will benefit, then the research by Jacoby gives good reason to think that the 
public may be persuaded by the policy.  By framing the issue so that specific 
benefits of the policy are highlighted, rather than only the general benefits, those 
who may not have supported the inclusion of social value criteria may change 
their mind.  Whilst the overall aim of the addition of the social value criteria is to 
increase the welfare created with each transplant, by not framing the issue in the 
general terms of its partly utilitarian approach, but instead framing it to focus on 
the specific beneficial consequences to groups or individuals, then there is greater 
chance that the public will support the policy.  
“The ability to frame issues – that is, define the way that policy 
controversies will be presented to the public – is undoubtedly one of the 
most important “tools” that political elites have at their disposal [e.g. 
(Edelman, 1993; Rochefort and Cobb, 1994)].  Reliance on one issue frame 
rather than another does not, in itself, require any outlay of tangible 
resources.  However, it does influence the distribution of public responses 
to that issue (Schneider and Ingram, 1990).  Thus, issue framing as a 
political strategy involves minimal costs, and it has the potential to provide 
sizable benefits (Schön and Rein, 1994).”  (Jacoby, 2000, p. 751) 
Even though the aim of framing the social value organ allocation policy in a way 
that focuses on the specific rather than the general benefits would be to influence 
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the level of support that the public will give to the policy, it should not necessarily 
be thought of in negative terms as is often the case e.g. (Page and Shapiro, 1992).  
It might be seen as the overt manipulation of citizen preferences (Ginsberg, 1986), 
or as a reflection of the shallow, superficial quality of individual issue attitudes 
(Zaller, 1992), but this is not necessarily accurate.  Jacoby claims that his study 
shows that rather than manipulating the preferences of citizens, citizens react to 
the substantive content of issue appeals (Jacoby, 2000, p. 764).  In this way, 
“…political elites do the same thing that any other reasonable person would do: 
they provide their "audience" – the mass public – with the kind of information that 
supports their own preferred position.  They do not accomplish this by outright 
lies (at least, usually)…” (2000, p. 764).  Presenting an issue in such a way that it 
is likely to gain the most support is something that is a political inevitability, but 
also, it is the natural way in which facts would be presented.  If a policy is being 
introduced because it is thought that this is the best thing to do, and that it has 
benefit to offer, it is natural to present that policy by focusing on what benefits can 
be expected to occur from it.  Of course, different political parties, and individual 
politicians themselves, will not all present or frame issues in the same way; 
“…political leaders differentially interpret the causes, nature, and consequences of 
social problems, a process that is usually facilitated by the very complexity of the 
problems themselves.  This is the essence of the issue-framing process” (Jacoby, 
2000, p. 764). 
 
Conclusion 
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It has been shown in this chapter, that there are three main ways in which a person 
can be instrumentally valuable to society: their active social contributions, their 
value to proximate individuals, and the extent of their morality.  However, even 
though people are instrumentally valuable in these ways, actually incorporating 
these contributions when making a decision about someone’s overall value to 
society would be particularly difficult, time consuming, and expensive if done so 
in their entirety.  To provide a comprehensive assessment of the social value of a 
person, the considerations that would need to be taken into account within each 
of the categories would require intrusive and time-consuming investigations, the 
costs of which would be sure to outweigh the potential benefits that could be 
expected to be gained from such investigations.  Instead, limiting the extent to 
which the categories are included when making a social value decision about a 
patient to only those factors which can be easily assessed, through readily 
accessible information, means that such intrusive and time-consuming 
investigations are not necessary, and useful social value judgements can still be 
made. 
The category of effects on proximate individuals would need to be restricted to 
only taking into account a person’s immediate family rather than including their 
extended family and their friends.  This is due to the extensive investigation that 
would be needed to determine the exact nature of the relationship between the 
patient and proximate individual, and how they might be affected by the death of 
the patient.  Restricting the scope of this criterion to include only those proximate 
individuals who are most affected in general makes the task feasible whilst still 
yielding useful information.  
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Similarly, limiting the scope of the morality criterion, and in fact altering it to 
consider only a person’s active detrimental contributions prevents the subjective 
nature of morality from becoming part of what should be an objective system for 
making social value judgements.  By limiting the scope further to only consider a 
person’s criminal record, again, extensive investigations into a person’s life can be 
avoided, saving time, money, and personal intrusion, whilst still yielding useful 
information.  
It might appear that there is an element of “double counting” in the system if a 
person’s morality in the form of active detrimental contributions are taken into 
account as well as their social contributions discussed in the first category.  
However, the difference between the two categories is that one looks at the active 
positive contributions that a person makes, whilst the other looks at the active 
negative or detrimental contributions.  A person’s positive contributions may 
award them social value points, whereas the likelihood of them making future 
negative contributions may lower their social value score through minus points 
being given. 
When introducing the social value criterion to the organ allocation system, it will 
also be important to frame the issue in a positive light and attempt to reduce the 
amount of sensationalist reporting of the policy.  In doing so, there is more chance 
of the public being amenable to the system, and so more chance to achieve the aim 
of increasing the welfare created with each transplant,   
Now that the broad ways in which a person can be instrumentally valuable to 
society have been highlighted, I will give an outline of how the overall criteria and 
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patient selection process would function in practice.  I will make a suggestion for 
how a standardised system for determining patients’ instrumental value could 
work that has parallels with the points systems used in many countries for 
immigration.
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Chapter 7: Selection in practice 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will outline how the social value assessment will work in practice, 
describing how the decisions made by the experts about what the needs of society 
are can be incorporated into an assessment of a patient’s social value.  This final 
social value score will in turn guide the selection of which patient will be selected 
as an organ recipient.  
However, before moving on to discuss this, it is worth highlighting two issues that 
will affect the social value of a person dependent on their skills and attributes 
when coming to a final assessment.  Firstly, it is not just the amount of welfare 
from a contribution that needs to be taken into account when determining a 
person’s overall social value, but also how much detriment can be avoided by their 
continued life.  Secondly, how replaceable or irreplaceable a person is will also 
play a role in determining a person’s social value score. 
 
The distinction between value to society and 
detriment to society 
Tied to the idea of value to society, is the idea of detriment to society.  When trying 
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to determine the value of something to society, clues to its value may be given by 
looking at not just what it contributes, but also what the consequences might be if 
that thing did not exist. 
“Some might feel that in assessing a patient’s value to society one should 
ask not only who if permitted to continue living can make the greatest 
contribution to society in some creative or constructive way, but also who 
by dying would leave behind the greatest burden on society in assuming 
the discharge of their residual responsibilities.  Certainly the philosophical 
utilitarian would give equal weight to both these considerations.”  
(Rescher, 1969, p. 178) 
The positive effects of a contribution need to be considered when determining 
how valuable it is to society, but so too do the detrimental effects that might be 
caused by the loss of this contribution; both will influence the overall social value 
score of a person.  Part of a person's value to society lies in the fact that their 
continued life can avoid a level of harm occurring that would be caused by their 
death.  So it follows, that the lives of those people whose death would be more 
detrimental to society are more instrumentally socially valuable than the lives of 
those people whose death would be less detrimental. 
It must be noted however, that the death of those people who make the most 
valuable contributions to society will not necessarily have the most detrimental 
consequences.  There is a subtle but significant difference between the effect that 
a person's contributions, and the harm that might be caused by the lack of those 
contributions, plays in determining a person's overall value to society.  Just 
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because a person may make a significant active contribution, it does not mean that 
the loss of that contribution will be particularly harmful.  Perhaps the 
contribution, whilst valuable, is not especially necessary, or the contribution can 
be easily replaced.  For example, take the case of a celebrity from a popular TV 
show, and a top heart surgeon, both of whom have no family.  The minor celebrity 
may make a significant active contribution to society through the entertainment 
they provide and the revenue they help create, and the surgeon may make a 
significant active contribution through all the lives they save.  However, the level 
of harm that is caused by their deaths may be lower than the level of harm caused 
by the death of someone whose active contributions are less socially valuable.  The 
celebrity may make active contributions which are valuable in the sense that they 
generate revenue for the country and create happiness through entertainment for 
a proportion of the population, however the loss of this contribution through their 
death is not likely to cause significant harm to the wellbeing of their followers, or 
to wider society.  Their active contributions may have a higher level of value than 
a lot of other people’s active contributions, in part because of the number of lives 
they affect, but their contributions are not an important and necessary part of 
society.  They are in many ways, superficial, but moreover, replaceable.  People 
may be happy that the celebrity and their contributions are there, but not be 
overly disappointed when they are gone.  The government may welcome the 
revenue, but will gain revenue from the replacement celebrity, and the public may 
welcome the entertainment, but will quickly move on and appreciate the next TV 
show host.  A Google trends graph (Fig.2) for the frequency of searches for 
different celebrities shows how quickly public interest returns back to previous 
levels following peak searches at the time of a death, even for the most famous of 
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celebrities.   
“Extensive media coverage at the time of a celebrity’s death can create a spike of 
public interest, but over time as the publicity drops away so too does the nostalgia 
wave” (Matheson and Baade, 2004; Gunter, 2014, p. 107). 
 
Fig.2: Data Source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends). 
The surgeon’s death on the other hand, may also not be significantly detrimental, 
but for different reasons.  The surgeon’s active contributions are valuable and, 
perhaps more meaningful than those of the TV show host by way of saving lives, 
but the surgeon could be replaced relatively easily with another surgeon 
(provided they are not one of the only pioneers of a new technique) and so her 
death would have little detrimental effect.  Her active contributions (in a 
professional capacity at least) could be easily fulfilled by another surgeon.  This 
level of ir/replaceability of a person and their contributions affects their value to 
society. 
Note that, the fact that the deaths of the surgeon and the celebrity cause little 
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detriment, does not mean that their contributions only have a small value.  Both 
make significant contributions to society, but since they can be easily replaced, the 
detriment caused by their deaths is minimal.   The way in which a person’s 
ir/replaceability affects their social value is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Ir/replaceability and value to society 
Keeping with the case of the surgeon for now, if they were one of the only people 
skilled enough to perform a certain type of life-saving surgery, then their value to 
society would rise due to their rare skill set and the fact that those skills are 
important for the good of society.  If an important/necessary contribution is in 
short supply, then it must be protected to ensure that it is not lost.  However, it is 
not just the level of irreplaceability of a person's active contributions that will 
affect their overall value; the level of irreplaceability of a person’s passive 
contributions will also play a significant role.  Take the case of a stay-at-home 
mother of five; even though her active contributions may be low in terms of her 
economic and professional contributions, she still makes valuable passive 
contributions by virtue of the relationship to her family.59  She is of value to her 
children and family not just because of the active contributions she makes within 
their lives, but also because of who she is in relation to them personally.  If the 
mother died and another person came along and performed all the roles the 
                                                      
59 I am not claiming that all stay-at-home mothers make few active contributions; I simply use this 
in the example here to illustrate that even in cases where someone makes few active contributions, 
there are circumstances where the irreplaceability of a person’s passive contributions means the 
person can still be significantly valuable.   
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mother performed, the children would still have been harmed.  It is not the 
fulfilment of the parental duties alone that is of value to the children, it is the 
mother herself.  A person is irreplaceable in a way that a skill set is not.  In this 
way, the mother’s value to society increases within the category of effects on 
proximate individuals due to her irreplaceability.  A recluse surgeon on the other 
hand, whilst making valuable active social contributions would be significantly 
less socially valuable under the category of effects on proximate individuals.  The 
active contributions that the surgeon makes to her patients could be fulfilled by 
another surgeon without causing any detriment, and because the surgeon has no 
friends or family, there are no passive contributions to proximate individuals to 
consider.  Langford holds a similar view and says that the mother is irreplaceable 
in a way that a heart surgeon is not, except in rare circumstances (where the heart 
surgeon is the only person that can carry out a particular operation for example).  
He says that when considering the allocation of scarce medical resources, and the 
prognoses for A and B are similar, “then the consequences for other people of 
saving A instead of B can properly be considered provided there is no realistic 
substitute for A” (Langford, 1992, p. 14). 
However, simply because something is irreplaceable does not immediately make 
it more valuable to society; there does have to be some level of importance and 
benefit there to begin with.   If a standard surgeon was compared to the only 
person on earth who could juggle 15 balls, the juggler’s skills would still be less 
valuable to society than the surgeons if the juggler’s skills did not provide a 
significant amount of welfare for people.  The reason for this is that the detriment 
that might be caused to society by the loss of the juggler’s unique skill will be 
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minimal in relation to the detriment that might be caused by the loss of the 
surgeon's skill in saving lives, even if this skill set can be more readily replaced.  
There is a balance between the importance and irreplaceability of contributions 
that needs to be struck.  The more important/necessary a contribution is for the 
functioning of society, the more value it will gain depending on its level of 
irreplaceability.  If the necessity of the contribution is lower, the value added to it 
because of its irreplaceability will also be lower. 
 
Narrowing down or informed selection? 
When making the final selection as to which patient will be the organ recipient, as 
explained, medical criteria are the most important criteria to take into account 
before any non-medical criteria should be applied (a suggestion also made by 
other commentators) (Rescher, 1969; Leenen, 1982; Blagg, 1998, p. 236).  The 
reason for this is that it ensures those who are most in need of medical attention, 
and are suitable recipients for treatment, receive treatment first.  Furthermore, 
putting medical criteria before non-medical criteria reflects the importance of 
each person's intrinsic value.  Only once the medical criteria have been used to 
determine which patients are most in need, and are medically suitable recipients 
for an organ, should non-medical criteria be used to select just which patients will 
receive treatment.  The non-medical criteria, specifically relating to social value, 
will now be discussed with regards to how it should be applied when assessing a 
patient’s social value. 
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There are two ways in which the social value criteria could be used to determine 
which patients should receive scarce medical resources.  The first option is to use 
and apply the social value criteria in a linear manner as a means of narrowing 
down the number of possible recipients until only one remains.  The second option 
is to apply the criteria simultaneously, taking into account all of the contributions 
that a person makes, so that a fully informed selection can be made.  It is this latter 
option that is the preferred method. 
In the linear, narrowing down approach, the most important criteria would be 
applied to the possible recipients first, and if there are two or more patients with 
a comparable score/value, then the next level of criteria will be applied, and so on, 
until there remains only one patient.  Leenen makes such a suggestion in his article 
Selection of Patients, saying that criteria relating to the individual (namely medical 
criteria) should be applied first, then criteria based on the patient’s immediate 
relationships (proximate individuals) applied second, and finally, criteria based 
on social value (Leenen, 1982, p. 35).60 
The reason why he supports this linear approach is that he claims those criteria 
that are most amenable to objectivity should be applied first, and those less 
amenable to objectivity should only be used if there remain two or more patients 
after the application of each criterion.   
He suggests the criteria should be applied in this order:  
                                                      
60 Note that what Leenen calls “social value” is only a part of what I call social value. 
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A. Medical criteria  
B. Personal criteria directly relevant to the treatment 
C. Daily living conditions directly relevant to the treatment 
D. The patient’s importance for his immediate relations 
(1982, p. 35)  
He claims that applying the selection criteria in this way would uphold the 
principles of equality and human rights (1982, p. 36). 
The only non-medical social value criteria that he allows to be considered is that 
of the patient’s importance for his immediate relations.61  He says that age and 
social behaviour are not suitable criteria for the selection of patients, and grave 
objections are made against the use of a patient’s significance for society also.  He 
says age is not a suitable criterion because a person’s rights do not change with 
age, and so their right for treatment should not depend on their age.  Similarly, 
how suitable a person is for treatment changes depending on their age, but is not 
the same for all people of the same age, and so age limits as a criterion should not 
be used (1982, p. 34).  He also says that social behaviour is not suitable because 
judgements about the lifestyle of a person are strongly connected to subjective 
convictions and moral judgements, which differ within society, and so cannot be 
objectively assessed (1982, pp. 34–35).  He goes on to argue that the significance 
                                                      
61 This criterion would closely align with the “effects on proximate individuals” category that I 
suggest. 
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of the patient to society is also not suitable because the assessment of social value 
is subjective and cannot be objectively established, with political factors perhaps 
coming in to play, alongside discrimination, and economic criteria prevailing 
(1982, p. 35).  
He acknowledges the fact that some people might object that the criteria should 
be applied simultaneously rather than consecutively, and he says that, “However 
understandable this comment might be, it should be kept in mind that the 
principles of equality of opportunity and equal human rights are at stake” (1982, 
p. 36).  Despite his lack of detail on these principles, it is understandable that he 
should want to use objective criteria to select patients for treatment.  But applying 
the criteria in a consecutive, linear fashion, with the most objective criteria first, 
means that there is the potential for patients to miss out on receiving an organ 
despite making significant social contributions in categories that are perhaps only 
slightly less amenable to objectivity.   
In the case of Leenen’s suggestions, once the medical criteria have been taken into 
account, if there is more than one possible recipient for treatment left, the 
importance of the patient to their immediate relations is taken into account.  This 
essentially means that the patient chosen for treatment is the one with the biggest 
family or the strongest relationship, despite another patient making significant 
contributions elsewhere, e.g. filling gaps in the labour market, or making 
advancements in renewable energy that have the potential to solve the energy 
crisis.  Once the importance to the patient’s immediate relations criterion has been 
applied, he suggests that a random patient selection should made if there is still 
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more than one suitable patient for treatment (1982, p. 36).  He favours this 
approach over narrowing down the possible recipients any further through the 
application of other social value criteria, as he considers other social value criteria 
too hazardous. 
However, how can an approach such as the linear application of the criteria uphold 
equal opportunity and respect equal human rights if some patients are excluded 
from consideration for treatment based on the consideration of only one criterion 
(after the medical criteria)?  By applying the criteria in a linear fashion, patients 
who are not particularly valuable in the first criterion to be applied will not have 
an equal opportunity to access an organ despite them being valuable in other 
areas of their life.   
As shown in the last chapter, people are valuable to others, and to society, in a 
number of different ways.  Because people can make valuable social contributions 
in other categories, other social criteria need to be taken into account also.  If social 
value is going to be taken into account, all of the different ways in which a person 
can be valuable need to be considered when determining who should receive an 
organ.62  Someone may not make many contributions under a criterion that is 
highly objective, however, under another, slightly less objective criterion, they 
may make significant contributions.  Applying the criteria in a linear way here 
would mean that the person would miss out on the chance of receiving an organ 
despite still making significant social contributions.  Not only does this undermine 
the principle of equality with regards to accessing the organs for transplant, but it 
                                                      
62 Or at least as far as is practically possible. 
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also undermines the aim of the system: increasing the overall welfare created with 
each organ transplant.  Not only is it inequitable to make such a decision based on 
a single criterion, but to do so would undermine the aim of the system. 
By not taking into account the person as a whole, the value that they have in other 
areas of their life and the contributions they have to offer are ignored.  
Furthermore, the cumulative sum of these other, individually less valuable 
contributions might outweigh the single, more valuable contribution that would 
be applied first in a linear approach.  In this way, the aim of allocating the organ to 
the patient who is most valuable to society is undermined by instead allocating 
the organ to the patient who is most valuable to society on only one particular 
criterion, rather than to the patient who is most valuable on the whole to society. 
It is for this reason that the linear narrowing down approach is not suitable for 
patient selection when applying social value criteria given the potential for 
patients to miss out on an organ despite making valuable contributions in 
different categories.  Instead, applying the criteria in a non-linear, simultaneous 
fashion is preferable.  This would take into account all of the social contributions 
a person makes63, meaning that the total value of a person is taken into account 
rather than just how valuable they are in one aspect of their contributions to 
society.  This will allow an informed selection to be made about which patient 
should be the organ recipient based on their social value score.   
                                                      
63 At least, taking into account all of the contributions that can be objectively and practically 
assessed and incorporated into the selection criteria.  
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Reaching a final decision on a patient’s social 
value 
In this section, I will outline a suggestion for the way in which the societal needs 
determined to be of importance by the criteria selection committee should be 
accumulated, and how a final decision on a person’s social value rank can be 
decided by the patient selection committee.  I suggest that a points system similar 
to that which some countries use for immigration to determine who should be 
allowed to stay in their country, could be adapted and used to determine who is 
most valuable to a particular society.  Using a points system such as this will help 
to overcome the utility aggregation problems often associated with utilitarianism.  
In this setting, such objections relating to the utility aggregation may come in two 
forms: 1) questioning how the amount of welfare created through active 
contributions compares to the welfare created through passive contributions, and 
2) how can the amount of potential welfare created by each contribution be 
quantified? 
The answer to these questions can be found by splitting it into two parts and 
drawing partly upon a rule utilitarian approach.  With regards to a person’s 
passive contributions in the form of their value to their proximate individuals, as 
mentioned in the last chapter, it is a patient’s family members who are most 
affected by their death, and who can be practicably taken into consideration.  As 
such, in order to limit the amount of detriment that is caused by a patient’s death, 
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on the criterion of “effects on proximate individuals” it will be the patient with the 
largest number of immediate family members that will be given priority.  So rather 
than working out how much welfare will be created for each proximate individual, 
which indeed would be a difficult and perhaps impossible task, broad strokes can 
be made instead, that the death of those patients with more family members will 
create more detriment in the form of emotional distress than the death of those 
patients with fewer family members.  No doubt there will be cases in which a 
person’s smaller family will be caused more emotional distress due perhaps to a 
closer family relationship, however, for the most part, the rule will increase the 
amount of overall welfare whilst allowing it to be practically implemented.   
When it comes to the quantification of active contributions, a simple way of 
bridging the problem is to determine first what the needs of society are and their 
relative importance in creating a sustainable, functioning, and growing society, 
thereby creating a hierarchy of needs.  Points can then be assigned to each level of 
need on the hierarchy using expertise from fields such as economics and sociology.  
The corresponding number of points can then be allocated to patients based on 
which needs their contributions help to meet.  So again, rather than working out 
the amount of welfare that might be created for every person in society through 
an organ transplant to a particular individual and facing the classic utility 
aggregation problem, the problem is managed.  The task of increasing overall 
welfare is made achievable and manageable by looking at what needs should be 
met within society, which in turn will generally improve welfare, rather than 
working out exactly how much welfare will be created from each action. 
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However, a simple tally of the number of criteria a patient meets would be unfair, 
as well as undermining the aim of the system as a whole; a patient who possesses 
a few highly valuable skills and attributes may miss out on an organ to someone 
who possesses a handful of low value skills and attributes.  This would be unfair 
to the patient as the decision-making process would not have reflected their value 
accurately.  It would also undermine the aim of the policy in the first place by 
potentially allocating an organ to a patient who would not necessarily benefit 
society as much as another.  For this reason, a needs and criteria hierarchy is 
preferable.  
Each contribution that a patient makes will be given a score depending on the 
needs the contributions go towards meeting, and the place of that need on the 
hierarchy, with some contributions receiving negative scores if they cause harm 
to society.  These scores will be totalled to give an overall social value score that 
will determine where an individual will be placed on the waiting list (after medical 
considerations have been taken into account). 
The benefits of using such a system with set criteria and points is that, not only 
will it help the decision-making process stay methodical and ensure that the set 
criteria are adhered to, but it also means that the process can easily be made 
accessible to the public.  By having set criteria that the committee base their 
decisions on, it avoids ad-hoc decisions being made about patients’ social value, 
and patients can be made aware of the criteria that their social value rank has been 
determined by, and just who the people are that are making these decisions.  (The 
specific identities of the committee would need to stay anonymous both for their 
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own protection and to avoid bribery, but the credentials of the committee could 
be made available).  In this way, the objections of Sanders and Dukeminier in the 
case of the Seattle patient selection committee making their decisions as a “secret 
committee operating without explicit criteria” are avoided (Sanders and 
Dukeminier, 1967, p. 378). 
In the next section, I will outline in more detail how the patient selection process 
and the points system for assessing social value will work in practice. 
 
Parallels with the immigration points system 
Once the medical criteria have been applied to patients, so that the most urgent 
patients have been grouped, a practical way to determine which patient is the 
most socially valuable in this group would be to use a points system similar to that 
which is used in immigration decisions.  The immigration points systems outlined 
below serve only to illustrate how a social value points system could work, and 
that the points system framework could be adapted for the assessment of social 
value.  The immigration criteria are mainly economic in nature, and so the scope 
of the criteria would need to be more comprehensive, with the immigration tiers 
changed to reflect the 3 categories of social value contributions that encompass 
the ways in which a person can contribute to society, e.g. services offered that have 
little economic value but high social value, the effects on proximate individuals, 
and a person’s criminal offending risk.  The non-economic but socially valuable 
 320 
contributions will play more of a prominent role in the case of social value 
assessment for organ allocation than is the case for immigration assessment.  By 
doing so, a more complete social value assessment can be made than could be done 
by using the immigration criteria alone.   
The limitations of the analogy between the two systems, as well as their 
similarities and differences, will be outlined in the discussion below in order to 
help build a picture of some of the main features of the proposed points system. 
Many countries have an immigration points system whereby when a person 
applies for immigration, they gain points depending on their skills and 
contributions.  In the UK and Australia, the points systems are mainly based 
around professional and economic contributions (Department of Home Affairs, no 
date; UK Home Office, 2014; GOV.UK, 2015).    
At the heart of the Australian points system is the decision to grant immigration 
visas for applicants based on their personal attributes and ability to contribute to 
society - most significantly, through their occupational status (Department of 
Home Affairs, no date; BBC News, 2014b).  The UK adopts a similar approach to 
the Australian immigration model, with there being 5 different tiers under which 
an applicant can apply that directly relate to the (mainly economic) contributions 
they can make to society:64 
                                                      
64 Technically speaking, there are only 4 tiers as of 25 March 2013.  “When the UK's employment-
based immigration was split into five tiers, Tier 3 was envisaged as the Tier for unskilled migrants 
and intended to replace existing low-skilled immigration programmes.  However, by the time the 
five-tier points-based system came into operation in 2008, the UK government felt there was no 
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Tier 1:  'High-value migrants' from outside the EEA [European Economic 
Area] and covers entry of entrepreneurs, investors, and those very few 
people who come under the 'exceptional talent' visa. 
Tier 2:   'Skilled workers' from outside the EEA with a job offer in the UK.  
It includes skilled workers who are transferred to the UK by an 
international company, skilled workers where there is a proven shortage 
in the UK, ministers of religion and sportspeople. 
Tier 3:  Designed for low-skilled workers filling specific temporary labour 
shortages.  The Government has never allocated any visas under this 
scheme. 
Tier 4:  Students aged over 16 from outside the EEA who wish to study in 
the UK.  Applicants must have a place at a registered UK educational 
establishment before they can apply. 
Tier 5:  Contains six sub-tiers of temporary worker including creative and 
sporting, charity, religious workers, and the youth mobility scheme which 
enables about 55,000 young people every year to work in the UK on 
working holidays.  The visas are awarded to young people from countries 
that have reciprocal arrangements with the UK.   
                                                      
need for any unskilled immigration from outside the European Economic Area.  It was designed to 
replace schemes such as the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) and the Sectors Based 
Scheme (SBS) currently only available for Bulgarians and Romanians. 
Consequently, Tier 3 was never operational and on 25th March 2013, Prime Minister David 
Cameron announced that it was to be 'shut down completely'.”  (WorkPermit.com, 2015a) 
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(WorkPermit.com, 2015b) 
Under each of the tiers are criteria which, if satisfied, will award a different 
number of points, and if enough of the criteria are met and enough points earned, 
then an application can be made.  Depending on the tier and type of visa applied 
for, the criteria are different, but can include: 
• having at least either £50,000, £200,000, or £2,000,000 in investment 
funds 
• have been officially endorsed as having a genuine and credible business 
idea 
• be a recognised or emerging leader in the fields of science, humanities, 
engineering, medicine, digital technology, or the arts 
• knowledge of English language 
• having a recognised bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, or PhD  
• have a job offer in the UK with an appropriate salary (usually £30,000 per 
year, or the ‘appropriate rate’ for the job offered – whichever is higher) 
o There are some exceptions for lower pay, e.g. if you’ll work as a 
medical radiographer, nurse, paramedic or secondary school 
teacher in some subjects, or you’ll work as a pre-registration nurse 
or midwife. 
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• the amount of personal savings you have 
• whether you are carrying out charity work 
(UK Home Office, 2014; GOV.UK, 2015) 
The parallels between the immigration points system and the proposed social 
value assessment for potential organ recipients are mainly to do with the 
structure of the two systems, rather than the specific criteria (although, as I will 
demonstrate, the immigration criteria may be useful as a partial basis for the 
criteria in one part of the social value assessment).  When determining a score for 
the social value assessment, points would be given depending on what the needs 
of society are at a given time, and how far the person’s contributions go towards 
meeting these different needs; an approach also used in the immigration 
assessment.  For example, in the UK when applying for immigration, if you are 
trained or have an occupation that is on the occupational shortage list (UK Home 
Office, 2016), then you will receive more points than if you have a job that is not 
on the list.  The reason for this, is that by having a job that is in short supply, you 
are helping to meet one of the needs of society more so than if you had a job for 
which there was little demand.  This criterion could also be used when allocating 
points for the social value assessment, as in general, on this criterion, those people 
who work in a profession on the occupational shortage list are more valuable than 
those people whose profession is not on the list as they are helping to meet the 
country’s employment needs.  
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The benefit of using the immigration system as a partial template, especially for 
the first category of active positive social contributions, is that by using the tools 
that are already available in the system, such as the occupational shortage list, the 
process of assessing a person’s social value when making organ allocation 
decisions can be sped up.  
A further parallel between the two systems, or more precisely, an apparent 
parallel with a slight difference in operation, is that the 5-tiers for immigration are 
akin to the 3 main categories in the social value system.  In the UK, whilst the 5 
tiers for immigration are called tiers, they are not necessarily worth more than 
each other in terms of points, but rather you apply for an immigration visa under 
one of the 5 tiers depending on your circumstances, and then under each tier, 
there are criteria which you gain points for.  A different number of points are given 
depending on your level of skill and economic contributions, e.g. level of English 
language, settlement funds (money readily available), level of education, 
profession, prospective earnings (UK Visa Bureau, no date).   Similarly, under a 
social value points system, the 3 main categories in which a person can contribute 
to society may not necessarily be worth more than each other, but their 
differentiation helps to make the assessment of social value more manageable and 
methodical by allowing the assessment to take place in 3 parts, with points being 
given for the contributions made under each category.   
Even though there are 3 main categories of social contributions, the actual social 
value assessment is more analogous to the assessments made under a single tier 
of the immigration system, with the three categories corresponding to different 
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immigration criteria within a tier.  By using the criteria in each category, a final 
social value score can then be reached, with points given depending on the types 
of social contributions the person makes.  
Despite the parallels between the two systems in terms of the points-based 
approach, there are significant differences and limitations to the analogy with 
regards to their specific criteria, motivation, and operation.  Whilst both systems 
use a points-based approach, assigning points to set criteria designed to reflect 
social value, it is only the first category of the social value assessment (active 
positive social contributions) where the content of the criteria are similar to those 
for immigration.  For the other two categories of the social value criteria, it is 
mainly the points-based approach where the parallels lie.  For example, even 
though there is an element of criminal assessment in both the immigration system 
and the social value system, the way in which the assessments are carried out, as 
well as the motivation behind the assessments, differ.  And similarly, it is only the 
points-based approach where there is a parallel for the category of effects on 
proximate individuals.  These similarities and differences will be discussed in 
more detail below in relation to the different social value categories. 
Under the first category of active positive social contributions, most of the criteria 
used in the immigration points system currently in place in the UK could be drawn 
on as a basis for this category’s social value assessment.  The immigration points 
system itself is based on the value that a person can contribute to society, with the 
criteria mainly taking into account the profession of the person, and the 
prospective economic contributions that they are likely to make, both directly and 
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indirectly (as outlined on pages 321-323), and covers most of the contributions 
that would need to be assessed under this category (UK Home Office, 2014; 
GOV.UK, 2015; WorkPermit.com, 2015b).   
Even though these are factors that would need to be considered under the active 
positive contributions category, these immigration criteria are (nearly) all 
designed to ensure that priority is given to migrants who will benefit the economy.  
Under the social value assessment for potential organ recipients, a person’s other 
active social contributions would need to be included, and so there would be less 
of a focus on purely economic criteria.  Even under the active positive social 
contributions category, it is not just the economic contributions that a person 
makes that are important, as the aim of the social value assessment is to also 
capture the other beneficial social contributions that a person makes.  As such, 
included in the social value assessment of a person’s active positive social 
contributions will be their contributions to society in the form of services offered 
even if they provide little economic benefit.  Such non-economic contributions are 
present in the immigration criteria, such as whether you are carrying out charity 
work, or have a low paid job on the exceptions list, but they play only a small role 
and are peripheral to the broadly economic contributions in the immigration 
criteria.  Under the social value system, these non-economic, but socially valuable 
contributions would play more of a prominent role alongside economic 
contributions. 
However, even though the criteria present in the immigration system might be 
used in the social value assessment, some of the criteria are potentially 
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problematic even as predictors of economic utility, and as such, the criteria would 
need to be adapted and not simply copied from one system to the other.  For 
example, salary may be a poor indicator of the value of a person’s professional 
contribution even if it useful to assess their potential economic contributions.  
The second category in the social value assessment would be the effect on 
proximate individuals category, whereby the number of immediate family 
members that a person has will be taken into account, and potentially the age and 
relation of those family members.  Again, the non-economic contributions a 
person makes are playing more of a prominent role in the social value criteria than 
they do in the immigration criteria, with this criterion serving to minimise the 
distress caused to families by an individual’s death.  The analogy between the two 
systems holds less strong for this category, with the main parallel being only that 
a points system is used.  The criteria that exist in the immigration system do not 
cover the kind of value that would be assessed under the effect on proximate 
individuals category, but the points system itself is still a useful framework here.  
Points could be given to the patient for the number and type of immediate 
relations they have.  Depending on the ages of the relatives, and the nature of the 
kinship to the patient, the patient’s death will have a different effect, and so this 
should be reflected in the points given (Raphael, 1992).  For example, if a female 
patient had 3 children and a father, the patient may receive 7 points for the father 
and 10 points for each child, given that the loss of a mother to young children may 
cause more significant detriment than the loss of an adult to their older parent. 
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The third category of social contributions in the form of negative contributions 
covers only the criminal activity of the person due to the problems with using a 
morality criterion outlined earlier in the thesis.  Looking at a person’s criminal 
record and the likelihood of committing future criminal actions is also something 
that is included in the immigration process under the term good character in both 
the UK and Australian immigration systems.  In the Australian immigration 
system, indicators of the lack of good character are related to having a criminal 
record, and the likelihood of making future criminal actions, such as: 
• engaging in criminal conduct 
• harassing, molesting, intimidating or stalking another person 
• vilifying a segment of the Australian community 
• inciting discord in the Australian community or in a part of it 
• being a danger to the Australian community or a part of it. 
(Migration Act, 1958, sec. 501 (6)) 
The UK immigration system also takes into account whether the applicant is of 
good character by again, looking at the applicant’s criminal record, e.g. 
convictions, non-custodial sentences, suspected criminal activity, as well as the 
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applicant’s financial soundness, notoriety65, and whether they have been 
deceptive or dishonest (UK Home Office, 2017).  
Whilst the UK and Australia both look at the character and criminal record of the 
person, there are no points awarded or deducted from the application; a decision 
on the applicant’s eligibility is simply made depending on the risk the assessor 
deems the applicant to pose.  However, in the social value assessment for organ 
allocation, I suggest that points are deducted from the overall score depending on 
the likelihood of the person making active detrimental contributions in the future 
in the form of criminal activities.  A different number of points would be deducted 
from the overall score based on the severity and likelihood of criminal actions 
being committed.  For example, if there were two people convicted of armed 
robbery, but one had an 80% chance of reoffending and the other a 30% chance, 
everything else being equal, the person who poses the higher risk will have more 
points deducted from their social value score than the lower risk person.  With 
regard to the severity of the crime, a convicted murderer with an 80% chance of 
reoffending would have more points deducted from their social value score than 
a convicted burglar with an 80% chance of reoffending.  The more serious the 
                                                      
65 “The decision maker should note that the following matters should not normally, of themselves, 
be relevant to assessing good character: a. Divorce/separation, or other marital or domestic 
problems, b. Promiscuity or sexual preference within the law, c. Drinking or gambling, d. 
Eccentricity, including beliefs, appearance and lifestyle; or e. Unemployment/working habits/ 
other legitimate means of support.  However, where there is evidence that a person has – by the 
scale and persistence of their behaviour – made themselves notorious in their local or the wider 
community, consideration should be given to refusal.  In such circumstances, the decision maker 
may ask for an interview to help substantiate any information received, for example, from 
members of the public.   
The decision must be a reasonable one.  Therefore, the scale and level of behaviour need to reflect 
so poorly on a person’s character that the application should be refused.” (UK Home Office, 2017, 
p. 22) 
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crime, and the higher the chance of reoffending, the more points that will be 
deducted from the final social value score.   
Whilst both the immigration points system, and the social value points system, 
have an element where the risk of a person committing a crime needs to be 
assessed, there are differences between both the motivation and the execution of 
the assessment between the two systems.  The motivation and execution of the 
criminal risk assessment in the social value system uses the assessment as a 
prioritisation tool and utilises a gradation scale of risk, whereas the immigration 
system uses the assessment as an exclusion tool, making a single threshold 
judgement of risk. 
The motivation behind the criminal assessment in the immigration system is to 
ensure that those applicants who pose a criminal risk are not permitted entry.  For 
the social value system however, the criminal assessment is used to determine the 
social value score of a potential organ recipient.  The immigration system uses the 
criminal assessment to determine whether an applicant should be excluded from 
admission, whereas the social value system uses the criminal assessment simply 
as a prioritisation tool.  It is this difference in motivation that means that using a 
points system for the criminal assessment is more suitable than the exclusion 
approach used in the immigration system, as no matter the crime risk of a patient, 
they will never be excluded from the waiting list for an organ.   
The actual execution of the criminal assessment is also different in that for the 
social value system, where a specific number of points needs to be deducted based 
on specific criteria and parameters.  The immigration system on the other hand, 
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simply requires the immigration officer to make a decision as to whether they 
think the applicant poses enough of a criminal risk to deny them entry; an opinion 
that may differ from officer to officer.  Within the social value system, such 
variables need to be removed as far as possible, and so specific parameters with 
specific point deductions is preferable.66  However, there might be difficulty in 
making criminal assessments about the severity and likelihood of reoffending in 
the social value system.  When comparing two people where one of whom poses a 
low risk of reoffending for a serious crime, and the other poses a high risk of 
reoffending for a minor crime, there may be a difficulty in deciding which patient 
poses the most risk.  An algorithm would be able to work out an overall point score 
for both patients, but this score would be based on the parameters that we decide.  
The patient selection committee would need to make a decision about whether, if 
the organ allocation decision came down to this element of point deduction, it 
would be better to allocate the organ to the person with the low risk of committing 
a serious crime, or the person with the high risk of committing a minor crime.   
By combining the scores from the 3 social value categories, an overall score is 
reached that will reflect the social value of the patient.  When an organ becomes 
available for transplant, of the recipients that are a suitable match for the organ 
and are in the most urgent need group, the patient with the highest social value 
score would be selected as the organ recipient.  
 
                                                      
66 It might be better if such variables were also removed from the immigration decision, but such 
a discussion would be tangential here. 
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The need for both an algorithm and human input 
in patient selection 
In order to ensure the social value assessment is carried out in an efficient manner, 
an algorithm will be used which will allocate points to patients according to 
whether certain objectively assessable criteria are met.  However, there will also 
need to be human input into the patient selection.  There are two main reasons 
why it is necessary to have both an algorithm and an expert committee to make 
accurate social value judgements about possible organ recipients at this final 
stage.  The first is that the human element can help to verify the claims of the most 
urgent patients in those cases where the algorithm has given the same social value 
score to more than one patient, and the second is that it can help to assess those 
contributions that cannot be easily entered into the algorithm, such as the risk 
assessment for future criminal actions. 
 
Verification 
There may be cases where two or more patients are given the same social value 
score once all of their contributions have been assessed.  In these cases, it might 
be better to verify the claims and circumstances of the patient to ensure the social 
value score is accurate and that the most socially valuable patient receives the 
available and suitable organ, rather than simply opting to allocate the organ 
randomly to one of the similarly scored patients.   
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For example, a patient may have registered their profession as one of those on the 
occupational shortage list, which would mean that they would be given more 
points than if they were in a profession that was not on the list.  Whilst it is possible 
that the patient could have outright lied about their profession, it is more likely 
that they would embellish their professional contribution in order to qualify for 
more points.  By placing those who attempt to manipulate the system at the 
bottom of the waiting list as a deterrent, as outlined earlier in the thesis, outright 
lies about social contributions should be minimal.  However, the opportunity to 
exaggerate their social contributions may still be an option that patients pursue. 
A patient may claim and register their occupation as one of those on the 
occupational shortage list, when in fact they have only minimal experience or 
involvement with that specific occupation, with their actual profession simply 
being related.  For example, one profession on the occupational shortage list is 
project manager within the electricity transmission and distribution industry (UK 
Home Office, 2019).  A patient who works in this industry may list their occupation 
as project manager when they may only be a project assistant or supervisor who 
has been involved in some minor way with the management of a project.  By 
carrying out this kind of verification in situations where two or more patients have 
the same social value score, a more accurate social value assessment can be made, 
and a decision reached as to which patient should be the organ recipient.  If after 
the verification process, there are two or more patients with the same score and 
are equally suitable for the available organ, then a random allocation can be made.   
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One of the problems highlighted earlier with carrying out thorough investigations 
and verifications into patients’ circumstances is that it is time and resource 
intensive, and so the costs of the investigation would outweigh the expected 
benefits.  However, if the verification element is limited to only the tie-break 
circumstances at this final stage, the frequency of the investigations is likely to be 
low enough that the resource costs are minimal.  
 
Criminal Risk Assessment 
The second reason for the need of an expert committee to be used in conjunction 
with the algorithm is to assess those contributions that a person makes that 
cannot be easily quantified and entered into the algorithm.  The computer 
algorithm can help to speed up the assessment of a person’s social value by 
accounting for the contributions a person makes that can be given a concrete 
value, such as profession or the number of immediate family members.  However, 
not all of the components that go towards making up a person’s social value can 
be given points easily, and so this is where there needs to be a human element to 
the scoring process, drawing on the input of experts.  
For the likelihood of future detrimental contributions in the form of criminal 
activities, the history and the circumstances of the patient need to be taken into 
account, and these factors can’t be weighed up and assessed easily by an 
algorithm.  (It is perhaps for this reason why an immigration system also has a 
human element in the process to assess good character alongside the points 
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algorithm.)  There are tools used in the UK criminal justice system, such as the 
offender group reconviction scale (OGRS), to help assess the risk of a criminal 
reoffending using limited information (Copas and Marshall, 1998).  The main aim 
of the tool and the score that it generates, is to “provide background information 
for probation officers in their writing of pre-sentence reports, [with] these reports 
being designed to inform judges and magistrates when deciding what sentence 
might be appropriate for each individual offender” (Copas and Marshall, 1998, p. 
159).  This score however, is intended only as informal advice to probation officers 
and does not play any formal part in the judicial process.  In order to make an 
accurate assessment of the risk of reoffending, the probation officer will “form 
their judgement in the light of all the special circumstances of the case” (Copas and 
Marshall, 1998, p. 159).  It is these special circumstances which cannot be easily 
captured and entered into an algorithm which means that there needs to be a 
human element to the social value assessment as well as the algorithm. 
 
The algorithm and the human element will work together in coming to a final 
decision on the social value score of the patient.  The algorithm will do much of 
the leg work by assigning a score to the patient based on the concrete facts of the 
patient’s situation in much the same way that the immigration points system does.  
The human element of the process will then come into play by revising the points 
score based on the variables and nuances that can be better captured by a human.  
In this way, the process of determining a social value score for a person can be 
 336 
done in a way that isn’t prohibitively time intensive; the human element only has 
to contribute to a part of the decision process rather than from beginning to end. 
 
Final overview 
It has now been shown how the patient selection process would function and how 
the patient selection committee would assess a patient’s social value.  To help 
make the whole process clear, I will give a final overview of the complete criteria 
and patient selection process. 
Patients will first be ordered based on their medical suitability for the available 
organ, and then any medically suitable patients who will die before the next 
suitable organ is likely to become available, will be classed as being in the most 
urgent need.  If there is more than one patient in this most urgent group, then the 
social value criteria will be applied in order to make a tie-break decision as to who 
should be the organ recipient. 
The criteria selection committee would decide what the specific basic needs of 
society are, and create a hierarchy based on how urgently they should be fulfilled, 
using indicators of function to make this assessment.  Each need will be given 
points depending on its place on the hierarchy. The patient would be judged on 
the 3 main categories of contributions: active positive social contributions, 
number of proximate individuals, and active negative social contributions.   
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Under the active positive contribution category, each contribution that a patient 
makes will be given a corresponding number of points depending on which need 
(as determined by the criteria selection committee) that contribution goes 
towards meeting.  Under the active positive contributions category, a person will 
be given points for factors such as their profession and economic contributions.  
Under the proximate individuals category, they will be given a number of points 
for each immediate family member that they have, with more points being given 
for dependents, and varying depending on the nature of the dependency and the 
age of the dependent.  Under the active negative contributions category, points 
will be deducted from the social value score depending on the likelihood of a 
person committing future criminal actions and the seriousness of those actions, 
based on their past criminal record. 
The total number of points will be calculated by entering the data into a database 
which an algorithm can use to generate a total point score.  The patient selection 
committee will assess any patient contributions that can’t be captured effectively 
by the database and algorithm, and add their scores to the generated score.  Out 
of the most medically urgent patients that are suitable for the available organ, the 
patient with the highest social value score will be selected to receive the organ. 
 
Conclusion 
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It has now been shown just how a final decision on who would be selected as the 
organ recipient for a transplant could be made under an organ allocation system 
that included a social value criterion.  The criteria for selection would be organised 
in a similar way to that of the immigration points system, whereby points are 
given to a patient depending upon which criteria they match, and in the case of the 
social value criterion for organ allocation, the contributions they make to society.  
When considering the contributions the person makes, their level of 
ir/replaceability also needs to be taken into account.  Even if someone makes a 
valuable contribution to society, that contribution might be easily fulfilled by 
someone else, making the death of the person less detrimental than the death of 
someone who is more irreplaceable. 
It has also been shown that when reaching a decision on a social value score for a 
patient, rather than applying the social value criteria in a linear fashion in order 
to narrow down the patient selection, all of the criteria should be applied 
simultaneously in order to make an informed selection.  By taking into account all 
of the criteria, it ensures that an accurate representation of the social value of the 
patient is achieved rather than simply a reflection of how valuable a patient is to 
society from only one aspect.  In this way, it can be assured that the organ is 
allocated to the patient who will create the most welfare for society.     
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Conclusion 
There has never been enough of a supply of transplantable organs to meet the 
demand, and so there has been a continual focus on improving the ways in which 
organs are allocated to patients in order to increase the effectiveness of each organ 
transplant.  There have been many factors incorporated into organ allocation 
criteria over time which have helped to ensure that each transplant is effective, 
not only in terms of a successful graft, but also in terms of cost effectiveness and 
longevity of the transplant.  Blood matching, tissue type matching, and time 
between removal and transplantation of the organ, are all factors that help to 
ensure that there is a successful graft, and that the organ remains functioning in 
the recipient as long as possible (NHSBT, 2011).  In the US, other factors have also 
been suggested, such as matching patients to organs based on the expected 
remaining life years left in both the patient and the organ (Mccullough and 
Schaubel, 2008; Stegall and Stegall, 2009).  The aim here is to not transplant an 
organ with 10 years of function left in it to a patient with only 5 years left to live 
even following transplant, when there is another possible recipient who has at 
least 10 years left to live.  Improvements in the way organs are allocated are 
continually being developed and implemented, e.g. the current ATTOM  study that 
aims to “improve equity of access to kidney and kidney–pancreas transplantation 
across the UK and to optimise organ allocation to maximise the benefit and cost-
effectiveness of transplantation” (Oniscu et al., 2016, p. 1).  This thesis continues 
this trend of improving the allocation of organs by suggesting ways in which non-
medical criteria can be included in organ allocation decisions, further improving 
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the non-medical benefits of organ transplantation through better recipient 
selection. 
The main point that I have argued for in this thesis is that there should be the small 
addition of an extra criterion to the current organ allocation system in order that 
better use can be made of organs for transplant.  And by better use, I mean 
increasing the overall welfare created with each transplant.  The extra criterion 
that I have argued for is a social value criterion that takes into account how 
instrumentally valuable a person is to society.  Whilst other commentators have 
also raised the possibility of the inclusion of social value considerations into scarce 
resource allocation decisions, their attempts at justifying the inclusion have been 
relatively brief.  They have not given enough detail to provide an adequate 
overview and justification for how such an inclusion would work, or have 
suggested a type of social value that is ethically unacceptable.  In this thesis I have 
provided a more thorough discussion of how a social value criterion could be 
included in scarce resource allocation decisions, specifically organ allocation 
decisions, and shown that such a criterion can be both ethically and practically 
implemented.   
Arguing for such a position has been largely abandoned in recent literature, and 
the reasons for this are understandable; the position has many negative 
associations and problems.  Making judgments about a person’s social value is 
associated with subjective prejudices and opinions, and when using these 
judgments to make patient selection decisions for healthcare treatments, the 
immediate thought is that certain groups of people may be excluded from 
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treatment, whilst other groups are given universal priority.  It might even be 
argued that there are similarities between such a proposal, and those of other 
potentially inglorious proposals such as eugenics, forced sterilisation, and 
euthanasia.  Arguing for the inclusion of social value judgments into healthcare 
provision might be seen as futile, or at the very least, prohibitively problematic, 
given that it has so many negative associations and facets that need to be covered.  
However, there are still positive elements to the inclusion of social value 
considerations in resource allocation, and I have attempted to provide an outline 
and justification for how this inclusion could be made whilst maintaining other 
important values such as equality and objectivity.   
Whilst the underlying argument for the inclusion of social value considerations 
into organ allocation decisions comes from a consequentialist background, the 
argument itself may appeal to proponents of other moral theories.  The aim of the 
proposal is not necessarily to maximise the welfare created with each organ 
transplant, but rather to simply increase the amount of welfare that can be created 
whilst maintaining equality, and equal opportunity to benefit from a resource.  
Attempting to maximise welfare might involve committing some intuitively 
immoral actions that will not be acceptable to many people, but simply increasing 
welfare when it involves little or no detriment is something that most people 
would agree with.  It is upon this principle that the argument for the inclusion of 
social value considerations in organ allocation decisions is made.  If more welfare 
can be created through a certain action than is currently the case, and there is little 
or no detriment created through the action, then it would be foolish not to carry 
out that action. 
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I have shown that including non-medical criteria into the organ allocation process 
in the form of instrumental social value judgments can be ethically acceptable if 
implemented in the right way, with such judgments being as objective as possible.  
In order to maintain the objectivity of these judgements, the scope of the criteria 
that make up the overall social value judgment needs to be limited.  The subjective 
elements of the criteria need to be removed as far as is possible, whilst still 
retaining the criteria’s effectiveness at accurately reflecting the patient’s social 
value.  If the subjective elements remained present in the decision, potential organ 
recipients may miss out on the chance of an organ based on the values of the 
selection committee, as was the case at the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center in the 
1960’s (Alexander, 1962).  I have also shown that limits to the extent of the criteria 
included when making these social value judgments need to be in place for 
practical reasons.  To take into account each and every aspect of the possible 
criteria within the different contribution categories would require intrusive and 
lengthy investigations into each patient’s life, making reaching a social value 
decision in a timely fashion a near impossibility.  With a more limited scope for 
the criteria that are taken into account however, the task becomes more 
manageable and practical for implementation, without sacrificing the usefulness 
of the judgment.  
I began by explaining in Chapter 1, how organs for transplant are currently 
allocated, and the reasons behind how patients are prioritised.  The main principle 
for organ allocation is that those patients who are medically suitable and in most 
urgent need, are prioritised for treatment.  And where there are two patients who 
are of similar need and prognosis, it is often the patient who has been on the 
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waiting list the longest who receives priority. 
In Chapter 2, I then went on to highlight the problems with the current organ 
allocation system.  The main problem is that it focuses too much on the effects and 
welfare for the individual patient from the allocation of an organ, and not enough 
on the effects and welfare for the wider society.  Concern for the wider effects is 
something that should be factored into the allocation system given that the organs 
are a social resource, and it is society who is making an investment of the organ in 
the recipient. 
“In “choosing to save” one life rather than another, “the society,” through 
the mediation of the particular medical institution in question – which 
should certainly look upon itself as a trustee for the social interest – is 
clearly warranted in considering the likely pattern of future services to be 
rendered by the patient (adequate recovery assumed), considering his age, 
talent, training, and past record of performance.  In its allocations of ELT 
[exotic lifesaving therapy], society “invests” a scarce resource in one 
person as against another and is thus entitled to look to the probable 
prospective “return” on its investment.”  (Rescher, 1969, p. 178) 
Furthermore, the current allocation system already has a strong element of utility 
promotion within it, and if further utility can be acceptably created with a slight 
change and addition to the current system, with little, if any, detriment created, it 
would make no sense not to. 
There are also two further problems with the current system in that the definition 
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of urgency needs to be redefined, and in turn, the waiting time criterion needs to 
be replaced.  Allocating organs to those patients who are in most urgent need is 
an acceptable method of distribution as, in theory, the patient in most urgent need 
can be saved who would otherwise soon die without a transplant, and further 
organs may become available to save the life of the next urgent patient on the 
waiting list.  However, in reality, there is a shortage of organs for transplant, and 
so patients who are classed as less urgent die whilst waiting for the next organ to 
become available.  Whilst they may be less urgent in medical terms as they are 
likely to live for a longer period, in real terms, all patients who are likely to die 
before another suitable organ becomes available are of the same urgency.  All face 
the same fate given that another organ is not likely to become available to save 
them.  As such, I suggested that the most urgent class of patients should be those 
patients who will die before the next suitable organ is likely to become available.  
This leads on to the next problem with the system in that the waiting time criterion 
used to decide between patients of the same urgency needs to be replaced as it 
can be unfair to certain patients.  Allocating resources on a first-come, first-served 
basis can be acceptable in some situations, but only when those interested parties 
all have the option to claim the resource from the same date, and are aware of the 
option.  However, in the case of organ transplants, people who are in urgent need 
of a transplant may have been registered on the waiting list for a shorter or longer 
time than someone else on the waiting list through no fault of their own.  Two 
patients who are at the same level of urgency may have been registered on the 
waiting list at different times due to one patient’s illness presenting early and 
progressing slowly, and another patient’s illness presenting later but progressing 
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faster.  It is unfair to use waiting time as a criterion here given that the two patients 
did not have the opportunity to register on the waiting list at the same time, as one 
patient did not even have their illness at the same time as the other.  As such, the 
waiting time criterion needs to be replaced by another method of deciding 
between patients of similar urgency. 
I then went on to discuss other possible systems for resource allocation and 
whether they could offer more suitable alternatives in the organ allocation setting 
to the prioritarian approach currently in place.  It was shown that if the alternative 
allocation systems are based solely on their main features, e.g. random selection, 
fair-innings, save the most lives, social value etc. then they do not provide a 
suitable alternative to a prioritarian approach for organ allocation.  However, 
when combined with the prioritarian approach, so that the main feature of the 
alternative system is applied to the cohort of patients who are in most urgent need 
of treatment, then they do provide acceptable alternatives, but it is only the social 
value/needs-based combination system that offers any real benefit over these 
alternatives.  The addition of the social value criterion enables the organ allocation 
system to take into account the effects of each organ transplant on the wider 
society and allocate the organ so that not only does the transplant benefit the 
recipient, but also wider society.  It also provides a suitable replacement for the 
waiting time criterion, so that, out of the most urgent group of patients, the patient 
who is the most socially valuable will be selected as the organ recipient. 
I then went on to outline in Chapter 3 how the inclusion of a social value criterion 
into organ allocation decisions could work as a replacement for the waiting time 
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criterion.  I also argued that the inclusion of a social value criterion in organ 
allocation decisions is acceptable, and perhaps even required, based on the role of 
the government to do what is not only in the best interests of individual members 
of society, but also society as a whole.  Of course, the inclusion of social value 
considerations into such resource allocation decisions is highly problematic not 
just in principle, but also for practical reasons. 
To highlight the problems that might be encountered when including a social 
value judgment about a patient in resource allocation decisions, I gave an 
overview in Chapter 4 of a version of this combination system that was used in the 
allocation of trial dialysis treatment in the 1960’s at the Seattle Artificial Kidney 
Center.  The way in which the system functioned here meant that any social value 
judgments made were highly subjective.  The problem arose from the fact that the 
committee used to select which patient would receive the organ was a lay 
committee and based their social value judgments about the patient on their own 
personal, and often biased views.  They had no expertise to assess instrumental 
social value, and as such, could not objectively make instrumental social value 
judgments. 
The opinions of a patient selection committee being taken into account when 
making social value judgments on possible recipients is not in itself a bad thing, 
and is indeed something that actually needs to happen to achieve the aims of the 
system.  However, as explained in Chapter 5, the opinions need to come from 
experts from the relevant fields who have the knowledge and expertise to make 
objective decisions about the relative social value of patients.  As such, these 
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experts should make up the patient selection committee, and the same applies to 
the criteria selection committee.  The views of a lay committee are not informed 
enough to be able to determine what the needs of society are and their relative 
importance at any given time, and so are not entirely suitable members for the 
selection committees.  The expert criteria selection committee, or possibly 
working group, would have a more detailed knowledge of the basic needs of 
society, and be able to create a hierarchy based on the needs of society at different 
times.  Similarly, lay members would not be as informed as experts in the fields of 
psychology and behavioural economics to know which patients might best meet 
the needs of society for the patient selection committee.  If social value 
considerations were to be included in organ allocation decisions, an expert 
committee from the relevant fields would need to play a large part in both the 
criteria selection and patient selection decisions in order to maintain an objective 
system, and to ensure that patients are not disadvantaged based on the biased and 
subjective views. 
Objective decisions would need to be made about the overall social value of a 
patient based on the ways in which they are valuable to society, by considering 
both their positive and negative active social contributions, and their passive 
contributions by way of their value to proximate individuals.  These different ways 
in which a person can be valuable to society were described in Chapter 6.  The 
three broad categories in which a person can be instrumentally valuable to society 
are through their positive active social contributions, their passive contributions 
through their value to proximate individuals, and through their morality.  
However, in order to maintain objectivity and practicality when making the social 
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value judgment, the scope of the investigation into the extent that a patient is 
valuable in each of these categories needs to be limited.  A person’s value to their 
proximate individuals needs to be limited to the number of immediate family 
members for practical reasons, and the morality category needs to be replaced by 
a less subjective criterion, but one that still accounts for a person’s detrimental 
contributions.  A person’s criminal record and the likelihood of future negative 
active social contributions being made is a suitable alternative that captures at 
least part of the essence behind the morality criterion.  This also has the appeal 
from a practical perspective, as a person’s criminal record is easily accessible.  
Reducing the scope of the criteria means that the system can be introduced with 
minimal cost, as the information needed is, for the most part, readily available.  
Lengthy and intrusive investigations are not required, reducing the amount of 
time and money required when introducing the criteria, whilst maintaining its 
usefulness in making an objective social value judgment.     
In Chapter 7, I outlined how the final decision on who would be selected as the 
organ recipient would be made if a social value criterion were included in the 
organ allocation process.  I suggested that the criteria for determining a patient’s 
social value should be applied in a simultaneous manner rather than linearly.  By 
applying the criteria simultaneously, it allows an informed selection to be made 
about which patient is most socially valuable.  In this way, the complete social 
value of the patient is taken into account.  If the criteria were applied linearly, one 
at a time, narrowing down the potential recipients until only one remained, the 
aim of the system would be undermined, and patients may be judged on only one 
or two contributions. 
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I then went on to describe how points would be allocated to patients based on the 
contributions that they make.  I drew parallels with the immigration points system 
as, even though the criteria differ, the structure provides a useful framework.  This 
parallel also shows that a points system is able to reflect social contributions, as 
the immigration points system is itself based on social contributions.67 
Also outlined in Chapter 7 was the need for both a points algorithm and a patient 
selection committee.  The points algorithm will help to make the patient selection 
process quicker by calculating the patient contributions than can be easily 
measured and quantified, such as the type and number of immediate family 
members, and a person’s profession and economic contributions.  The human 
element in the form of the patient selection committee is also needed however, to 
assess those contributions that cannot be easily entered into an algorithm. 
If a social value criterion is introduced to the current system in the way outlined 
in this thesis, then better use of the organs available for transplant can be made; 
the overall welfare that occurs from each organ transplant will be increased with 
little detriment created.  Those who are most in need of an organ (and who are 
medically suitable) will still receive priority for treatment, but instead of using 
waiting time to decide which of the most urgent patients should receive the organ, 
the social value criterion would be used.  In this way, not only will the individual 
organ recipient benefit, but so too will wider society.   
                                                      
67 However, the social contributions included in the immigration points system are mainly 
economic in nature.  
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It might be questioned whether it is even possible for judgments to be made about 
what the needs of society are, and which patients might be best placed to help 
meet these needs.  Making these kinds of assessments naturally involves 
predictions about future circumstances, which inherently involve a level of 
uncertainty.  Whilst decisions over future circumstances will always involve 
uncertainty, this is not necessarily a reason to refrain from making the decision.  
Treatment decisions are made based on a patient's prognosis, but it is not 
guaranteed that the patient will benefit as expected (and they frequently don’t).  
Nonetheless, these kinds of decisions are routinely and justifiably made.  If 
relevant information and evidence is relied upon for making these decisions, an 
informed decision can be made.  With the case of the experts on the criteria and 
patient selection committees discussed in this thesis, there is evidence within 
their fields that can be drawn upon to make their informed decisions even in the 
face of uncertainty.  For example, psychologists can draw upon studies and 
research into the re-offence rate of people from different backgrounds and in 
different situations in order to gain an idea about the likelihood of a person 
committing future crimes through prevalent trends, and economists can 
determine which occupations are in short supply and will need more investment.  
Even though there is uncertainty around what future circumstances may arise and 
contributions that may be made, reasonable and justifiable predictions can be 
drawn from the evidence available.  
There are other problems that would still need to be resolved before such a system 
could be put into place, not least of which is the development of an actual 
algorithm for determining social value, and a decision on how many points should 
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be given for different social contributions based on the current needs of society.  
However, the development of these features should be the topic of another project.  
Such a task would be a job for the experts that I have described given that they 
have the relevant knowledge and expertise to make these decisions.  The objective 
in this thesis was to simply assess whether there could be a place for social value 
judgments in organ allocation decisions from an ethical perspective, and to make 
a suggestion about how they could be implemented from a practical perspective, 
providing a possible framework for how an organ allocation system including 
social value considerations could work. 
A further problem that would need to be resolved in a separate project is related 
to public opinion.  It would need to be determined how acceptable the 
introduction of a social value criterion into organ allocation decisions would be in 
the eyes of the public.  If its introduction did not carry public favour, then it is 
entirely possible that the public will refuse to donate their organs, thereby 
creating more detriment overall due to exacerbating the shortfall in 
transplantable organs.  Again however, this is a job for someone in a field such as 
sociology and would be a research project in itself.  It might even be beneficial to 
look at possible marketing options to determine whether the system might gain 
more public favour when presented in a particular way.  
The aim here in this thesis however was to present a positive case for the inclusion 
of social value criteria into organ allocation decisions and to present a possible 
option for policy change.  I have gone further than previous commentators by 
providing a more thorough examination of the issue in order to provide a stronger 
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case for the inclusion of social value criteria, rather than simply giving a brief 
overview of the issue.  Furthermore, I have provided a possible framework for 
how the addition of a social value criterion could be implemented into an organ 
allocation system in order to show that it could be practicably incorporated into 
patient selection decisions.  Hopefully it may raise discussion amongst policy 
makers about rekindling this abandoned approach to resource allocation, but in a 
different form than it has been implemented in the past, with the further projects 
mentioned providing the next step forward.   
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